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International trade continues to be a relevant and contentious topic. While
various agreements have substantially reduced the tari↵s applied on most traded
goods, trade is still burdened by restrictive laws, policies, and regulations. As
a result, policymakers have shifted their focus to non-tari↵ instruments which
may potentially block market access and act as barriers to trade. One such
example is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) e↵orts to
harmonize and reduce non-tari↵ measures (NTMs), and eliminate non-tari↵
barriers (NTBs). Nevertheless, NTMs have not only continued to persist in the
region, but the incidence of NTMs has even increased in recent decades.
This thesis examines the persistence of NTMs in the ASEAN region. Section 1
of this introductory chapter begins with a brief overview of NTMs, the ASEAN
e↵orts relating to NTMs, and the NTM regimes of the Member States. Sections
2 and 3 outline the research questions, and the methodologies used in answering




NTMs are laws, regulations, and other policy instruments which can a↵ect the
quantities and/or prices of internationally traded goods.1 As such, this term
encompasses a broad range of instruments, from price2 and quantity3 measures
to standards and quality requirements. NTMs become NTBs when they (i) are
1. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Non-Tari↵ Measures to Trade:
Economic and Policy Issues for Developing Countries (Geneva: United Nations, 2013), 2.
2. Such as anti-dumping measures and subsidies.
3. Such as quotas and tari↵-rate quotas.
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used to discriminate against foreign firms, (ii) have protectionist purposes, or
(iii) are improperly or unjustifiably applied.4 In other words, NTBs are NTMs
that “are protectionist either by intent or e↵ect.”5
This definition of NTBs recognizes the fact that NTMs are generally issued to
address market failures. For example, measures such as limits on pesticide lev-
els in food products, and carbon dioxide emissions standards for vehicles, aim
to address externalities. Nevertheless, even NTMs with ostensibly legitimate
justifications may have protectionist motivations or e↵ects. Notably, quality
standards6 are potentially burdensome for developing countries, as the latter
may lack the required infrastructure and resources to comply with require-
ments. These measures may substantially raise production and trade costs,
such as when the requirements exceed generally accepted norms and standards.
Exporters may also need to bear significant information costs when importing
countries have di↵erent NTM regimes in place. Consequently, NTMs have the
potential to adversely a↵ect trade flows.
1.1.2 ASEAN Initiatives on Non-Tari↵ Measures
With the signing of the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, ASEAN was formed by
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darus-
salam joined in 1984. By 1999, ASEAN’s membership had expanded to 10, with
the addition of Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), Myan-
mar and Vietnam. Ostensibly, the goal was to “accelerate economic growth,
social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors
in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation
for a prosperous and peaceful community.”7 The primary focus, however, was
on political-security objectives, and economic matters took a backseat.
4. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Non-Tari↵ Measures to Trade:
Economic and Policy Issues for Developing Countries, 2.
5. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Trade and
Non-Tari↵ Measures: Impacts in the Asia-Pacific Region (Bangkok, Thailand: United Na-
tions, 2015), 11.
6. Such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade
(TBTs). SPS measures aim to protect the public’s well-being by preventing the spread
of diseases, pestsand contaminants. TBTs refer to a broad range of measures, including
labeling requirements, which aim to ensure safety and quality, and promote other non-trade
objectives.United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Non-Tari↵ Measures to
Trade: Economic and Policy Issues for Developing Countries, 33
7. Article I, Bangkok Declaration.
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The earliest e↵orts to address NTMs date back to 1977. Under the Agreement
on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements, the Member States8 pledged to
liberalize NTMs on a preferential basis. In 1987, the Member States9 signed the
Memorandum of Understanding on the Standstill and Rollback on NTBs among
ASEAN Countries. This Memorandum contained the dual commitments (i) not
to introduce new or additional NTMs which would impede intra-regional trade,
and (ii) to remove any NTMs which impede intra-regional trade. It was not
until 1992 that definite schedules for the elimination of NTBs were set under
the Agreement on the Common E↵ective Preferential Tari↵ (CEPT) Scheme
for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA):
“1. Member States shall eliminate all quantitative restrictions in respect of
products under the CEPT Scheme upon the enjoyment of the concessions
applicable to those products.
2. Member States shall eliminate other non-tari↵ barriers on a gradual
basis within a period of five years after the enjoyment of concessions ap-
plicable to those products.”10
However, due to a lack of specific implementing plans, the Member States failed
to comply with these commitments.11
In 2003, the Member States agreed to establish an ASEAN Community by
2020. This Community would be a deeper form of integration than that of
a free trade area, and would be built on 3 pillars: (i) the ASEAN Political-
Security Community; (ii) the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community; and (iii) the
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).12
The AEC Blueprint, which contains the commitments and Strategic Sched-
ule for the establishment of the AEC, was adopted in 2007. The aim was to
transform the region into a single market and production base characterized
by, among other things, the free flow of goods. In order to do so, the Mem-
ber States committed to, among others: remove all NTBs by 2015; enhance the
8. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
9. The founding members, including Brunei Darussalam.
10. Agreement on the Common E↵ective Preferential Tari↵ Scheme.
11. Myrna S. Austria, “Non-Tari↵ Barriers: A Challenge to Achieving the ASEAN Economic
Community,” in The ASEAN Economic Community: A Work in Progress, ed. Sanchita Basu
Das et al. (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013), 36.
12. Rodolfo C. Severino and Jayant Menon, “Overview,” chap. 1 in The ASEAN Economic
Community: A work in progress, ed. Sanchita Basu Das et al. (Singapore: Institute of South-
east Asian Studies, 2013), 5.
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
transparency of NTMs; simplify, harmonize, and standardize trade and customs
processes and procedures; establish the ASEAN Trade Repository; harmonize
standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessment procedures with in-
ternational practices; and develop mutual recognition agreements on conformity
assessment for specific sectors.13 These commitments were supplemented by the
ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), which was signed in 2010. This
treaty contained additional trade facilitation measures, and emphasized the
commitments regarding the removal of NTBs and the harmonization of NTMs.
Originally scheduled for 2020, the AEC’s launch was brought forward to 2015.
In November 2015, however, ASEAN recognized its failure to fulfill the NTM-
related commitments. For example, the ASEAN Trade Repository was still
under construction, and e↵orts to remove NTBs were still ongoing. As Figure
1.1 below shows, the number of NTMs has even increased in the region.
Figure 1.1: NTMs in Force in ASEAN,2000 to 201514.
Nevertheless, ASEAN remained committed to its goal of economic integration.
That being so, ASEAN adopted the AEC Blueprint 2025 as the successor to
the AEC Blueprint. The aim was to complete those actions that had remained
unfinished under the previous Blueprint, namely the elimination of NTBs, the
13. ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, Jakarta, 2008.
14. Adapted from Lili Yan Ing et al., “Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN: A Simple Proposal,”
in Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN, ed. Lili Yan Ing, Santiago Fernandez de Cordoba, and
Olivier Cadot (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN, 2016), 22, http : / / asean . i -
tip.org.
1.1. Motivation 5
convergence of Member States’ trade facilitation regimes, and the harmonization
of standards and technical regulations.15
Given the region’s track record vis-à-vis its NTM-related commitments, how-
ever, doubts remain as to its ability to achieve the aforementioned goals. The
problems may well lie with the underlying instruments themselves, i.e. the
AEC Blueprint and ATIGA. The instruments’ ine↵ectiveness may be rooted in
drafting issues, such as the lack of specificity of stated commitments and obli-
gations.16 Alternatively, the region’s policymakers may have focused on general
aims without regard for the Member States’ economic and political contexts.17
Domestic factors may hinder the Member States’ compliance with their regional
commitments.
1.1.3 ASEAN Member States and Non-Tari↵ Measures
NTM regimes are, by their nature, broad and complex. By definition, any in-
strument can be considered an NTM as long as it can a↵ect the prices and/or
quantities of traded goods. As an exhaustive discussion of the Member States’
NTM regimes would be unduly long and complex, this sub-section merely out-
lines their basic features.
Legislation can be in the form of statutes or subsidiary legislation, such as rules,
regulations, memoranda, proclamations, and other ministerial or administrative
issuances. Statutes provide for the general policies and objectives underlying
the measure, while subsidiary legislation fleshes out the administrative and im-
plementing details. The Member States’ NTMs are embodied in both types
of legislation, although a majority take the form of subsidiary legislation.18
For example, Cambodia’s technical barriers to trade (TBTs) are composed of
anukret19, prakas20, and laws, as illustrated by Figure 1.2. As legislative instru-
ments, and regardless of their form, NTMs are binding on the public.
15. ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025, Jakarta, 2015.
16. See Chapter 2.
17. See Chapters 3 and 4.
18. See Ing et al., “Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN: A Simple Proposal.”
19. These are sub-decrees adopted following a cabinet meeting, and signed by the Prime
Minister.
20. These are regulatory proclamations issued by members of the Government.
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Figure 1.2: Technical Barriers to Trade, Cambodia21.
A majority of the region’s NTMs are quality measures, i.e., sanitary and phy-
tosanitary (SPS) measures and TBTs. Export-related measures are the third
most common type of NTM. Table 1.1 provides a breakdown of the most preva-
lent types of NTM in the region, as a percentage of total NTMs.
Table 1.1: Top NTM Types, as of 201522.
Type %
Technical Barriers to Trade 43.1
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 33.2
Export-related Measures 12.8
The issuance of NTMs is highly decentralized within Member States. NTMs are
issued by the ministries, agencies, departments, or bureaus having jurisdiction
over the relevant subject matter, objectives, or policy goals. Health and agri-
culture ministries have issued the majority of NTMs, except in Indonesia and
Myanmar. Table 1.2 shows the top issuing authority in each Member State, as
well as the total number of NTMs they have issued, in percentage terms.
21. From Chap Sotharith, c. Ruth Elisabeth L. Tobing, and Anika Widiana, “Classification
of Non-tari↵ Measures in Cambodia,” in Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN, ed. Lili Yan Ing,
Santiago Fernandez de Cordoba, and Olivier Cadot (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN,
2016), 58, http://asean.i-tip.org.
22. Data from Ing et al., “Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN: A Simple Proposal,” 24.
23. Data from ibid., 41, 56, 69, 81, 89, 110, 117, 133, 145, 160.
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Table 1.2: NTMs by Issuing Body, as of 201523.
Member State Ministry/Agency Total, in %
Brunei Darussalam Ministry of Health 68.8
Cambodia Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries 30
Indonesia Ministry of Trade 29.2
Lao PDR Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry 19.93
Malaysia Ministry of Health 70.41
Myanmar Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries & Rural 49
Philippines Department of Agriculture 36.8
Singapore Agri-Food & Veterinary Authority 59.92
Thailand Ministry of Public Health 42.6
Vietnam Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development 34.2
1.2 Research Questions
This thesis aims to shed light on the incidence of NTMs in ASEAN by addressing
this main research question:
Why do NTMs persist in ASEAN, despite the region’s legal commit-
ments to harmonize and minimize these instruments?
In order to arrive at a more nuanced answer, this question is tackled from
di↵erent perspectives. The logical starting point is an analysis of the region’s
trade regime, as embodied in both treaty and soft law instruments, and its
underlying enforcement mechanisms.24 In particular, it is necessary to establish
whether the Member States are interested in complying with their international
law commitments. In other words, the persistence of NTMs is initially examined
as a question of international law compliance, as reflected in the first sub-
question:
i. Does the ASEAN trade regime provide su cient incentives for com-
pliance with the commitments relating to NTMs?
Any analysis of State behavior necessarily needs to delve into the underlying
motivations of the States concerned.25 In particular, the ASEAN experience is
noteworthy in that the increasing incidence of NTMs coincided with structural
changes and deeper integration e↵orts. The growth of the manufacturing sector
24. See Chapter 2.
25. See Chapter 3.
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and of intra-regional production networks seemingly spurred a paradoxical de-
mand for both liberalized trade and NTMs. This begs the second sub-question
of whether societal preferences for certain types of policies, such as NTMs, are
linked to economic trends and changes:
ii. Can the region’s structural changes, such as the increased promi-
nence of industry and production networks, explain the demand for
NTMs?
Additionally, policies cannot be detached from their underlying socio-economic
and political contexts.26 While societal preferences for trade policies may be
explained by economic trends, how these preferences are actually translated
into laws and regulations depends on the existing political institutions. As
such, the link between economic and political factors, on the one hand, and
NTM incidence, on the other, bears looking into:
iii. Are political and economic factors linked with NTM incidence?
Can the former account for the rising incidence of NTMs in ASEAN?
It is hoped that by investigating the factors underlying the persistence of NTMs
in ASEAN, fruitful insights may be gained for the purpose of policymaking at
both regional and national levels. This assessment may deepen our understand-
ing of policy-making dynamics by illuminating a wide range of issues, from
societal preferences for certain policies, to compliance with multilateral obliga-
tions. Consequently, these insights may help policymakers draft more e↵ective
and responsive legislation and commitments.
1.3 Methodology and Scope
In answering the above questions, this thesis adapts an interdisciplinary ap-
proach and relies on the tools and methods of law and economics. The analysis
is guided by the literature on (i) compliance with international law, (ii) the
political economy of trade protection, (iii) public choice theories of regulation,
and (iv) the economic e↵ects of political institutions.
The primary approach is a qualitative analysis of the ASEAN trade regime.
This method is useful and appropriate in light of the nature of the research
26. See Chapter 4.
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questions. Specifically, this thesis aims to make sense of Member States’ motives
and the resulting increase in NTMs in ASEAN. The qualitative method enables
the ASEAN trade regime to be examined in relation to the underlying legal,
economic and political contexts. This type of analysis yields insights into both
the behavior and underlying motives of the Member States with regard to trade
policy.
While the qualitative analysis shows the importance of political and economic
factors for trade policy, it fails to establish the actual relationship between these
factors and NTM incidence. To supplement the insights of this analysis, this
thesis also uses correlation analysis, i.e., Spearman’s correlation and indepen-
dent samples t-tests, to examine the link, if any, between NTM incidence and
economic and political factors. Correlation analysis is useful in establishing
the link between di↵erent variables. Independent samples t-tests can also iden-
tify whether there is a significant di↵erence in trade policy, i.e., NTM incidence,
among Member States falling into di↵erent institutional categories. The present
thesis can use these quantitative analyses to identify the possible determinants
of NTM incidence.
In general, this thesis focuses on the way in which the ASEAN Member States
respond to regional and domestic preferences for trade policies. Considering the
region’s relative success in its tari↵-related commitments,27 this thesis considers
the incidence of NTMs only. While investigations into the trade e↵ects of NTMs
(such as the identification of ASEAN NTBs and the determination of changes
in trade flows) are undoubtedly timely and important, these are beyond the
scope of this study.
Finally, the contents of the ASEAN instruments are taken at face value. Specifi-
cally, given that the region’s e↵orts at economic integration comprise a reduction
in trade barriers, the literature on federalism and harmonization can be linked
to the questions raised in this thesis. For example, the question of whether
ASEAN, rather than its Member States, should be responsible for determining
which measures are to be considered NTBs, is pertinent to the issue of NTM
incidence. The e ciency of the region’s trade-related commitments, such as
standards harmonization and the use of mutual recognition agreements, is like-
wise pertinent. However, the scope of this thesis is limited to an examination of
27. By 2014, the average tari↵ rates for the Member States under the ATIGA was 0.54%.
ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Integration Report 2015, Jakarta, 2015, 9-10
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Member States’ (non)performance of their trade liberalization e↵orts, i.e. their
NTM-related commitments. The goal of this thesis is limited to gaining insights
into the incidence of NTMs in the ASEAN region. While the NTM-related com-
mitments do form part of regional integration endeavors, the latter is not the
focus of the current research project. Additionally, given the complexity of the
issues pertaining to fiscal federalism and harmonization, they merit a separate,
in-depth analysis which due to the limited scope of this thesis, is best left for
future research.
1.4 Chapter Overviews
This thesis consists of 5 chapters, including this introductory chapter. The
subsequent 3 chapters each tackle a specific question, and may be read inde-
pendently of one another.
Chapter 2 addresses the question of whether the ASEAN trade regime o↵ers
su cient incentives for compliance. The provisions of the applicable legal in-
struments, together with the region’s enforcement institutions, will be analyzed
in light of the theories on compliance with international law. This chapter sug-
gests that, because of the vague and general language used in detailing the com-
mitments, the ASEAN’s legal instruments have failed to facilitate cooperation
and compliance by Member States. This problem may have been exacerbated
by the lack of e↵ective enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms in the
region.
Chapter 3 examines the incidence of NTMs in the ASEAN region within the
context of the region’s structural changes. In particular, it asks whether NTMs
were motivated by a desire to protect sectors which have been adversely a↵ected
by the growing importance of industry. Alternatively, it asks whether NTMs
promote and enhance the Member States’ participation in production networks.
Guided by scholarship on the political economy of trade protection and public
choice theories of regulation, the trends in the imposition of NTMs were exam-
ined in relation to the characteristics of the Member States concerned. Chapter
3 illustrates the fact that NTMs may be motivated not just by protectionist
desires, but also by an increased demand for regulatory quality.
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The persistence of NTMs may likewise be due to ASEAN’s failure to account
for the underlying determinants of policy. Chapter 4 aims to identify the deter-
minants of NTM incidence in the ASEAN region. Possible correlations between
NTM incidence on the one hand, and di↵erent political and economic charac-
teristics on the other, will be analyzed together with the strength and direction
of any such association. The results would seem to indicate that sectoral trends
matter. Additionally, the degree of political insulation and accountability may
a↵ect how responsive governments are to demands for increased protection.
Lastly, Chapter 5 summarizes the insights of Chapters 2 to 4, and discusses the
policy implications of this thesis’ findings. It concludes with a brief discussion
of possible extensions of this analysis.
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2 The Carrot or the Stick: A
Question of Compliance1
2.1 Introduction
Over the course of recent decades, the commitments of the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) to eliminate non-tari↵ barriers (NTBs) and in-
crease the transparency of non-tari↵ measures (NTMs) have been embodied in
several instruments, ranging from non-binding declarations to binding treaties.
However, the consensus is that the ASEAN’s e↵orts in this regard are still un-
successful and need to be bolstered. This implies that these legal instruments
have failed to influence the behavior of the ASEAN’s Member States.
In analyzing the reasons for the persistence of NTMs and NTBs in Southeast
Asia, the logical starting point is the e↵ectiveness of the foundational legal
instruments. Do Member States have an interest in complying with their inter-
national commitments? Specifically, does the ASEAN trade regime su ciently
incentivize compliance with the NTM- and NTB-related commitments? These
issues regarding compliance with, and the e↵ectiveness of, ASEAN international
law obligations are the main issues dealt with in this chapter. This chapter pro-
poses one explanation for the persistence of NTMs and NTBs in Southeast Asia:
that the ASEAN’s legal instruments have failed to provide su cient incentives
for compliance.
This chapter begins with an overview of the main compliance theories in the
disciplines of international relations, international law, and law and economics,
set out in Section 2.2. The theories within the law and economics discipline
are given particular importance. This discussion is not meant to provide an
1. I would like to thank Emanuela Carbonara, Michael Faure, Klaus Heine, and those
participating in the EDLE Fall Seminar at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, for their
invaluable comments.
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exhaustive review of the literature, but merely to guide subsequent discussions.
Section 2.3 follows with a description of the ASEAN trade regime and enforce-
ment framework. Section 2.4 continues with an analysis of this trade regime,
guided by the law and economics theories on compliance. Section 2.5 concludes
with a summary of the factors a↵ecting the ASEAN Member States’ compli-
ance with their obligations to eliminate NTBs and enhance the transparency of
NTMs.
As this chapter concerns compliance, the focus is on the Member States. In-
ternational law directs and informs the conduct of, and interactions between,
States. This does not mean, however, that domestic interests and idiosyncratic
State characteristics are not important or do not determine trade policy. As
such, the role of these intra-State factors on trade policy will be dealt with in
separate chapters.
2.2 Theories of Compliance
The key idea underlying the concept of compliance is conformity of behavior
with the requirements of legal and regulatory institutions.2 Thus, compliance
in international law refers to:
1. the extent to which signatory States have changed their behavior in ac-
cordance with their procedural and substantive obligations under treaties,
customary international law and soft law instruments, 3 and
2. whether their actions are in line with the spirit of the agreement.4
Implementation and e↵ectiveness are concepts related to compliance. Imple-
mentation refers to the actions, such as the enactment of measures or the
amendment of existing legal and regulatory institutions, undertaken by States
to fulfill their international law obligations.5 Implementing actions are needed
2. Joan E.Donoghue et al., “Theme Plenary Session: Implementation, Compliance and
E↵ectiveness,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)
91 (1997): 52.
3. Such as memoranda of understanding, joint agreements, and declarations, which are
non-binding instruments which contain promises or expressions of intent about future State
actions
4. E.Donoghue et al., “Theme Plenary Session: Implementation, Compliance and E↵ec-
tiveness,” 59.
5. Ibid.
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where the status quo in the signatory States diverges from the norms, obli-
gations and requirements under international agreements. Where the existing
regimes already conform to these international obligations and requirements,
the signatory State is already compliant. E↵ectiveness, on the other hand,
refers to whether the international agreement has achieved its stated objectives
and/or addressed the problems it was intended to resolve.6 An international
regime may be deemed ine↵ective, despite high compliance rates by signatory
States, where the stated goals and objectives remain unattained or where the
problems remain unresolved. Nevertheless, widespread noncompliance may be
a sign of an ine↵ective legal regime.7
While noncompliance is a sign of ine↵ectiveness, seemingly compliant behavior
does not su ciently prove the power of international law to influence States.
Regularity of behavior among States may occur for reasons unrelated to the
obligatory power of international law. Where States share common interests,
for example, cooperation can occur even in the absence of law.8
Table 2.1 represents a hypothetical one-shot game involving two States, A and
B, who share common interests. These might be neighboring States sharing
a common border. In this scenario, each State does best if it respects the
border. Perhaps neither State has su cient military and economic resources to
launch an e↵ective attack on the other. It is also possible that the costs of any
such expansion outweigh the benefits gained from the additional territory. If A
attacks B, the former wastes too many resources. B su↵ers a small loss because
its territory will be diminished, but it will su↵er a greater loss if it attacks
A as well. If both respect the border, the maximum joint payo↵ is achieved.
The dominant strategy of each self-interested State is to respect the border,
regardless of the action of the other State. This result would have occurred
even in the absence of a treaty or binding legal norm.9 In other words, the legal
rule merely requires the States to do what they would have already done.
6. Ibid.
7. Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Concep-
tions of International Law,” Michigan Journal of International Law 19 (1998): 346.
8. Andrew T. Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,” California
Law Review 90, no. 6 (2002): 1843; Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of
International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 27-28; Andrew T. Guzman,
How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2008), 25-26.
9. Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 28; Guzman, “A Compliance-
Based Theory,” 1842-1843; Guzman, How International Law Works, 29.
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Table 2.1: Shared Interests
State B
attack respect
State A attack -10,-10 -5,10
respect 10,-5 15,15
Table 2.2: Pure Coordination Game
State B
action X action Y
State A action X 5,5 0,0
action Y 0,0 5,5
International law can exert more influence when States find themselves in ei-
ther a coordination game or a prisoner’s dilemma. In a pure coordination game,
the States have an incentive to cooperate. However, cooperation depends on
the successful coordination of actions between the States. As shown in Table
2.2, the highest payo↵s are seen when the States coordinate their actions, with
both converging on either (X, X) or (Y, Y). The problem becomes one of de-
termining the focal point to maximize the total payo↵s.10 One example is the
use of harmonized rules and standards for the international carriage of persons
and goods by air. A common set of rules and standards benefits States as this
decreases the costs associated with air transport. Once a set of rules has been
determined, no State has an incentive to deviate. Thus, international law mat-
ters as a way of identifying cooperative actions and establishing a focal point
for coordination.11
Table 2.3: Prisoner’s Dilemma
State B
defect cooperate
State A defect 5,5 10,1
cooperate 1,10 8,8
Cooperation is most di cult when the States find themselves in a prisoner’s
dilemma. Table 2.3 presents a bilateral one-shot example of this game, where
the States can maximize their joint payo↵s through coordination. However,
10. Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 32-33; Guzman, How Interna-
tional Law Works, 26-27.
11. Guzman, How International Law Works, 28.
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coordination is not assured as they can each gain at the other’s expense through
defection.12 The dominant strategy of each State is defection. The predicted
outcome is a failure of coordination, with each State violating its obligations.13
This prediction, however, is too bleak and unrealistic. States do comply with
their international law obligations, even in prisoner’s dilemma situations.
The existing literature on compliance comes from international relations, in-
ternational law, and law and economics scholarship. The following subsections
provide an overview of the main theories, focusing on the law and economics
theories of compliance. However, these are not meant to provide a complete
review of the compliance literature. Rather, this summary shows that this lit-
erature is still developing, and that the most important questions concerning
State behavior have not yet been fully answered. The main ideas gleaned from
the law and economics compliance theories will guide and inform the discussion
presented in 2.4.
2.2.1 International Relations Theories of Compliance
The theories in this discipline are greatly influenced by political science, in-
ternational relations, and economics.14 International relations scholars regard
laws as of a directive nature, in that the motivation for most legal regimes is
the pursuit of goals and objectives.15 The main schools of thought are realism,
institutionalism, and liberalism.
Realism
Under realism, self-interested States are the primary and unitary actors in in-
ternational relations. Their pursuit of their own interests and objectives is only
constrained by the power and interests of other States.16 States only comply with
international law when doing so is in their own interest. The necessary corollary
12. Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 29-32; Guzman, “A
Compliance-Based Theory,” 1842; Guzman, How International Law Works, 29-32.
13. Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 30; Guzman, “A Compliance-
Based Theory,” 1842; Guzman, How International Law Works, 32.
14. Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory,” 1823.
15. Kingsbury, “The Concept of Compliance,” 350.
16. Ibid.
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is that States with significant power to act will not hesitate to disregard their in-
ternational law obligations when these conflict with their own interests.17 Thus,
international cooperation is only possible where this promotes the interests of
all States concerned.18 However, this theory is belied by the fact that nations ex-
pend considerable resources to create international laws and legal mechanisms,
including mechanisms for the resolution of international disputes.19
Institutionalism
As with realism, States are the primary, rational, and unitary actors under
institutionalism.20 These self-interested States interact within the framework
of international institutions which play a facilitative role. Institutions serve
to encourage cooperation by reducing transaction costs and the costs of sanc-
tions. Institutions thus transform one-shot to repeated interactions,21 stabilize
expectations, increase the flow of information, facilitate monitoring, and pro-
vide a forum for the settlement of disputes.22 In this context, institutions can
encourage compliance by making noncompliance costly.
A shortcoming of this institutionalist approach is its failure to account for the
internal aspect of laws. It disregards the volitional sense of obligation that one
must conform to legal rules and norms.23 Another criticism is that this approach
only applies to coordination games, where international law can establish the
focal points for cooperation. Institutionalism is inapplicable to multilateral
prisoner’s dilemmas, as these are characterized by free-riding and collective
action problems.24 Although institutions can further transparency and increase
information flows, sanctions still need to be imposed by the compliant States.
Since sanctions are costly for both the sanctioned and the sanctioning States,
compliant States will prefer to free-ride on the sanctioning acts of others. Thus,
17. Kingsbury, “The Concept of Compliance,” 351.
18. Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory,” 1837.
19. Ibid., 1837-1838.
20. Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy:
Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (2011); Robert M. Axelrod, The Evolu-
tion of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 2006), both cited in Guzman, “A Compliance-
Based Theory,” 1839-1840.
21. Ibid., 1840.
22. Kingsbury, “The Concept of Compliance,” 352.
23. Ibid., 354-355.
24. Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 87.
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the imposition of sanctions will be sub-optimal, and this institution is ine↵ective
in promoting compliance.
Liberalism
Instead of interstate interactions, liberalism focuses on the dynamics between
intra-state actors, such as individuals and interest groups, and the e↵ects these
have on state policy.25 Unlike realism and institutionalism, this theory dis-
penses with the assumption of unitary state actors.26 State institutions only
serve to represent and regulate intra-state actors, aggregating and channeling
the latter’s interests and preferences in accordance with their relative weight
and bargaining power in society.27 Liberalism assumes that the heterogeneous
interests of intra-state actors28 define state preferences, which in turn dictate
how States act when representing their constituencies.29 Thus, the domestic
political process determines state policy, and a State will only have an inter-
est in international relations if the intra-state actors also do. All international
interactions, including entry into international law agreements and obligations,
are driven by particular State aims and interests.
Under liberalism, States are disaggregated into its various components which
perform representative, regulatory, and other bureaucratic functions.30 Each
State likewise engages in transnational transactions with other States, inter-
governmental institutions, and private entities. In this context, compliance is
the outcome of aggregated preferences through domestic political processes and
transnational interactions.31 Thus, “state preferences and policies are interde-
pendent and [that] the strategic games states play matter for policy.”32
However, this focus on individuals, private entities and interest groups makes
this theory intractable and complex. While liberalism is useful in shedding
25. Andrew Moravcsik, “Liberal Theories of International Law,” in Interdisciplinary Per-
spectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, ed. Je↵rey L.
Duno↵ and Mark A. Pollack (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 83-113; Andrew
Moravcsik, “The New Liberalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed.
Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 234-251.
26. Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory,” 1838.
27. Moravcsik, “Liberal Theories of International Law,” 84.
28. Moravcsik, “The New Liberalism,” 236-237.
29. Ibid., 237-239.
30. Kingsbury, “The Concept of Compliance,” 356-357.
31. Ibid., 357.
32. Moravcsik, “Liberal Theories of International Law,” 86.
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light on domestic interactions and their e↵ect on international policy and com-
pliance, it fails as a general theory of compliance given its inability to predict
the outcomes of intra-state interactions.33
2.2.2 International Law Theories of Compliance
Despite the importance of compliance to international law, this discipline has
been criticized for neglecting this concept in its research agenda and for fail-
ing to provide theories capable of addressing its various nuances.34 To date,
international law’s main compliance theories are the legitimacy model and the
managerial model. These theories rest on the traditional positivist and rule-
based views of law, where the focus is on the di↵erentiation of law from non-law
instruments.35
Legitimacy
Legitimacy theory rests on the essential assumption that compliance occurs
when rules have “come into being in accordance with the right process.”36 Legit-
imacy is defined as “a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself
exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those
addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates
in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.”37 The four
factors which a↵ect the compliance decision are determinacy,38 symbolic vali-
dation,39 coherence,40 and adherence.41 Rules which exhibit these four factors
33. Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory,” 1839.
34. Ibid., 1830.
35. Kingsbury, “The Concept of Compliance,” 348-349; Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits
of International Law, 15.
36. Thomas M. Franck, “Legitimacy in the International System,” American Journal of
International Law, no. 82 (1988): 706 as quoted in Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory,”
1834.
37. Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1990), 24-25 as quoted in Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International
Law, 26.
38. “Determinacy refers to the clarity of the rule or norm,” in Guzman, “A Compliance-
Based Theory,” 1834.
39. “Symbolic validation refers to the presence of procedural practices or rituals that provide
a rule with symbolic importance and legitimacy,” in ibid.
40. “Coherence refers to the connection between rational principles and the rule,” in ibid.
41. “Adherence refers to the connection between the rule and the secondary rules used to
interpret and apply the primary rule,” in ibid.
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generate a strong compliance pull, while the absence of these factors leads to a
weaker compliance pull.42
However, the assertion that legitimacy generates compliance fails to explain
the importance of legitimacy and the reason behind the causal link between
legitimacy and compliance. This shortcoming is the main weakness of legitimacy
theory.43
Managerial Model
Focusing mainly on treaties, Chayes and Chayes (1995) examined the mecha-
nism underlying the compliance of States. Their managerial model eschews the
importance of sanctions and other coercive mechanisms, asserting that coercive
measures are “a waste of time”.44 Instead, they assert that compliance can be
achieved through “a cooperative, problem-solving approach.”45 This model as-
sumes that States have a general propensity to comply with international law46
due to considerations of e ciency, interests and the force of norms:
1. Compliance minimizes transaction costs, as States no longer need to con-
stantly perform cost and benefit analyses for every decision;47
2. International agreements and treaties are consent-based, which States
would not have agreed to if such instruments failed to serve their in-
terests;48 and
3. A general compliance norm generates a compliance pull which influences
States to comply.49 In other words, the existence of a treaty itself creates a
normative obligation to comply. Given this general propensity to comply,
compliance is the expected outcome of international legal regimes.
42. Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995), 24 as quoted in Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory,” 1834.
43. Ibid., 1834-1835.
44. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with
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Considering that States have a general propensity to comply with their treaty
obligations, deliberate violations are the exception. Instances of breach can be
explained by the following:50
1. Ambiguous and indeterminate treaty provisions, which “produce a zone of
ambiguity within which it is di cult to say with precision what is permitted
and what is forbidden”.51 The more general the language used, the greater
the range of possible interpretations the signatories can make.
2. The States have a limited capacity to perform their undertakings and obli-
gations. This may be caused by lack of scientific, technical, bureaucratic,
and financial resources. States may also lack the capacity to perform
when the treaty obligations aim to constrain the actions of individuals
and private entities.52
3. There is a time lag before the social or economic changes required by
treaty obligations can take e↵ect.53
Instead of putting too much emphasis on enforcement, e↵orts and resources
should be directed towards management processes which enhance coordination
and encourage compliance, such as transparency,54 dispute settlement,55 and
capacity building.56
The main criticism of the managerial model focuses on its limited applicabil-
ity to treaties and international agreements which only address coordination
problems.57 Another weakness is its inability to explain the mechanism behind,
and motivations for, compliance by States. Consent-based theories such as this
merely assume that States comply with the law without explaining why mere
consent would su ce to generate actual compliance. In reality, consent alone
does not provide a strong enough incentive to comply, especially if compliance is
costly or against the State’s self-interest.58 And the notion of a compliance norm







57. Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory,” 1832-1833; Guzman, How International Law
Works, 16.
58. Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory,” 1832.
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is a mere assumption which fails to explain why a State would comply with bur-
densome obligations, particularly where international obligations conflict with
national interests and objectives.59
2.2.3 Law and Economics Theories of Compliance
The main proponents of compliance theories in law and economics scholarship
are Goldsmith and Posner (2007),60 and Guzman (2002, 2008).61 A common
feature of their work is their use of rational choice assumptions, particularly
the existence of self-interested and rational States, in explaining how, when and
why States comply with international law.62
Goldsmith and Posner
The Limits of International Law focuses on States as unitary actors “acting
rationally to maximize their interests, given their perception of the interests
of other states and the distribution of state power.”63 Unlike the managerial
model, Goldsmith and Posner (2007) shun the assumption of State preference
for compliance with international law for two reasons:
1. international law compliance will not occur at the expense of other state
preferences, such as for security or economic goods;64 and
2. assuming the existence of a preference for compliance fails to explain the
mechanisms underlying actual compliance.65 Thus, this model rejects the
view that States comply with the law for non-instrumental and normative
reasons.66
59. Ibid.
60. Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law.
61. Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory”; Guzman, How International Law Works.
62. A recent addition to this literature is Economic Foundations of International Law by
Posner and Sykes (2013). Similarly with Goldsmith and Posner (2007), Posner and Sykes
(2013) discuss the conditions under which international law either fails or succeeds, given the
assumption of rational States.
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International interactions are modeled as a two-stage game involving States.67
During the first stage, States can allocate resources among themselves in accor-
dance with a set of rules, i.e. international law, which is consistent with their
interests and capacities. The second stage arises because of a shock68 which
threatens the stability of the first stage status quo. Due to transaction costs
and imperfect information, States are incapable of e ciently adjusting the ini-
tial set of rules to accommodate this shock. The resulting patterns of behavior
could fall under any, or a combination, of four types:
1. In coincidence of interest, the dominant strategy of each self-interested
State is to act in accordance with the set of rules, regardless of the actions
of the other States. In equilibrium, the States seemingly act in accordance
with the rules, whereas in reality they are each acting independently in
their own interests.69
2. In coordination, each State is indi↵erent to the di↵erent possible states of
the world. The priority is to create a focal point on which the States can
plan their actions, thus avoiding conflict. In this case, States can achieve
higher payo↵s when they coordinate their actions, and no State has an
incentive to defect from the agreed set of rules.70
3. The States may find themselves in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma. While
it may be in the interest of a State to deviate from the initial set of rules,
this action may set o↵ retaliatory actions and other sanctions on the
part of the other Parties, making all States worse o↵. Under cooperation,
self-interested States refrain from seeking short-term benefits in order to
preserve medium- and long-run benefits. The prisoner’s dilemma may be
overcome if: the States are aware of what qualify as cooperative acts; they
have su ciently low discount rates; the game is repeated indefinitely; and
the short-run payo↵s do not outweigh the long-run payo↵s.71
4. If a State, or a coalition of like-minded States, is powerful enough to
pursue its interests even at the expense of weaker States and in deviation
of the set of rules, then a state of coercion arises. Weaker States are
67. Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 10-11.
68. Whether this shock may be political, economic, technological, or otherwise.
69. Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 11-12, 27-28.
70. Ibid., 12, 32-35.
71. Ibid., 12, 29-32.
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forced to sacrifice their interests at the behest of powerful States because
the threat of costly punishment from the latter is credible. In equilibrium,
the strong and weak States act rationally in accordance with their beliefs
regarding the interests and relative power of the other States.72
Under the Goldsmith and Posner (2007) model, international law is “endogenous
to state interests”73 as it “emerges from states’ pursuit of self-interested policies
on the international stage”.74 Law is the result of the rational pursuit of interests
by States, constrained only by the interests and relative power of other States.
Elaborating on the above assertions, Goldsmith and Posner (2007) also dis-
cussed treaties and soft law instruments. The basic idea is that States enter
treaties in order to reduce uncertainty, thus encouraging cooperation or coordi-
nation.75 In establishing treaty and soft law regimes, States agree on common
terms, necessarily distinguishing acts of cooperation from defection. Even in
a multilateral setting, States either comply or defect in pairs, with “each state
in a pair complying with the common terms as long as the other state in the
pair does”.76 This implies that any punishment for defection will come from
the a↵ected State alone. The corollary to this is that despite the multilateral
nature of a regime, there will be heterogeneity in the behavior of States in line
with their interests and relative power.77 Compliance occurs when States “fear
retaliation from the other state or some kind of reputational loss, or because
they fear a failure of coordination”.78 The choice between treaty and soft law
regimes is based on three factors:
1. whether the Parties wish to signal the depth of domestic political support
for their international commitment;
2. whether they wish to take advantage of default rules and international
conventions attendant to treaty regimes to aid interpretation and save on
transaction costs; and
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3. their conveyance of the seriousness of each Party’s commitment to the
agreement.79
Guzman
Guzman (2002, 2008) presents a compliance theory which shows how inter-
national law can a↵ect a State’s behavior even in the absence of an e↵ective
enforcement system. As with Goldsmith and Posner, this model applies to both
treaty and soft law regimes.
International law is defined as those obligations that a↵ect the incentives and
behavior of States,80 making it more likely that a State will act in a manner
consistent with its obligations and promises.81 The scope of this term includes
non-binding “soft law”82 instruments such as joint declarations, memoranda of
understanding, and executive agreements.83 Guzman’s (2002, 2008) approach
di↵ers from traditional international law scholarship, as the latter focuses exclu-
sively on treaties and customary international law. For Guzman (2002, 2008),
treaties, soft law, and customary international law merely represent the spec-
trum of the forms and degrees of commitment84 that States may choose from
in their dealings with each other.
States are assumed to rationally pursue solely their own interests, without any
innate preference for compliance and without any regard for the legitimacy
of law.85 The main implication is that cooperation is only likely if this is in
the interest of the involved States. In situations where cooperation is easy to
achieve, such as games of common interest, pure coordination, and the battle
of the sexes, international law requires nothing more than what States would
have done even in the absence of law. International law has little e↵ect in these
situations.86 The more interesting cases are those where cooperation is di cult,
79. Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 91.
80. Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory,” 1878.
81. Ibid., 1882.
82. The term “soft law” refers to non-binding rules and instruments which “interpret or
inform our understanding of binding legal rules or represent promises that in turn create ex-
pectations about future conduct”. Andrew T. Guzman and Timothy L. Meyer, “International
Soft Law,” Journal of Legal Analysis 2, no. 1 (2010): 174
83. Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory,” 1879.
84. Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory,” 1882-1883; Guzman, How International Law
Works, 144.
85. Guzman, How International Law Works, 16-17.
86. Ibid., 25-29.
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such as prisoner’s dilemma games, as these show that international law does
a↵ect state behavior.87
In a prisoner’s dilemma, while the highest overall payo↵s will be achieved
through mutual cooperation, the dominant strategy of each party is to defect.
In one-shot games, the expected equilibrium is defection.88 International law is
one mechanism used to overcome this dilemma by encouraging mutual coopera-
tion.89 In one-shot games and without any e↵ective enforcement system, doubts
as to the e↵ectiveness of any international law regime are not unwarranted. If
the parties are incapable of imposing credible sanctions for defection, the payo↵
schemes – and ultimately the incentives to defect – are left unchanged. However,
it is illusory to think that inter-state relations can be categorized as one-shot
games in this age of globalization. The repeated nature of state interactions
enables the “Three Rs of Compliance” – reciprocity, reputation, and retaliation
– to promote cooperation.90
Reputational sanctions91 and reciprocal actions are not intended to penalize a
defecting State. Rather, both are adjustments in the compliant States’ beliefs
and actions, respectively, because of the defection. Specifically, a reputation
for compliance “consists of judgments about the state’s past behavior and pre-
dictions made about future compliance based on that behavior”.92 Reciprocity,
meanwhile, is the “adjustment in a state’s behavior motivated by a desire to
maximize the state’s payo↵s in light of new circumstances or information”.93
On the other hand, retaliation refers to “actions that are costly to the retaliating
state and intended to punish the violating party”.94
Guzman (2002, 2008) developed a theory of reputation to show how interna-
tional law can a↵ect behavior in favor of compliance even in the absence of
an enforcement mechanism.95 Reputation is e↵ective, even when neither reci-





91. This refers to the costs su↵ered by a state’s reputation in cases of noncompliance.
92. Guzman, How International Law Works, 33.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid., 34.
95. See also Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory,” 1844-1851.
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embark on costly actions.96 Compliant States need only to assess their poten-
tial or current partner’s reputation. Specifically, a State’s reputation can be
regarded as a proxy for its actual willingness to comply with its legal obliga-
tions, which is an unquantifiable variable for other States. Habitual compliance
with legal obligations will create a good reputation, while noncompliance will
create a bad reputation. The former is valuable as this allows States to easily
find partners, enter future cooperative agreements, and extract more generous
concessions. This is possible because its promises are considered to be credible
by these future partners.97
States are assumed to be interested in maintaining a good reputation only to
the extent that this reputation improves their payo↵s.98 Defection implies that
the future gains from the breached agreement are sacrificed in favor of short
term gains. In the face of an incentive to defect, reputational sanctions will tilt
the scales in favor of compliance only if the costs of noncompliance outweigh
the payo↵s from defection. In addition, the reputational sanctions also a↵ect
payo↵s from future agreements. The lessened credibility will make it di cult
for the defecting State to enter future agreements. Likewise, defecting States
are unlikely to be granted generous concessions from future partners who are
doubtful of their willingness to fulfill their commitments. If the parties to an
agreement su ciently value long-term gains over short-term ones, compliance
with international law is possible, not because of any enforcement mechanism,
but due to the value of reputation as collateral for both current and future
agreements.99
Reputational costs also explain why States resort to di↵erent regime forms,
from non-binding soft law commitments to treaties. Legal form functions as
a costless signal of a State’s willingness to comply with its international legal
obligations “and the amount of reputational collateral they wish to pledge”.100
More serious commitments, such as treaties, can generate higher payo↵s at the
risk of greater reputational costs in the event of any breach.
Compliance is also a function of reciprocity. In a prisoner’s dilemma, every party
to an international law regime has an incentive to defect to take advantage of
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possible short term gains. However, this defection will spur reciprocal defections
from the other parties, thereby undermining the future stability of the regime.
If long-term payo↵s outweigh the short-term gains, the mere threat of reciprocal
defections may su ce to deter defections if this threat is credible. The concept
of reciprocity is also linked with that of reputation in that a breach under a
current agreement lessens the credibility of the defecting State with respect to
its current partners. These partners are less likely to accept any promises of
future compliance with the current agreement and to enter future agreements
with the defector.
However, reciprocity may fail to deter defections if the threat of reciprocal defec-
tions is not credible or inconsequential to the defecting State.101 Reciprocity is
also problematic in the multilateral setting, particularly where the international
law regime aims to address problems pertaining to collective action and public
goods. An example of a non-rivalrous good is the environment. The enjoyment
by one of clean air does not diminish others’ consumption of the same good. If
one State breaches an environmental treaty, it is irrational for the other parties
to engage in reciprocal defections as this would undermine the purpose of the
treaty to the detriment of all. In this context, the threat of reciprocal defec-
tions lacks any credibility. Thus, the “incentive to comply is reduced”102 and
compliance remains an issue. A common solution is to allow compliant States
to engage in reciprocal defections only with respect to the defecting State.103
Retaliation plays a role where reputation and reciprocity, either singly or taken
together, may not su ce to generate compliance, such as when short-term gains
outweigh the costs of defection. Retaliatory actions, which are costly for the
retaliating State, are only rational if they generate benefits for the retaliating
State. One possible benefit is the creation of a credible reputation for punishing
defectors whenever the rights and payo↵s of the retaliating State are compro-
mised. This reputation for punishment is valuable, as it induces both current
and future partners to comply with their legal commitments. A State may also
resort to retaliation to convince defectors to cease ongoing breaches and com-
ply with the current legal regime. Through the imposition of costly sanctions,
the retaliating State may su ciently alter the payo↵ scheme for the defector
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retaliatory acts may be in the interest of retaliating States by (i) signaling
that defections will be punished, and by (ii) deterring defections by any future
partners.104
As with reciprocity, retaliation is less e↵ective in multilateral scenarios involv-
ing public goods, due to the free-rider problem. In the event of breach, compli-
ant States have an incentive to free ride on the retaliatory acts of others, and
the resulting level of retaliation is sub-optimal. This collective action problem
lessens the credibility of the threat of retaliation. A solution, as in the case of
reciprocity, is to grant only the injured States the right to impose retaliatory
sanctions.105
Thus, compliance is a function of reputation, reciprocity and retaliation. By
making instances of breach costlier, States are incentivized to comply. Interna-
tional legal regimes are able to a↵ect behavior, regardless of its form.
Another important and related question is why States resort to soft law instead
of hard law. Intuitively, treaties and other binding instruments seem prefer-
able. These require greater reputational collateral, thus incentivizing compli-
ance and discouraging breaches. As States are assumed to enter international
legal regimes only when these are in their interest, compliance would always be
preferable.
Guzman and Meyer (2010) o↵ered four reasons for the use of soft law. Firstly,
soft law solves coordination problems by creating a focal point on which behav-
ior can be aligned in a less costly manner than that of treaties and other hard
law regimes.106 Secondly, as the joint losses associated with breaches of hard
law107 are greater, these lessen the net value of the hard law regime. These
costs arising from breaches of hard law are zero-sum, as the losses su↵ered by
one State are not gained by the other. This makes soft law regimes less costly
and more attractive.108 Thirdly, it is easier and less costly to amend subopti-
mal soft law regimes.109 Lastly, unlike institutional regimes created under hard
law, institutions and tribunals functioning under soft law regimes may issue
nonbinding decisions, pronouncements, and other instruments which are still
104. Guzman, How International Law Works, 46-47.
105. Ibid., 66-67.
106. Guzman and Meyer, “International Soft Law,” 176-177, 188-192.
107. These are primarily reputational and retaliatory costs.
108. Guzman and Meyer, “International Soft Law,” 177, 192-197.
109. Ibid., 178, 197-201.
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capable of shaping and influencing future behavior even in the absence of the
unanimous consent of all parties. This may help to encourage long-term coop-
eration even in the face of explicit opposition to stronger forms of cooperation
from other States.110
Behavioral Law and Economics
A recent development in the literature is represented by the application of be-
havioral law and economics to international law. The theories of rational choice
and behavioral economics are used together to better explain why States behave
the way they do.111 The rational choice analysis of inter-state interactions can
be supplemented with insights into systematic heuristics and biases. Heuris-
tics and biases can explain actions and decisions which seemingly violate the
assumption of actors’ rationality. Two concepts related to bounded rational-
ity are particularly relevant to the issue of compliance with international law,
namely the “status quo bias” and the “endowment e↵ect”.112
The “status quo bias” and the “endowment e↵ect” can be explained using the
concept of reference points. Actors evaluate choices and make decisions by
considering a reference point. How reference points are defined can influence
outcomes, and the commonly used reference point is the status quo.113 How-
ever, individuals are subject to a “status quo bias”. They prefer not to deviate
from the status quo “because the disadvantages of leaving it loom larger than
advantages”.114 A related pattern is the “endowment e↵ect”, which causes in-
dividuals to demand a higher price for giving something up than they would
be willing to pay for it.115 The outcome depends on how the reference point is
presented: individuals would be more reluctant to act if the choice involved a
change from the status quo, or if the choice is presented as a loss. Thus, the
choice architecture matters.116
110. Ibid., 178, 201-207.
111. Anne van Aaken, “Behavioral International Law and Economics,” Harvard International
Law Journal 55, no. 2 (2014): 421-481.
112. Ibid., 427-429.
113. Ibid., 428.
114. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, “Anomalies: The Endow-
ment E↵ect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no.
1 (1991): 197-198.
115. Ibid., 194.
116. Aaken, “Behavioral International Law and Economics,” 429.
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These concepts have implications for the negotiation, design and implemen-
tation of international law obligations. International law instruments, just like
contracts, can create reference points by allocating rights, entitlements and obli-
gations. Treaties can have an opt-in default at the first level, where States are
required to expressly agree to be bound by the treaty. Specific treaty provisions
may be tailored to be opt-in or opt-out, reflecting the signatories’ degrees of
interest.117
The reference point and the choice architecture may a↵ect the degree to which
treaty obligations are met, due to the status quo bias and the endowment e↵ect.
States may be reluctant to meet obligations requiring substantial changes on
their part, such as the abolishment of existing institutions or the amendment
of current laws. And the longer a States has “owned” a certain endowment,
be it a right or an entitlement, the higher the “price” it would demand for
it. Performance may also be a function of the perception of the other States’
obligations. Specifically, a State will meet its obligations if there is a strong
sense of entitlement to the outcomes provided under the treaty. On the other
hand, a State which feels shortchanged will renege on its obligations.118 Thus,
how the treaty terms are drafted can a↵ect the signatory States’perception of
the treaty, and this perception can influence their willingness to comply with
its terms.
2.2.4 Summary
The literature on compliance with international law is still at the developmen-
tal stage, and the debate on why States act the way they do is still ongoing.
The various theories may di↵er in their methodologies, but they all provide in-
sights into why States undertake, and comply with, international commitments.
International law deals with inter-state rights and obligations. As such, it is
unsurprising that the main actor in most of the theories is the unitary State.
Institutionalism and liberalism are the exceptions, given their emphasis on in-
stitutions and domestic actors, respectively. Most of the theories, except for
the legitimacy theory, assume that States are driven by their pursuit of their
117. Aaken, “Behavioral International Law and Economics,” 451.
118. Oliver Hart and John Moore, “Contracts as Reference Points,” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 1 (2008): 3.
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own interests as guided by their preferences, regardless of how these interests
are defined.
The theories di↵er in tackling the issue of whether international law matters in
influencing the behavior of States. Realism alone argues that law is an epiphe-
nomenon. The other theories are more optimistic about the role of international
law. International law matters in coordination games (institutionalism and the
managerial model) and prisoner’s dilemmas (Goldsmith and Posner [2007], and
Guzman [2002, 2008]). Nevertheless, the rationality assumption has its lim-
its, and the existing theories have limited power in explaining certain cases of
breach. As such, it is not unreasonable to supplement the existing theories with
concepts from behavioral economics.
In Section 2.4, the compliance of the ASEAN Member States with their NTM-
and NTB-related obligations is examined in light of the insights gained from
the law and economics compliance theories.
2.3 ASEAN International Trade Regime
This section describes the international trade regime in ASEAN. It begins with
a brief overview of the ASEAN institution, followed by a discussion of the NTM-
and NTB-related commitments and the ASEAN framework for the resolution
of economic and trade issues.
2.3.1 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN is not the region’s first attempt at establishing an organized body.
Earlier attempts included the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (1954), the
Asian and Pacific Council (1966), the Association of Southeast Asia (1959), and
the Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia Association (1964). All of these failed due
to a variety of reasons, such as intra-group tensions, conflicting organizational
objectives, and the inability to truly reflect and promote regional interests.119
119. Diane A. Desierto, “Postcolonial International Law Discourses on Regional Develop-
ments in South and Southeast Asia,” International Journal of Legal Information 36, no. 3
(2008): 419.
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ASEAN was formed with the signing of the Bangkok Declaration in 1967. Osten-
sibly, the Association’s goal was to “accelerate economic growth, social progress
and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of
equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosper-
ous and peaceful community.”120 The primary focus, however, was on political-
security issues such as the tensions in Indochina, and the post-Vietnam War
Communist threat.121
ASEAN was modeled after the European Free Trade Area’s system of “open
regionalism” with a decentralized institutional structure.122 This structure en-
abled the organization to pursue its consensus-based approach and its policy of
non-interference. Specifically, ASEAN has dealt with regional matters using the
“ASEAN Way” of cooperation, using informal rules and consensual decision-
making which respects the Member States’sovereignty.123 The “ASEAN Way”
is essentially a diplomatic process, “in which diplomatic o cials initially engage
in informal discussions to later facilitate a consensus-based decision at o cial
meetings.[...] Accordingly, ASEAN will adopt only policies to which all member
states agree, either because the policy itself has been modified, or member state
positions have converged.”124 Nevertheless, this approach and the correspond-
ing primacy of sovereignty made sense in light of the Member States’ colonial
past125 and the importance of nation-building during the post-Second World
War years.126 In this way, regional cooperation and stability was achieved with-
out sacrificing the Member States’ pursuit of their domestic goals.
Over the following decades, and in response to calls for a stronger, more e↵ective
120. Art. I, The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), 1967.
121. Paul Bowles and Brian MacLean, “Understanding Trade Bloc Formation: The Case of
the ASEAN Free Trade Area,” Review of International Political Economy 3, no. 2 (1996):
321; Lay Hong Tan, “Will ASEAN Economic Integration Progress Beyond a Free Trade
Area?,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 53, no. 4 (2004): 935; Robert
J.R. Elliott and Kengo Ikemoto, “AFTA and the Asian Crisis: Help or Hindrance to ASEAN
Intra-Regional Trade?,” Asian Economic Journal 18, no. 1 (2004): 7, doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8381.2004.00179.x; Anja Jetschke, “ASEAN,” chap. 26 in Routledge Handbook of Asian
Regionalism, ed. Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs (London: Routledge, 2012), 328.
122. Jetschke, “ASEAN,” 330.
123. Ibid., 329.
124. Lee Leviter, “The ASEAN Charter: ASEAN Failure or Member Failure,” N.Y.U. Journal
of International Law and Politics 43 (2010): 167.
125. Shaun Narine, “Asia, ASEAN and the question of sovereignty: the persistence of non-
intervention in the Asia-Pacific,” chap. 12 in Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, ed.
Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs (London: Routledge, 2012), 155.
126. Ibid., 158.
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institution, ASEAN endeavored to reorganize and establish a more centralized
structure. This was most notable in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis,
which culminated in the enactment of the ASEAN Charter. The ASEAN Char-
ter took e↵ect on 15 December 2008, and transformed the organization into a
rules-based entity with legal personality.127
Economic regionalism began to take center stage during the 1990s. ASEAN be-
came increasingly concerned with the rise of China and India, both of which were
seen as potential competitors for foreign investment. The 1997 financial crisis
likewise exposed the economic interdependence among the Member States, as
well as the region’s weak institutional arrangements.128 These factors prompted
the move towards closer economic integration,129 i.e., the establishment of the
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).
127. Chapter II, Art. 3, ASEAN Secretariat, The ASEAN Charter, Jakarta, 2007.
128. Jetschke, “ASEAN,” 333.
129. ASEAN Vision 2020, 1997, http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-vision-2020.
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Table 2.4: A Chronology of ASEAN Instruments Regarding
NTMs and NTBs
Instrument NTM- and NTB-Related Com-
mitments
1977 ASEAN Preferential Trade Agree-
ment
Liberalization of NTMs on a preferen-
tial basis
1987 Memorandum of Understanding
on Standstill and Rollback on NTBs
among ASEAN Countries
Not to introduce new/additional
NTMs; phase out/eliminate NTMs
which would impede intra-ASEAN
trade
1992 Agreement on the Common E↵ec-
tive Preferential Tari↵ Scheme for the
ASEAN Free Trade Area
Eliminate all quantitative restrictions
and all other NTBs within 5 years
2006 ASEAN Free Trade Area Council
Roadmap
NTB elimination by: January 1, 2008,
2009 and 2010 for Brunei Darussalam,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and
Thailand; January 1, 2010, 2011 and
2012 for Philippines; and January 1,
2013, 2014 and 2015 for Cambodia,
Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Vietnam
2007 ASEAN Economic Community
Blueprint
Remove all NTBs by 2015; enhance
the transparency of NTMs; harmonize
standards and regulations with inter-
national practices, where applicable
2009, ASEAN Trade in Goods Agree-
ment
Not to adopt or maintain any NTM
or quantitative restriction on intra-
regional trade; ensure the transparency
of permitted NTMs; review NTMs to
identify and eliminate NTBs; harmo-
nize national standards with interna-
tional standards and practices
2015, ASEAN Economic Community
Blueprint 2025
Elimination of NTBs, harmonization of
standards and technical regulations
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2.3.2 Trade-Related Instruments
ASEAN’s e↵orts to liberalize trade and eliminate trade barriers date from as
early as 1977, with the enactment of its first Preferential Trade Agreement.
Since then, several hard and soft law instruments on trade liberalization have
been enacted. Unlike with the region’s tari↵ liberalization measures, there has
been limited success in eliminating NTBs and harmonizing NTMs, due to a lack
of specific implementing plans.130 As such, the region’s current focus is on the
elimination of border and behind-the-border protectionist practices, other than
tari↵s, that impede trade.131
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint
In 1997, ASEAN resolved to transform itself into a stable, prosperous, and
highly competitive region with equitable economic development and reduced
poverty and socio-economic disparities. This marked the move towards closer
economic integration. In 2003, the Member States agreed to establish an
ASEAN Community by 2020. This Community would constitute a deeper form
of integration than that of a free trade area, and would be built on 3 pillars:
(i) the ASEAN Political-Security Community, (ii) the ASEAN Socio-Cultural
Community, and (iii) the AEC.132 The AEC Blueprint, which was approved in
2007, contained the guiding principles and main commitments for the creation
of the AEC.133
The AEC Blueprint states that it will transform ASEAN into a single market
and production base with the following core elements: free flow of goods; free
flow of services; free flow of investment; free flow of capital; and free flow of
skilled labor. The primacy of ensuring the free flow of goods was emphasized.134
A key component in achieving the free flow of goods is the elimination of NTBs.
Under the AEC Blueprint, the Member States are bound to, among other things:
130. Austria, “Non-Tari↵ Barriers: A Challenge to Achieving the ASEAN Economic Com-
munity,” 36.
131. ASEAN Secretariat, AEC Blueprint 2025, 3.
132. Severino and Menon, “Overview,” 4.
133. ASEAN Secretariat, AEC Blueprint.
134. Ibid., 6.
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1. simplify, harmonize, and standardize trade and customs processes, proce-
dures, and related information flows;135
2. establish the ASEAN Trade Facilitation Repository,136 which shall contain
trade-related and NTM-related information. This information will enable
the identification and elimination of NTBs;
3. harmonize standards, regulations and conformity assessment procedures,
by aligning them with international practices where applicable;137
4. develop and implement mutual recognition agreements on conformity as-
sessment for specific sectors;138 and
5. work towards the complete elimination of NTBs (by 2010 for ASEAN-5139,
by 2012 for the Philippines, and by 2015, subject to a certain flexibility for
CLMV140), through enhanced transparency, e↵ective surveillance mecha-
nisms, and the establishment of regional rules and regulations that are
consistent with international best practices.141
ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement
The ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) supersedes, consolidates and
streamlines the provisions of preexisting trade agreements into one instrument.
The ATIGA took e↵ect on 30 April 2010, and it aims to achieve the free flow
of goods in the region, and in particular the removal of existing NTBs. It
identifies the specific commitments of the Member States, and also provides for
monitoring and implementation mechanisms.
Chapter 4, Article 40 of the ATIGA provides for the NTM-related provisions.
Firstly, Member States are bound not to adopt or maintain any NTM on the
intra-ASEAN trade of any good, except in accordance with either their WTO
rights and obligations, or with the provisions of the ATIGA. Secondly, Member
States are bound to ensure (i) the transparency of any permitted NTMs, and




139. This refers to Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.
140. This refers to Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), Myanmar, and
Vietnam.
141. ASEAN Secretariat, AEC Blueprint, 7.
2.3. ASEAN International Trade Regime 39
(ii) that these NTMs do not create “unnecessary obstacles in trade among the
Member States”.142
Member States also committed not to adopt or maintain any prohibition or
quantitative restrictions on the intra-ASEAN trade of any good.143 Member
States reiterated their commitment to review NTMs, with a view to identifying
NTBs, and to eliminate NTBs144 in accordance with the following 3-tranche
schedule under the AEC Blueprint:
1. by 1 January 2008, 2009 and 2010 in the case of Brunei Darussalam,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand;
2. by 1 January 2010, 2011 and 2012 in the case of the Philippines; and
3. by 1 January 2013, 2014 and 2015, with degrees of flexibility, in the case
of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam.
The list of NTBs to be eliminated shall be agreed upon by the AFTA Council,
based on the recommendations of a number of ASEAN bodies.145 Nevertheless,
the Co-ordinating Committee for the Implementation of the ATIGA, in con-
sultation with the relevant ASEAN bodies, shall review NTM notifications by
the Member States and reports from the private sector in order to determine
whether the subject measure is an NTB which should be eliminated by the
imposing Member State.146
The ATIGA provisions on standards and technical regulations grant Member
States greater flexibility by providing the Member States with a range of possi-
ble actions in order “to mitigate, if not totally eliminate, unnecessary barriers to
trade”. Specifically, Member States can opt to harmonize their national stan-
dards with international standards and practices, promote the mutual recog-
nition of conformity assessment results in the region, develop and implement
Sectoral Mutual Recognition Agreements and Harmonised Regulatory Regimes,
142. ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, 2009, Chapter 4, Article 40.
143. Ibid., Chapter 4, Article 41.
144. Ibid., Chapter 4, Article 42.
145. These include the Co-ordinating Committee for the Implementation of the ATIGA,
the ASEAN Consultative Committee on Standards and Quality, the ASEAN Committee on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary, the working bodies under ASEAN Directors-General of Customs,
and other relevant ASEAN bodies.
146. ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, Chapter 4, Article 42.
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or adapt a combination of these actions.147 In the case of standards, harmoniza-
tion with international standards is the preferred option. In case of the absence
of applicable international standards, Member States may align their national
standards amongst themselves.148
With regard to technical regulations, Member States are required to ensure that
these do not create technical barriers to trade. Ideally, technical regulations
should be based “on international or national standards that are harmonised to
international standards, except where legitimate reasons for deviations exist”.149
Furthermore, before they adopt any technical regulations, Member States are
directed to consider alternatives that are the least trade restrictive. Member
States are to avoid the adoption of prescriptive standards which act as “unneces-
sary obstacles to trade”.150 Moreover, Member States must accord intra-regional
imports with “no less favourable” treatment than that accorded to like products
from any other Member State.151
ATIGA also contains provisions relating to conformity assessment procedures.
In particular, Member States are required to ensure that conformity assessment
procedures do not create “unnecessary technical barriers to trade”.152 Further-
more, conformity assessment procedures that apply to suppliers of intra-regional
imports, should not be more stringent than those applied to suppliers of like
products of national origin.153
Regarding sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, the Member States af-
firmed their rights and obligations under the Agreement on the Application
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, also known as the SPS Agreement.154
They further committed to apply the principles of the SPS Agreement to the de-
velopment, application and recognition of SPS measures.155 The Member States
also agreed that the implementation of SPS measures will be guided, where
applicable, by international standards, guidelines and recommendations devel-
oped by international organisations, and that these measures will be accessible
147. ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, Chapter 7, Article 73.
148. Ibid., Chapter 7, Article 74.
149. Ibid., Chapter 7, Article 75.
150. Ibid.
151. Ibid.
152. Ibid., Chapter 7, Article 76.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid., Chapter 8, Article 79.
155. Ibid., Chapter 8, Article 81.
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to other Member States.156
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025
Originally scheduled for 2020, the launch of the AEC was brought forward to
2015. However, in November 2015 ASEAN recognized its failure to fulfill key
obligations such as the elimination of NTBs. For example, the ASEAN Trade
Repository, which includes the NTM database, was still under construction.
While the Member States have uploaded NTM lists in the ASEAN website, this
information has not been updated and has not been uploaded in a standardized
format.157 Notably, the NTM lists provided failed to o↵er any rationale for the
measures and the applicable enforcement methods. This inadequate information
made the identification, and the eventual elimination, of NTBs in the region
virtually impossible.158 Measures to harmonize and standardize other standards
and technical regulations are likewise still underway.159
ASEAN adopted the AEC Blueprint 2025, the successor instrument to the AEC
Blueprint, in November 2015. This instrument reiterates the commitment to
transform the region into a highly integrated and cohesive economy, and aims
to complete the unfinished actions under the previous Blueprint. This includes
the complete elimination of NTBs, the convergence of the Member States’ trade
facilitation regimes through the harmonization of standards and mutual recogni-
tion agreements, the improvement of conformity assessment procedures, and the
enhancement of transparency and information flows between Member States.160
Thus, the current operative instruments are the ATIGA (treaty) and the AEC
Blueprint 2025 (soft law). These aim to transform ASEAN into an economic
community characterized by the free flow of goods, through the elimination of
unnecessary barriers to trade.
156. Ibid.
157. ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Integration Report 2015, 15.
158. Austria, “Non-Tari↵ Barriers: A Challenge to Achieving the ASEAN Economic Com-
munity,” 39.
159. ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Integration Report 2015, 15-17.
160. ASEAN Secretariat, AEC Blueprint 2025, 3-6.
42 Chapter 2. The Carrot or the Stick: A Question of Compliance
2.3.3 Dispute Settlement and Enforcement Mechanisms
Enforcement systems can serve an important role in incentivizing States to
comply with their obligations. Enforcement in ASEAN comes in the form of
dispute settlement mechanisms which rely mainly on voluntary submissions by
Member States. Another notable feature is the lack of imposable sanctions or
penalties in cases of noncompliance, or insu cient compliance, with obligations.
Table 2.5: ASEAN Dispute and Enforcement Mechanisms
Instrument Mode of Enforcement
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
(1976)
Friendly negotiations, good of-
fices, mediation, inquiry, concili-
ation
Protocol of Enhanced Dispute
Settlement Mechanism (2004)
Consultations, submission to a
panel, good o ces, conciliation,
mediation
ASEAN Charter (2008) Dialogue, consultation, media-
tion, good o ces, conciliation,
mediation
Protocol to the ASEAN Char-




Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
This treaty represents an early attempt by ASEAN to institute a dispute set-
tlement procedure which is “rational, e↵ective and su ciently flexible”.161 No-
tably, it embodies the region’s commitment to abide by the “ASEAN Way”, by
establishing the following as the guiding principles for intra-ASEAN relations:
“a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial
integrity and national identity of all nations;
b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external
interference, subversion, or coercion;
161. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 1976, Preamble.
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c. Non-interference in the internal a↵airs of one another;
d. Settlement of di↵erences or disputes by peaceful means;
e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;
f. E↵ective cooperation among themselves.”162
This treaty mandates the creation of a High Council, composed of ministerial
representatives from the Member States, which shall take cognizance of disputes
or situations that may disturb regional peace and harmony.163 In the case of
disputes, Member States are bound to settle the same amicably through friendly
negotiations, without resorting to the threat or use of force.164 If negotiations
between the disputing parties fail, the High Council is empowered to recom-
mend the use of the appropriate settlement mechanism, such as good o ces,
mediation, inquiry, or conciliation, along with other appropriate measures de-
signed to prevent the deterioration of the situation, as is necessary.165 However,
this provision is subject to a consensus requirement, i.e., that all the disputing
parties agree to the use of the recommended settlement mechanism.166
One glaring characteristic of this Treaty is its failure to provide for monitoring
and implementing measures, and for sanctions in cases of noncompliance with
the results of the dispute settlement mechanisms.
The Protocol of Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism
This Protocol specifically applies to ASEAN economic agreements,167 without
prejudice to the right of Member States to resort to other available fora.168
However, only Member States can invoke the provisions of this Protocol. Private
individuals or entities cannot initiate its dispute resolution and adjudicatory
proceedings.169
162. Ibid., Chapter I, Article 2.
163. Ibid., Chapter IV, Article 14.
164. Ibid., Chapter IV, Article 13.
165. Ibid., Chapter IV, Article 15.
166. Ibid., Chapter IV, Article 16.
167. Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism, 2004.
168. Ibid., Article 1(3).
169. Locknie Hsu, “The ASEAN Dispute Settlement System,” in The ASEAN Economic
Community: A Work in Progress, ed. Sanchita Basu Das et al. (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing,
2013), 390.
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Member States may initiate consultations regarding concerns about the imple-
mentation, interpretation, or application of any economic agreement,170 such
as: (i) when benefits accruing to a Member State are being nullified or im-
paired; and (ii) when the achievement of any economic agreement’s objectives
is being impeded by a Member State’s noncompliance with its obligations.171
Should a Member State fail to reply to a request for consultation within ten
days from the receipt of the request, or fail to engage in consultations within
thirty days from the receipt of the request, or should the parties fail to amicably
resolve their dispute within thirty days of receipt of the request, the complaining
Member State may raise the matter at the Senior Economic O cials Meeting
and request that a panel be set up. The Senior Economic O cials Meeting is,
however, free to decide by consensus not to constitute a panel.172 The parties
may, at any time during a dispute and even after the constitution of a panel,
also submit a request for good o ces, conciliation, or mediation procedures.173
Thus, this Protocol is clearly non-obligatory, with Member States retaining the
right of recourse to diplomatic channels.
The panel shall make an objective assessment of the facts and substantive pro-
visions of the disputed economic agreement, and shall submit its findings and
recommendations on the basis thereof.174 All panel deliberations shall be con-
fidential,175 and the written report shall be submitted to the Senior Economic
O cials Meeting within sixty days of its establishment.176 A panel report may
be appealed by any party to the dispute; otherwise, the Senior Economic O -
cials Meeting shall adopt the report.177
Appeals shall be limited to legal issues and interpretations covered in the panel
report,178 and shall likewise be confidential.179 The Appellate Body may uphold,
modify or reverse the panel report.180 The Senior Economic O cials Meeting
170. Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism, Article 3(1).
171. Ibid., Article 3(2).
172. Ibid., Article 5(1).
173. Ibid., Article 4.
174. Ibid., Article 7.
175. Ibid., Article 8(5).
176. Ibid., Article 8(2).
177. Ibid., Article 9(1).
178. Ibid., Article 12(6).
179. Ibid., Article 12(9).
180. Ibid., Article 12(12).
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shall adopt the Appellate Body’s report unless the disputants all agree, not to
adopt the same within thirty days after its distribution to the Member States.181
The panel or Appellate Body report may recommend that a concerned Member
State take actions on any measure that violates the provisions of the economic
agreement.182 However, such recommendation can neither augment nor dimin-
ish the existing rights and obligations under the said agreement.183 Disputants
must comply within sixty days of the adoption of the Senior Economic O cials
Meeting of the panel report or the Appellate Body’s report, unless the par-
ties agree to a lengthier deadline.184 Implementation shall be monitored by the
Senior Economic O cials Meeting.185
In the event of noncompliance, the other parties to the dispute may initiate ne-
gotiations for compensation. The payment of compensation, however, is purely
voluntary. If no agreement is reached on the matter of compensation, any party
to the dispute may request for authorization from the Senior Economic O cials
Meeting to suspend the concessions or other obligations under the economic
agreement.186 However, these remedies are temporary measures which shall last
only until the disputed measure has been removed, or the recommendations
of the panel or Appellate Body have been adopted, or a mutually satisfactory
solution has been reached.187
The ASEAN Charter
The ASEAN Charter is the main legal instrument for the region. It not only
established a more encompassing dispute mechanism, but also fleshed out the
legal and institutional framework of ASEAN as an organization.
The ASEAN Charter binds the Member States to abide by fundamental prin-
ciples, such as the renunciation of aggression,188 the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes,189 enhanced consultations on matters a↵ecting the common interests of
181. Ibid., Article 12(13).
182. Ibid., Article 14(1).
183. Ibid., Article 14(2).
184. Ibid., Article 15(1).
185. Ibid., Article 15(6).
186. Ibid., Article 16(1)(2).
187. Ibid., Article 16(9).
188. ASEAN Secretariat, The ASEAN Charter.
189. Ibid., Chapter 1, Article 2(2)(d).
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the region,190 and adherence to multilateral trade rules and rules-based regimes
in ensuring the implementation of economic commitments.191 It likewise reaf-
firms the primacy of the “ASEAN Way” through the adoption of the following
principles:
1. respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity
and national identity of all Member States;192
2. non-interference in the internal a↵airs of Member States;193
3. respect for the right of every Member State to lead its national existence
free from external interference, subversion, and coercion;194 and
4. abstention from participation in any policy or activity which threatens
the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political and economic stability of
Member States.195
In the event of any disputes, Member States must resolve them peacefully
through dialogue, consultation and negotiation.196 At any time during a dis-
pute, Member States may resort to good o ces, conciliation, or mediation197
which shall be conducted by either the ASEAN’s Chairman or its Secretary-
General.198 The applicable dispute settlement mechanism depends on the type of
dispute. Disputes arising from, or connected to, specific ASEAN instruments,
shall be settled in accordance with the mechanisms and procedures provided
for in such instruments.199 The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation shall apply in
case of disputes which do not concern the interpretation or application of any
specific ASEAN instrument.200 In case of disputes arising from or concerning
ASEAN economic agreements, the Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement
Mechanism is applicable.201 The Charter also provides for the establishment
of dispute settlement mechanisms, such as arbitration, for disputes concerning
190. ASEAN Secretariat, The ASEAN Charter, Chapter 1, Article 2(2)(g).
191. Ibid., Chapter 1, Article 2(2)(n).
192. Ibid., Chapter I, Article 2(a).
193. Ibid., Chapter I, Article 2(e).
194. Ibid., Chapter I, Article 2(f).
195. Ibid., Chapter I, Article 2(k).
196. Ibid., Chapter VII, Article 22(1).
197. Ibid., Chapter VII, Article 23(1).
198. Ibid., Chapter VII, Article 23(2).
199. Ibid., Chapter VII, Article 24(1).
200. Ibid., Chapter VII, Article 24(2).
201. Ibid., Chapter VII, Article 24(3).
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the interpretation or application of the Charter and other ASEAN instruments
where a specific mechanism has not previously been established.202
Compliance by Member States with the results of any dispute settlement mech-
anism shall be monitored by the Secretary-General.203 Any non-compliance may
be referred by any a↵ected Member State to the ASEAN Summit204 for a deci-
sion.205 However, the Charter does not provide for any definite sanctions in case
of noncompliance with or breach of dispute settlement findings and ASEAN in-
struments. The Charter likewise retains the “ASEAN Way” of decision-making
through consultation and consensus,206 although the ASEAN Summit may opt
for a di↵erent decision-rule on a case-to-case basis where no consensus can be
reached.207
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint
To guide and encourage the implementation of its key actions, the AEC Blueprint
provides for a strategic schedule208 which specifies the target implementation
dates for Member States’ obligations. However, national-level implementation
remains in the hands of the relevant government agencies of each Member
State.209 ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial bodies merely monitor the national-level
compliance of Member States.210
The applicability of the Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism to the AEC
Blueprint is also acknowledged by the AEC Blueprint.211 Recognizing the need
for monitoring and dissemination of progress with the implementation of the
AEC obligations, the AEC Blueprint recommends the development and main-
tenance of statistical indicators and AEC scorecards.212 The ASEAN Secre-
tariat is charged with the overall monitoring and implementation of the AEC
202. Ibid., Chapter VII, Article 25.
203. Ibid., Chapter VII, Article 27(1).
204. The ASEAN Summit is the supreme policy-making body of ASEAN, and is composed
of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States. ibid., Chapter IV, Article 7.
205. Ibid., Chapter VII, Article 27(2).
206. Ibid., Chapter VII, Article 20 (1).
207. Ibid., Chapter VII, Article 20(2).




212. ASEAN Secretariat, AEC Blueprint, 27.
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Blueprint.213
While the monitoring process was intended to be conducted in phases214, only
one AEC Scorecard Report215 was published in 2012.216 Instead of providing
detailed accounts of the implementation process, it adopted a yes-or-no check-
list format. This checklist tracked whether the measures aiming to achieve an
overall target, such as the free flow of goods, had been fully implemented by
all Member States. Since it merely provided an overview, the Scorecard failed
to identify which measures, such as the elimination of NTBs or the creation of
national trade repositories, the Member States had failed to enact.
As with other ASEAN instruments, the AEC Blueprint does not provide for any
applicable sanctions and penalties in cases of noncompliance with its obligations
and other provisions.
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025
In general, ASEAN only plays a supervisory role vis-à-vis implementation of the
AEC Blueprint 2025. The AEC Council, under the supervision of the ASEAN
Secretariat,217 is responsible for overall implementation and compliance mon-
itoring.218 The actual implementation of commitments is the responsibility of
each Member State. Notably, Member States are allowed to use the “consen-
sus and flexibility approach in the decision-making process [. . .] in certain
sensitive aspects.”219
The AEC Blueprint 2025 is complemented by a Consolidated Strategic Action
Plan (CSAP), which aims to operationalize the AEC Blueprint 2025’s key mea-
sures. The CSAP’s action lines are the responsibility of ASEAN sectoral bodies,
in coordination with the relevant government agencies of the Member States.220
The NTM-related key action lines include the following:
213. Ibid.
214. The intent was to monitor the progress in 4 phases: 2008-2009, 2010-2011, 2012-2013,
and 2014-2015.
215. Which covered the first 2 phases only.
216. ASEAN Secretariat, A Blueprint for Growth ASEAN Economic Community 2015:
Progress and Key Achievements, Jakarta, 2015, 7-8.
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1. to develop procedures and/or guidelines that address NTMs;
2. to explore stronger disciplines vis-à-vis NTMs;
3. to strengthen links with the private sector;
4. to update and review (i) NTMs, and (ii) the ASEAN NTM database; and
5. to coordinate with other ASEAN working groups and task forces in rela-
tion to SPS standards-related activities.221
While the AEC Council can enforce compliance of the AEC Blueprint 2025
measures, the Blueprint itself still does not provide for sanctions and penalties in
case of noncompliance with, and breach of, its key commitments and provisions.
2.4 ASEAN Compliance with NTB- and NTM-
Related Commitments
Given the state of the law in Southeast Asia, it would be logical to expect a
reduction in NTMs in the region. However, this expectation is belied by actual
data.
Figure 2.1: NTMs in Force in ASEAN, 2000-2015222.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the rising trend in the total number of NTMs in ASEAN.
From 2000 to 2015, the number of NTMs rose from 1,641 to 5,877. Indonesia,
221. ASEAN Economic Community 2025 Consolidated Strategic Action Plan, http://asea
n.org/storage/2017/02/Consolidated-Strategic-Action-Plan.pdf.
222. Adapted from Ing et al., “Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN: A Simple Proposal,” 22.
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Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand collectively impose 65% of total NTMs
in the region. Figures 2.2 to 2.5 show the number of NTMs in force in these
countries from 2000 to 2015. There is a clear and remarkable increase in the
case of Indonesia. The NTMs in both Thailand and the Philippines likewise
steadily increased. Malaysia, on the other hand, exhibited a more stable level.
Figure 2.2: Indonesia223.
Table 2.6: NTMs by Type as of December 2016227.
ID MY PH SG TH VN
No. of measures (green) 107 22 11 9 17 33
No. of measures (amber) 68 12 3 4 14 18
No. of measures (red) 211 37 8 21 35 64
No. of tari↵ lines a↵ected by red 968 216 8 7 126 946
No. of sectors a↵ected by red 53 34 6 27 29 43
Table 2.6 presents data from the Global Trade Alert.228 Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam have all been cited as hav-
ing implemented measures which almost certainly discriminate against foreign
223. Adapted from ibid., 26.
224. Adapted from ibid.
225. Adapted from ibid.
226. Adapted from ibid., 27.
227. From “Global Trade Alert,” accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.globaltradeale
rt.org.
228. This database is coordinated by the Center for Economic Policy Research, and provides
information on potentially discriminatory state measures such as NTMs and trade policy
instruments.
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Figure 2.3: Malaysia224.
Figure 2.4: The Philippines225.
Figure 2.5: Thailand226.
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interests.229 While the Global Trade Alert reports a wide range of state mea-
sures, several of the flagged measures are NTMs. This suggests that potentially
discriminatory or protectionist NTMs are still in force in the region. In fact, 69
cases involving NTMs/trade barriers have been raised before the Co-ordinating
Committee for the Implementation of the ATIGA and the ASEAN Consultative
Committee on Standards and Quality from 2012 to 2014.230 All Member States
have been involved in at least 2 of these cases, with Indonesia being cited 18
times. These trends suggest that the Member States have failed to comply with
their international law obligations to eliminate NTBs and harmonize NTMs.
The law and economics compliance literature suggests that international law
can help tilt the scales in favor of compliance by altering the incentives of
States. Law can create focal points for cooperation and make long-term ben-
efits more valuable than short-term gains. International law regimes can also
make reputation for compliance a valuable form of collateral for inter-state
dealings, providing an additional incentive for compliance. As will be seen in
the following discussion, the insights from these theories can also shed light on
ASEAN noncompliance. Due to their general and vague language, the ASEAN
legal instruments not only failed to create focal points for coordination, but
also undermined the e↵ectiveness of reputation, reciprocity and retaliation as
incentives for compliance.
Let us assume that States are rational actors who, in their dealings with each
other, primarily pursue their own interests and preferences. This implies that
the Member States, in vowing to ensure the free flow of goods within the region,
believe that free trade is in their common interest. This begs the question: why
have the Member States failed to comply with their obligations to harmonize
NTMs and eliminate NTBs?
Realists would suggest that the benefits gained from these commitments do
not justify the costs involved in honoring them. Thus, non-compliance best
serves the interests of the Member States.231 However, this argument fails to
explain why the Member States have repeatedly bound themselves by making
such commitments. When confronted with the region’s inability to achieve its
229. Red measures.
230. “Matrix of Actual Cases on NTMs/Trade Barriers,” accessed December 1, 2016, http:
//asean.org/asean-economic-community/asean-free-trade-area-afta-council/
other-documents/.
231. Kingsbury, “The Concept of Compliance,” 351.
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NTM- and NTB-related goals, ASEAN’s response has always been to rea rm
its commitment to the same. It is noteworthy that these developing countries
have used significant resources to create this international trade regime and to
establish the AEC.232 It is therefore illogical to conclude that these States are
not interested in free trade and the removal of trade barriers when their actions,
i.e. the creation of international law regimes, would indicate otherwise.
Given this, a closer look at the nature of trade is necessary. International
trade has been characterized as a repeated multilateral prisoner’s dilemma.233
The highest payo↵s can only be achieved when all States act to ensure the
free flow of goods. In this case, all Member States need to comply with their
commitments to remove unnecessary trade barriers and harmonize permitted
NTMs. However, each Member State can gain at the expense of others by
retaining protectionist trade barriers. This way, import-competing producers
retain a domestic advantage while exporting producers gain access to foreign
markets. Every State therefore has an incentive to defect.
This multilateral prisoner’s dilemma is further complicated by the nature of
NTMs and NTBs. NTMs encompass a wide variety of measures and regula-
tions, other than tari↵s, that can a↵ect the price or quantity of traded goods,
whether or not the underlying rationale is protectionist. NTMs include SPS
measures, technical barriers to trade (TBTs), labelling and other specification
requirements, and quantitative restrictions. Some examples are limits on pes-
ticide levels for food products, carbon dioxide emissions standards for vehicles,
product labelling requirements for food items, and certification procedures for
chemical and pharmaceutical products.234 NTMs become NTBs when they are
applied in a discriminatory manner against foreign firms, are imposed with
a protectionist intent, or when they are unjustified or improperly applied.235
Thus, NTBs are NTMs that “are protectionist either by intent or e↵ect.”236
This wide range of NTMs means that it is di cult to classify and monitor
232. See Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory,” 1837.
233. Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 145.
234. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Trade and
Non-Tari↵ Measures: Impacts in the Asia-Pacific Region, 9.
235. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Non-Tari↵ Measures to Trade:
Economic and Policy Issues for Developing Countries, 2; Austria, “Non-Tari↵ Barriers: A
Challenge to Achieving the ASEAN Economic Community,” 33.
236. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Trade and
Non-Tari↵ Measures: Impacts in the Asia-Pacific Region, 11.
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them.237 For example, States may classify NTMs not as trade measures per se,
but as health and safety regulations. Alternatively, States may be unaware that
a certain measure, which has legitimate purposes, operates as a trade barrier.
This uncertainty makes breach, be it willful or inadvertent, more likely.
These factors may shed some light on the ine↵ectiveness of the ASEAN insti-
tutional enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms. These mechanisms
require clarity on two specific aspects of the question, namely: that Member
States know what is expected of them, and that a Member State has failed to
comply. From the very outset, enforcement of NTM- and NTB-related commit-
ments would require region-wide knowledge of which measures qualify as NTMs
and NTBs. Both the wide scope and ambiguity of NTMs make this identifi-
cation process unduly burdensome and complicated. Another requirement is
the sharing of interests by Member States, i.e., their interest in the elimina-
tion of trade barriers. However, the prisoner’s dilemma nature of trade means
that Member States retain an incentive to defect by not complying with their
commitments.
That the Member States are in a multilateral prisoner’s dilemma does not mean
that international law no longer matters. It is important to note that the Mem-
ber States do share an interest in ensuring the free flow of goods in the re-
gion. This is shown by the region’s successful tari↵ liberalization e↵orts.238 For
ASEAN, international law can be used to address the uncertainty and informa-
tion issues plaguing NTMs and NTBs.
The prerequisite for compliance in prisoner’s dilemmas is that the States know
the distinction between acts of cooperation and defection.239 Ideally, interna-
tional law instruments240 clarify any ambiguities by identifying the focal points
for State behavior. However, ASEAN treaties and soft law instruments have
consistently used general and vague language in describing commitments, thus
leaving room for doubt as to the exact obligations of Member States. Examples
of this include the following:
1. Regarding the obligation to ensure the transparency of permissible NTMs,
237. Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 148.
238. ASEAN Secretariat, AEC Blueprint, 7.
239. Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 31.
240. Such as treaties and soft law documents.
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the ATIGA requires Member States to ensure that NTMs are “not pre-
pared, adopted or applied with the view to, or with the e↵ect of, creat-
ing unnecessary obstacles in trade among the Member States”.241 Mem-
ber States are likewise bound to ensure that standards, technical regula-
tions, and conformity assessment procedures “do not create unnecessary
obstacles to trade”.242 However, what constitutes an unnecessary obsta-
cle to trade is left undefined. Apart from rea rming the Member States’
rights and obligations under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT Agreement),243 the specific goals and actions needed to identify and
address unnecessary standards are not detailed. Indeed, ATIGA merely
echoed the general provisions of the TBT Agreement without addressing
how these will be implemented in the diverse political, economic and cul-
tural contexts of the Member States. The result is that the ATIGA has
failed to establish e↵ective focal points which Member States may align
their legal regimes and practices to.
2. Member States are obliged to review the NTMs reported by the other
Member States in the ASEAN Trade Repository Database244 in order to
identify and eliminate NTBs. Member States are likewise obliged to main-
tain the transparency of NTMs.245 In view of this, the database should
ideally shed light on both the rationale and mode of enforcement of NTMs.
However, the binding nature of these commitments are weakened by the
ATIGA itself. It establishes that the NTM database is to be based on the
submissions and notifications of the Member States.246 While the ATIGA
specifies the information needed for the disclosure of proposed measures,
it remains silent on the required information for those NTMs that are
already in force. Thus, the ATIGA grants the Member States ample dis-
cretion with regard to the manner of their compliance.
In fact, as of April 2018, the ASEAN Trade Repository Database is merely
linked to the individual National Trade Repositories of the Member States.
241. Chapter 4, Article 40(2), ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement.
242. Chapter 7, Article 71, ibid.
243. Ibid., Chapter 7, Article 73.
244. This database is established pursuant to Article 13 of the ATIGA, and can be accessed
at http://atr.asean.org.
245. ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, Chapter 4, Article 40.
246. Ibid.
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As the latter are maintained by each of the Member States, the informa-
tion is not presented in a uniform and consistent matter. Specifically,
there is incomplete information on the manner of enforcement, the scope,
and the rationale of the NTMs, all of which are necessary items of infor-
mation for the identification of NTBs. In e↵ect, Member States can hinder
compliance with their obligations vis-à-vis the elimination of NTBs and
the enhanced transparency of NTMs, through their incomplete disclosure
of relevant information.
3. Under ATIGA, Member States can choose from di↵erent measures, or
a combination thereof, “to mitigate, if not totally eliminate, unnecessary
technical barriers to trade”,247 such as the harmonization of standards and
the mutual recognition of conformity assessment results. The broad dis-
cretionary power given to the Member States under this provision, along
with the absence of any specific timeframes or schedules for compliance,
easily enables them to counter any accusations of noncompliance or breach
of their obligations.
4. Under both the AEC Blueprint and the AEC Blueprint 2025, Member
States are obligated to eliminate NTBs and enhance the transparency of
NTMs. However, the implementing details are not specifically defined
or explained. There is a dearth of guidance on which measures can be
considered as NTBs, which standards shall be used as the benchmark in
harmonisation e↵orts, and which measures shall be adopted to enhance the
transparency of NTMs. Also there are no definite deadlines or timeframes
in the AEC Blueprint 2025 for the implementation and completion of the
strategic measures. This level of generality in the definition of strategic
measures makes it di cult to identify cases of noncompliance, breach of
or incomplete compliance with their commitments by the Member States.
5. The ATIGA may have adapted the NTB elimination schedules under the
AEC Blueprint, and used obligatory language in describing the commit-
ment to eliminate NTBs, i.e., “shall eliminate [ . . .]”.248 Neverthe-
less, the list of NTBs for elimination is subject to the agreement of the
AFTA Council.249 It should be pointed out that this body is composed of
247. Chapter 7, Article 73(2), ibid.
248. Ibid., Chapter 4, Article 42(2).
249. Ibid., Chapter 4, Article 42(3).
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ministerial-level nominees and the ASEAN Secretary General.250 Bearing
in mind the “ASEAN Way” of diplomacy, it is doubtful whether such a
Council will really be able to enforce the elimination of NTBs. That the
elimination of identified NTBs is still subject to the discretion of bureau-
crats negates the obligatory character of the ATIGA provision.
Ostensibly, the ATIGA, AEC Blueprint, and AEC Blueprint 2025 promote the
free flow of goods and the creation of a single market and production base. That
the NTB- and NTM-related obligations are contained in both treaty and soft
law instruments seems to imply that the Member States are serious about their
commitments. Nevertheless, this is belied by the general and vague language
used in these instruments, which creates uncertainty as to the precise obligations
of the Member States. No instrument appears to delineate which acts are to be
considered cooperative, and which are to be deemed acts of defection, making it
more di cult for the Member States to overcome this prisoner’s dilemma. The
seemingly obligatory, unequivocal nature of the commitments is also negated
by the ample discretion exercised by the Member States,251 which e↵ectively
allows them to evade their obligations.
Nevertheless, it may be reasonably surmised that considerable political support
exists for guaranteeing the free flow of goods within the region. ATIGA, as a
treaty instrument, necessarily underwent ratification procedures in the Member
States. Legislative consent in the Member States is a credible signal of political
support for this treaty.252 The governments of the di↵erent Member States would
not have been willing to enter a treaty regime if such had not been the case. On
the other hand, domestic support for the removal of protectionist policies is a
di↵erent matter. While the governments may have an interest in promoting free
trade, domestic interest groups253 have an interest in preserving their payo↵s
from protectionist policies. The vague provisions of ATIGA, AEC Blueprint,
and AEC Blueprint 2025 may be a manifestation and result of such interest
groups’ opposition to free trade. The importance of interest group pressure on
trade policy is therefore an important factor to be taken into consideration.254
250. Ibid., Chapter 10, Article 90.
251. For example, in the creation of trade repositories vis-à-vis the elimination of NTBs.
252. Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 91-95.
253. Particularly import-competing producers.
254. See Chapters 3 and 4.
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According to Goldsmith and Posner (2007), cooperation is also possible in re-
peated prisoner’s dilemmas where the game is repeated indefinitely or for a
su ciently long period,255 and where the payo↵s from defection do not out-
weigh the gains from cooperation.256 In a repeated game, compliant States can
punish a breach during the current period by not cooperating in future peri-
ods. For example, a State which imposes increased tari↵s this year in violation
of its trade agreement risks facing retaliatory tari↵s from the other States in
coming years. The losses caused by this tari↵ war may outweigh the defecting
State’s initial gains from the increased tari↵s. Thus, the threat of a trade war
may su ce to encourage compliance by the States. In the ASEAN context,
is intra-regional trade of su cient importance for trade agreements to exert a
compliance pull on the Member States?
For ASEAN, the amount of extra-regional trade is clearly greater than intra-
regional trade. Table 2.7 shows data on total ASEAN trade during 2014 and
2015, broken down per country and for the whole region. The data is presented
in terms of value, expressed in US$ millions, and as a percentage of total trade.
Except for Lao PDR, extra-regional trade accounted for more than half of total
trade. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 present figures for exports and imports for the same
periods, respectively. Extra-regional exports amounted to 74% of total exports,
while extra-regional imports amounted to 78% of total imports. Lao PDR
obtained most its imports from within the region and exported its goods mainly
to ASEAN Member States. Singapore has the highest levels of trade activity in
the region, although its intra-ASEAN trade accounted for only a fourth of its
total trade.
At first glance, intra-regional trade is not as important as extra-regional trade.
The Member States seem to obtain less value, in the form of traded goods, from
within the region than from outside. This is one result of ASEAN’s outward-
oriented trade policies.260 It can be argued that the low value of intra-regional
trade makes the threat of starting a trade war less credible, as Member States
255. Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 31.
256. Ibid., 32.
257. Data from “Intra- and Extra-ASEAN Trade,” accessed December 1, 2016, http://
asean.org/?static_post=external-trade-statistics-3.
258. Data from ibid.
259. Data from ibid.
260. Chia Siow Yue and Michael G. Plummer, “Introduction,” in Realizing the ASEAN Eco-
nomic Community: A Comprehensive Assessment, ed. Michael G. Plummer and Chia Siow
Yue (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009), 7.
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Table 2.7: ASEAN Total Trade257.
Intra-ASEAN 2014 2015
Value %, Total Value %, Total
Brunei Darussalam 3,860.7 27.2 2,644.9 28.2
Cambodia 7,615.5 25.7 4,462.0 22.7
Indonesia 90,725.3 25.6 63,604.8 21.7
Lao PDR 3,496.3 64.9 4,356.9 64.4
Malaysia 118,965.0 26.9 102,890.5 27.4
Myanmar 11,455.0 42.0 11,294.9 39.9
Philippines 25,370.0 19.6 25,600.8 19.9
Singapore 203,196.4 26.2 182,050.7 27.5
Thailand 102,725.3 22.6 104,820.8 25.1
Vietnam 40,797.7 13.9 41,891.1 12.8
Total 608,207.0 24.1 543,617.5 23.9
Extra-ASEAN 2014 2015
Value %, Total Value %, Total
Brunei Darussalam 10,320.1 72.8 6,747.4 71.8
Cambodia 22,039.1 74.3 15,214.2 77.3
Indonesia 263,746.2 74.4 229,372.2 78.3
Lao PDR 1,892.5 35.1 2,406.6 35.6
Malaysia 323,812.9 73.1 272,939.7 72.6
Myanmar 15,801.8 58.0 16,980.5 60.1
Philippines 104,196.9 80.4 103,343.0 80.1
Singapore 572,819.6 73.8 481,058.6 72.5
Thailand 352,800.6 77.4 312,326.6 74.9
Vietnam 252,979.4 86.1 285,852.6 87.2
Total 1,920,408.9 75.9 1,726,241.4 76.1
do not have a lot to lose. This may undermine the compliance pull of the
ASEAN trade regime. Nevertheless, a closer examination of the trade figures
would suggest otherwise.
Table 2.10 shows the top 10 ASEAN export markets and import origins for
2014 and 2015, expressed as a share of total trade. Intra-ASEAN trade clearly
exceeds the trade flow between ASEAN Member States and its other trading
partners. China, with a 19% import share in 2015, is the only partner that
comes close. The shares among the other partners are markedly small com-
pared to the intra-ASEAN flow. The top traded commodities in the region are
261. Data from “Top 10 Export Market and Import Origins,” accessed December 1, 2016,
http://asean.org/?static_post=external-trade-statistics-3.
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Table 2.8: ASEAN Exports258.
Intra-ASEAN 2014 2015
Value %, Total Value %, Total
Brunei Darussalam 2,093.0 19.8 1,239.5 19.5
Cambodia 2,037.9 19.1 819.1 9.3
Indonesia 39,822.2 22.6 33,572.3 22.3
Lao PDR 1,451.3 55.0 2,646.4 71.2
Malaysia 65,238.6 27.9 56,200.4 28.1
Myanmar 4,362.3 39.5 4,289.6 37.5
Philippines 9,211.2 14.9 8,536.9 14.6
Singapore 127,739.2 31.2 118,271.4 32.3
Thailand 59,425.8 26.1 61,925.9 28.9
Vietnam 18,260.5 12.3 18,063.7 11.1
Total 329,642.1 25.5 305,565.2 25.9
Extra-ASEAN 2014 2015
Value %, Total Value %, Total
Brunei Darussalam 8,491.1 80.2 5,110.6 80.5
Cambodia 8,643.5 80.9 8,019.4 90.7
Indonesia 136,470.5 77.4 116,710.0 77.7
Lao PDR 1,188.6 45.0 1,067.9 28.8
Malaysia 168,688.7 72.1 143,668.8 71.9
Myanmar 6,668.3 60.5 7,142.2 62.5
Philippines 52,598.7 85.1 50,111.6 85.4
Singapore 282,029.5 68.8 248,072.9 67.7
Thailand 168,147.8 73.9 152,470.3 71.1
Vietnam 129,831.0 87.7 143,950.1 88.9
Total 962,757.7 74.5 876,323.8 74.1
electrical machinery, equipment, and parts.262 Exports and imports of electrical
machinery amounted to 25% and 23% of total exports and imports, respectively,
in 2015.263 These trade patterns are due, among others, to the Member States’
increased participation in production networks. In fact, the AFTA has one of
the highest intra-regional shares of exports of parts and components (28%).264
262. This also includes the following: sound recorders and reproducers; television image and
sound recorders and reproducers; and parts and accessories of such articles.
263. “Top 10 ASEAN Trade Commodity Groups,” accessed December 1, 2016, http://
asean.org/?static_post=external-trade-statistics-3.
264. World Trade Organization, technical report (World Trade Organization, 2011), 67, htt
ps://www.wto.org/english/res%7B%5C_%7De/publications%7B%5C_%7De/wtr11%7B%5C_
%7De.htm.
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Table 2.9: ASEAN Imports259.
Intra-ASEAN 2014 2015
Value %, Total Value %, Total
Brunei Darussalam 1,767.7 49.1 1,405.4 46.2
Cambodia 5,577.6 29.4 3,642.9 33.6
Indonesia 50,903.1 28.6 30,032.6 21.0
Lao PDR 2,045.0 74.4 1,710.5 56.1
Malaysia 53,726.3 25.7 46,690.1 26.5
Myanmar 7,092.6 43.7 7,005.3 41.6
Philippines 16,158.8 23.8 17,063.9 24.3
Singapore 75,457.2 20.6 63,779.3 21.5
Thailand 43,299.5 19.0 42,894.9 21.2
Vietnam 22,537.1 15.5 23,827.4 14.4
Total 278,564.9 22.5 238,052.3 21.9
Extra-ASEAN 2014 2015
Value %, Total Value %, Total
Brunei Darussalam 1,828.9 50.9 1,636.8 53.8
Cambodia 13,395.6 70.6 7,194.8 66.4
Indonesia 127,275.7 71.4 112,662.2 79.0
Lao PDR 703.9 25.6 1,338.7 43.9
Malaysia 155,124.2 74.3 129,270.9 73.5
Myanmar 9,133.4 56.3 9,838.3 58.4
Philippines 51,598.2 76.2 53,231.4 75.7
Singapore 290,790.1 79.4 232,985.6 78.5
Thailand 184,652.9 81.0 159,856.2 78.8
Vietnam 123,148.4 84.5 141,902.5 85.6
Total 957,651.3 77.5 849,917.6 78.1
Taken together, these trade trends support the argument that ASEAN non-
compliance can be traced to the failure of the trade regime to establish focal
points for coordination. Given the importance of production and supply chains
in ASEAN, trade links are rather important to the economies of the Member
States. Looking at the actual trade shares between ASEAN and its partners,
and bearing in mind the role of ASEAN in global value chains, intra-ASEAN
trade becomes sizable and significant.265 This contradicts the notion that the
Member States do not reap significant gains from intra-regional trade. As such,
trade agreements should exert a compliance pull on these countries.
265. “But if one controls for the size of the ASEAN economies in global trade, intra-ASEAN
trade is actually four times higher than would be the case if these were randomly distributed
countries.” Yue and Plummer, “Introduction,” 5.
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Given their intent to establish the AEC, the Member States clearly envision
increased intra-regional trade and other economic activities. This satisfies the
requirement of repeated interactions between the States. The importance of
intra-regional trade shows that there are gains in sustaining long-term trade
relations between the Member States. Long-term cooperation, which results
in the free flow of goods within the region, is more beneficial than short-term
gains derived from protectionist trade policies. The Member States’ failure
to overcome the prisoner’s dilemma can thus be reasonably attributed to the
general and vague language of ASEAN’s legal instruments, which have failed to
establish the necessary focal points for cooperation.
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The uncertainty generated by such instruments has repercussions on the e↵ec-
tiveness of reputation as a compliance incentive.266 This is a serious weakness
given that neither reciprocity nor retaliation e↵ectively encourage compliance
within the region.
The threat of reciprocal defections by compliant Member States is not credible
for a number of reasons. Firstly, this threat is not as e↵ective in the context
of multilateral prisoner’s dilemmas.267 The endeavour to establish the AEC is
precisely such a multilateral setting. Reciprocal defections lack any credibility
since they would undermine the creation of the AEC.
Secondly, the lack of widespread compliance among Member States weakens the
credibility of reciprocity. ASEAN itself has recognized that significant work still
needs to be done to fulfil its NTB- and NTM-related commitments.268 Threats
of reciprocal defections lose credibility where the other Parties themselves are
in breach of, or have failed to su ciently meet, their obligations.
Thirdly, the “ASEAN Way” weakens the e↵ectiveness of reciprocity as a com-
pliance mechanism. Given the importance of flexibility, consultation, and con-
sensus in the region, ASEAN e↵ectively only endorses policies which “satisfy
the ‘lowest common denominator’.”269 Policies, commitments, and even opin-
ions which do not meet the approval of all Member States are seemingly dis-
regarded. Thus, the dissent of a single Member State would su ce to block
implementation of measures and policies, and even the release of statements
critical of other Member States. This flexibility undermines the obligatory pull
of ASEAN commitments. If commitments are no longer obligatory, then there
is less scope for reciprocal defections.
The “ASEAN Way’s” emphasis on sovereignty, and the resulting primacy of
non-interference, further impairs the compliance pull of reciprocity. In partic-
ular, the ASEAN Charter binds the Member States not to interfere in other
Member States’ domestic a↵airs, be they economic or political. Threats of re-
ciprocal actions may be construed as interfering with the other Member State’s
exercise of its sovereign powers. This is particularly likely in the context of
266. Guzman, How International Law Works, 93-96.
267. Ibid., 65.
268. ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Integration Report 2015, 15-17.
269. Leviter, “The ASEAN Charter: ASEAN Failure or Member Failure,” 161.
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NTM-related commitments. Member States need only to claim that the mea-
sures or policies are in pursuit of legitimate national interests. That being so,
the default ASEAN response is, and has always been, a non-response. For
example, neither ASEAN nor any of its Member States criticized Indonesia
when forest fires that had been deliberately started resulted in a region-wide
environmental hazard, or when Indonesian-backed militias launched attacks in
East Timor.270 During the 2017 ASEAN Summit, neither the Rohingya crisis
in Myanmar nor the Philippines’ war on drugs and its alleged human rights
violations were addressed.271 Against this backdrop, it is unlikely that breaches
of NTM-related commitments would elicit reciprocal actions from the Member
States.
As with reciprocity, retaliation is also an ine↵ective mechanism for compliance.
Firstly, the ASEAN enforcement and settlement systems do not even provide
for any penalties or sanctions in the event of breach of obligations. The ASEAN
Secretariat is not even authorized to punish violations of AEC-related obliga-
tions.272 While compensation in cases of breach is available under the Protocol
on Enhanced Dispute Settlement, actual payment is purely voluntary. Thus,
ASEAN enforcement systems lack any coercive power, and ultimately they fail
to alter the payo↵ schemes of Member States, since they fail to make breach
costlier than compliance.
The weaknesses in the region’s enforcement institutions can also be traced
back to the “ASEAN Way”. The preference for diplomatic processes273 has
resulted in the creation of institutions that are incapable of disciplining the
Member States.274 For example, the Senior Economic O cials Meeting is not
even obliged to constitute panels when a Member State initiates proceedings
270. Narine, “Asia, ASEAN and the question of sovereignty,” 159.
271. Reuters sta↵, “Southeast Asia summit draft statement skips over Rohingya crisis,”
Reuters, November 2017, https : / / www . reuters . com / article / us - asean - summit -
myanmar/southeast-asia-summit-draft-statement-skips-over-rohingya-crisis-
idUSKBN1DD0CP; JC Gotinga, “ASEAN summit silence on Rohingya ’an absolute travesty’,”
ALJAZEERA, November 2017, http : / / www . aljazeera . com / news / 2017 / 11 / asean -
summit-silence-rohingya-absolute-travesty-171114211156144.html.
272. Helen E.S. Nesadurai, “Enhancing the Institutional Framework for AEC Implemen-
tation: Designing Institutions that are E↵ective and Politically Feasible,” in The ASEAN
Economic Community: A Work in Progress, ed. Sanchita Basu Das et al. (Singapore: ISEAS
Publishing, 2013), 418.
273. Specifically, for “non-intrusive, intergovernmental mechanisms for decision-making, en-
forcement and adjudication. ibid., 413.
274. Ibid., 412.
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under the Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement. In a way, this ine↵ective
enforcement system complements the policy of non-interference and respect for
national sovereignty. Furthermore, the “ASEAN Way” discourages the resort to
retaliatory actions against policies and decisions enacted pursuant to a Member
State’s exercise of sovereignty. In fact, no Member State has invoked the pro-
visions of the Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement.275 Instead, the weak
and ine↵ective enforcement systems encourage Member States to settle their
di↵erences through diplomatic inter-governmental channels.
In cases where retaliation and reciprocity are ine↵ective, reputation may serve
to tilt the scales in favor of compliance.276 However, the influence of reputation
is lessened by legal uncertainty. When the legal instruments are vague, am-
biguous or incomplete in regard to the nature and content of the obligations,
the reputational costs are lessened.277 As a wide variety of measures can qual-
ify as NTMs, Member States can plausibly claim that they have inadvertently
failed to comply with their obligations. For this same reason, it is di cult to
assert that another Member State has failed to address problematic NTMs. In-
stances such as these are not equivalent to intentional and clear-cut violations
of international law, resulting in considerable reputational costs. This weak-
ness illustrates the importance of the ASEAN Trade Repository, as this would
provide greater transparency. Greater transparency promotes compliance as it
is “less likely that a violation will be perceived as compliant or that compliant
behavior will be perceived as a violation.”278
2.5 Conclusion
The compliance decisions of rational, self-interested States with their interna-
tional law obligations is a multifaceted variable. In the setting of trade policy, it
is in the interests of States to pursue cooperative actions in order to ensure at-
tainment of the highest possible payo↵s. In ASEAN, this cooperative endeavor
is embodied in both treaty and soft law instruments, which would suggest that
the Member States are serious about achieving their goal of creating the AEC.
275. ASEAN Public Information, e-mail to author, August 29, 2016.
276. Guzman, How International Law Works.
277. Ibid., 93.
278. Guzman, How International Law Works, 96.
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However, an examination of the language used in these instruments suggests
that the mere enactment of such legal instruments may not su ce to guarantee
Member States’ compliance. In failing to establish the focal points for coordi-
nation, these instruments have failed to promote cooperation and compliance.
The rational choice compliance theories suggest that other mechanisms, primar-
ily reputation, reciprocity and retaliation, determine the compliance decisions
of States. An examination of the enforcement and dispute settlement mecha-
nisms in ASEAN, however, suggests that these “Three Rs of Compliance” may
not su ce to e↵ectively incentivize compliance by the Member States. This
discussion thus o↵ers one possible explanation for the persistence of NTMs and
NTBs in Southeast Asia.
Nevertheless, trade policy is not solely dependent on international law obliga-
tions. The question of why the ASEAN Member States persist in their use of
NTMs and NTBs cannot be convincingly answered by merely looking at the
compliance issue. For example, the political economy literature suggests that
rent-seeking and lobbying activities also play an important role in the setting
of trade policy. Thus, an analysis of other forces, such as the Member States’
intra-state interactions and other institutional characteristics, is needed in order
to identify the factors underlying and motivating the use of NTMs and NTBs
in Southeast Asia.279






The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) represents a shift in the trade poli-
cies of Southeast Asia. Its earlier trade initiatives, such as the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA), were shallow agreements2 focusing exclusively on tari↵
liberalization. The AEC is a deeper form of integration. Deep integration is
“a process of economic integration that erodes di↵erences in national economic
policies and regulations and renders them more compatible for economic ex-
change.”3 In the AEC’s case, it involves commitments which a↵ect beyond-the-
border measures such as non-tari↵ measures (NTMs). In particular, ASEAN
Member States are tasked to remove non-tari↵ barriers (NTBs) and harmonize
NTMs. The aim is to facilitate the free flow of goods in order to transform
ASEAN into a single market and production base, with the specific emphasis
on enhancing the region’s capacity to be part of the global production chain.4
This change in regional preferences, from shallow to deeper integration, is not
1. This chapter is based on my paper “Structural Change and Protection: Non-Tari↵
Measures in ASEAN,” in Public Law and Economics: Economic Regulation and Competi-
tion Policies (forthcoming). I would like to thank Emanuela Carbonara, Michael Faure,
Roger van den Bergh, the participants of the EDLE Winter Seminar at Erasmus University
Rotterdam, and the participants of the World Economics Association conference on “Public
Law and Economics: Economic Regulation and Competition Policies 2017” for their valuable
comments.
2. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2011, 110.
3. Soo Yeon Kim, “Deep Integration and Regional Trade Agreements,” in The Oxford
Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade, ed. Lisa L. Martin (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2015), 361.
4. ASEAN Secretariat, AEC Blueprint, 6.
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surprising in light of the increasingly greater role played by the Member States
in production networks.5
The distinguishing feature of today’s production networks is the unbundling of
production stages not only among di↵erent firms but also across di↵erent coun-
tries.6 This is reflected in the growth of trade in intermediate goods, namely
parts and components.7 Today, production networks encompass multiple coun-
tries, and products may entail multiple border crossings up to the final process-
ing stage. Di↵erent and conflicting trade-related domestic laws and regulations,
such as NTMs, thus have the potential to significantly increase the production
costs of production networks.8 The increased transboundary movement of both
intermediate and final goods highlights the importance of deeper integration, as
this lowers trade costs through legal and regulatory convergence, and strength-
ens ties between signatories.9 Notably, increased production network trade is
one of the driving forces behind the surge in deep integration agreements.10 In
fact, the primacy of enhancing production networks in ASEAN is one of the
main factors behind e↵orts to harmonize NTMs and eliminate NTBs.
NTMs include any measure or policy, other than tari↵s, that may a↵ect the price
or quantity of traded goods.11 This definition includes statutes, regulations, and
policies that on the face of it are unrelated to trade. The existing scholarship
generally identifies two types of underlying motivations for the existence of
NTMs, namely (i) concern for public welfare and (ii) political economy goals.12
Measures prompted by concerns for public welfare address market failures, such
5. AFTA has one of the highest intra-regional shares of exports of parts and components
(28%), as noted by the World Trade Organization in the World Trade Report 2011
6. Gianluca Orefice and Nadia Rocha, “Deep Integration and Production Networks: An
Empirical Analysis,” The World Economy 37, no. 1 (2014): 106, doi:-0.1111/twec.12076.
7. Prema–Chandra Athukorala and Jayant Menon, “Global Production Sharing, Trade
Patterns, and Determinants of Trade Flows in East Asia” (2010), 1, https://www.adb.
org/publications/global-production-sharing-trade-patterns-and-determinants-
trade-flows-east-asia.
8. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2011, 111.
9. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2011 ; Orefice and Rocha, “Deep Inte-
gration and Production Networks.”
10. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2011, 109; Kim, “Deep Integration and
Regional Trade Agreements,” 360.
11. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Non-Tari↵ Measures to Trade:
Economic and Policy Issues for Developing Countries, 2.
12. World Trade Organization, technical report (World Trade Organization, 2012), 50, htt
ps://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report12_e.pdf.
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as information asymmetries 13 or externalities. On the other hand, producers
and import-competing sectors may lobby for protection against the e↵ects of
trade liberalization. Politicians who issue such protectionist measures are thus
driven by political economy motives.14 The motivation for NTMs “can best be
deduced from the type of NTM chosen, from the sector to which it is applied,
from its design and implementation, and from its impact.”15 However, even
NTMs with stated legitimate objectives may have unintended consequences on
trade flows, or be used to achieve protectionist aims. Furthermore, those NTMs
having protectionist or discriminatory e↵ects, whether intentional or otherwise,
are NTBs.
There is no one way to categorize or classify NTMs. An easy way to make sense
of these measures is to distinguish them based on their e↵ects, such as price
measures (subsidies), quantity measures (quotas) or quality measures. Price and
quantity measures a↵ect the prices or quantities of traded goods, respectively.
Quality measures impose standards and requirements on either the production
process or product features.16 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and
technical barriers to trade (TBTs) are the most commonly used quality measures
in the world.17 SPS measures aim to protect human, plant and animal life
against contamination and the spread of diseases. TBTs are more general, and
refer to measures which impose technical and quality requirements.18
The motives and e↵ects of NTMs become especially salient in the context of in-
creased participation in production networks. For example, countries may have
di↵erent standards for the quality of products and processes. Lower quality in-
termediate products and processes may compromise the quality of final goods.
However, as the actual quality of intermediate inputs is not immediately ap-
parent, total demand for them may be adversely a↵ected. Quality measures
such as SPS and TBTs may serve to address this information asymmetry by
signaling that the traded goods meet the quality and safety standards of the
importing countries, thus stimulating demand for the intermediate inputs.19
13. There is an information asymmetry where one party to an exchange or transaction has
an informational advantage over the other parties.
14. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2012, 50.
15. Ibid., 51.
16. Ibid.
17. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Non-Tari↵ Measures to Trade:
Economic and Policy Issues for Developing Countries, 4-5.
18. Ibid., 4.
19. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2012, 62.
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Alternatively, SPS and TBTs may act as disguised protectionist measures, as
when these measures require foreign producers to use costlier, and even un-
necessary, production methods. As export costs increase, the market share of
domestic firms increase.20 Thus, NTMs may significantly increase trade costs,
and this hinders the further development of intra-regional production networks.
Considering the role played by production networks in their economies, the
Member States clearly have an interest in minimizing costly trade barriers and
harmonizing trade-related domestic policies.
The persistence of NTMs among the Member States despite the region’s avowed
policy of trade liberalization, is an interesting phenomenon. The increased
participation of the Member States in both production networks and deeper
integration e↵orts coincided with a rising incidence of NTMs. Is there a link
between participation in production networks and trade liberalization e↵orts on
the one hand, and NTM incidence on the other? Did the promotion of trade
in sectors involved in transboundary production networks cause a demand for
protection, in the form of NTMs, in other sectors? These questions drive the
discussion in this chapter.
As a starting point, the emergence of production networks in the Member States
must be placed in due context. From the late 1980s onwards, there was an in-
crease in both the economic importance of production networks and e↵orts to
enhance the region’s attractiveness as a production base. Initiatives like the
AFTA promoted the intra-regional movement of intermediate goods through
the institution of preferential tari↵ rates for networks operating in the Member
States. This contributed to the increased involvement of the Member States
in production networks in the last 2 decades, along with the rise of the indus-
trial and manufacturing sectors. Industries and firms involved in production
networks are clearly the main beneficiaries and proponents of the AEC and of
deeper regional integration. However, the AFTA has also meant the removal of
tari↵ protection for import-competing industries such as agriculture. The rise
of industry and manufactures has also diminished the economic importance of
agriculture. Agricultural producers therefore have an incentive to lobby, and
the complexity and opacity of NTMs makes these measures the ideal form of
protection.
20. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2012, 59-60, 62.
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In other words, the structural changes in the economies of the Member States
may have influenced the interests of political and economic actors, and these
interests are embodied in the enacted instruments, policies, and regulations.
This explains the apparent disconnect between the region’s stated policy of
trade liberalization on the one hand, and the persistence of NTMs and NTBs
on the other. Firms involved in production networks are pushing for freer trade
in intermediate goods. This has led to e↵orts at integration geared towards the
promotion of the region as a production base. However, producers in import-
competing sectors and/or declining industries favor protection. This would
cushion them against losses, preserve jobs, and ensure their market share in
the face of foreign competition. As the governments are prevented by their
international commitments from imposing tari↵s and quotas, they resort to
less transparent means of protection, i.e., NTMs. Thus, structural and policy
changes favoring trade liberalization have created a demand for a more subtle
form of protection in the declining sectors.
At this point, it should be said that this analysis does not aim to prove causa-
tion. The goal is merely to derive useful insights into the use and incidence of
NTMs. This chapter uses a qualitative approach in examining the features of
Member States, production networks and NTM usage. Since NTMs are essen-
tially instruments issued by political actors, this examination shall be guided
by the literature on the political economy of protection. It is hoped that by
looking at the structural characteristics of the Member States, together with
the nature of their involvement in production networks, and the trends and fea-
tures of their NTM usage, useful insights into the use and persistence of NTMs
in the region can be gleaned.
Section 3.2 provides a brief discussion of the literature on the political economy
of protection. Section 3.3 examines the trends in ASEAN, guided by the exist-
ing scholarship. It begins by looking into the rise of production network trade,
as promoted by the region’s trade agreements and policies. This is followed by
an examination of the data in order to to identify any trends in the incidence
of NTMs vis-a-vis the participation of Member States in production networks
and the structural changes in their economies. NTM types, regulated prod-
uct categories, and issuing authorities are also examined to determine whether
the trends support the hypothesis that NTM incidence is the result of political
economy motives. Section 3.4 summarizes.
72
Chapter 3. Motivations Matter:
Changing Preferences and Non-Tari↵ Measures
3.2 Structural Change and the Political Econ-
omy of Protection
The evolving nature of trade is among the main drivers of structural change.
Unbundled production enables more countries, notably those from the develop-
ing world, to participate in manufacturing processes. The increased economic
importance of manufacturing has significant e↵ects in both the economic and
political spheres.
To illustrate, consider the simple case of a country endowed with labor, capital
and land. These resources can be used in either agriculture or manufacturing.21
Labor and land can be used for agricultural purposes, while labor and capital
can be employed in manufacturing. A country with limited capital resources,
such as the majority of developing countries, will mainly focus on agricultural
activities. Agricultural goods will be produced and traded for manufactures.22
As capital accumulates or flows in from foreign investment, increasingly more
labor will be attracted to the manufacturing activities. This increase in capital
initiates the switch from agriculture to manufactures. This change is reflected in
the changing composition of export goods, from primary agricultural products
to manufactured goods.
As a result of this transition: (i) the importance of agricultural products as
export items tends to decline as the economy shifts in favor of manufacturing
activities; and (ii) agriculture’s economic importance, as measured by labor
share and output, will tend to decline relative to manufacturing.23 These struc-
tural changes a↵ect incentives from, and support for, certain kinds of economic
21. Kym Anderson, “Economic Growth, Comparative Advantage, and Agricultural Trade
of Pacific Rim Countries,” Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics 51, no. 3 (De-
cember 1983): 232; Kym Anderson, “Economic Growth, Structural Change and the Political
Economy of Protection,” in The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection: East Asia in
International Perspective, ed. Kym Anderson and Yujiro Hayami (Australia: Allen & Unwin,
1986), 7.
22. Anderson, “Economic Growth, Structural Change and the Political Economy of Protec-
tion,” 7; Anderson, “Economic Growth, Comparative Advantage, and Agricultural Trade of
Pacific Rim Countries,” 232.
23. Anderson, “Economic Growth, Structural Change and the Political Economy of Protec-
tion,” 8.
3.2. Structural Change and the Political Economy of Protection 73
policies. For example, agriculture’s lessened economic significance is often ac-
companied by increased protection relative to export industries.24 As these poli-
cies are nothing but governmental enactments, the political economy theories
on regulation help shed light on the underlying processes and motivations for
di↵erent policies.
One view is that governmental policies, statutes, and regulations are mainly
motivated by politicians’ desire to promote the “common welfare”, “public in-
terest”, or “public good”. Specifically, the public interest theory states that
regulations are necessary to protect the public against market failures such as
information asymmetry, externalities, imperfect competition, and the like.25 For
example, where market forces alone are incapable of generating su cient incen-
tives for optimal information disclosure, i.e., on product safety and quality,
there is room for disclosure regulations and quality standards.26
Critics of the public interest theory have pointed out that regulations often fail
to achieve their stated aims, or that they only do so at great cost.27 This regula-
tory failure can be traced to the self-interest of politicians and regulators, which
is used by private and special interests to influence policies and regulations to
their benefit.28 The private interest or public choice theories of regulation seek
to explain why policies often seem to favor, rather than regulate, their subject
sectors and interests. Politicians and regulators are assumed to interact with
the private sector within the context of a political market. Laws, policies and
regulations are issued only insofar as these can generate public support for the
incumbent. Citizens support public o cials only to the extent that they ben-
efit from these enactments. Public o cials are “captured” by private interests
24. Johan F.M. Swinnen, Anurag N. Banerjee, and Harry de Gorter, “Economic Devel-
opment, Institutional Change, and the Political Economy of Agricultural Protection: An
econometric study of Belgium since the 19th century,” Agricultural Economics 26 (2001):
29; Johan F.M. Swinnen, “A Positive Theory of Agricultural Protection,” American Journal
of Agricultural Economics 76, no. 1 (1994): 1; Johan F.M. Swinnen, “The Political Economy
of Agricultural and Food Policies: Recent Contributions, New Insights, and Areas for Further
Research,” Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 32, no. 1 (2010): 35-36.
25. Anthony Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Hart Publishing, 2004),
29-54; Michael E. Levine and Jennifer L. Forrence, “Regulatory Capture, Public Interest,
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis,” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 6
(1990): 167-168.
26. Ogus, Regulation, 38-41.
27. Ibid., 55-56.
28. Levine and Forrence, “Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda:
Toward a Synthesis,” 169.
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when policies are traded by the former for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary
benefits from private interests.
Stigler (1971) presented this political process as a market for regulation. Indus-
tries can benefit from certain types of regulation, such as subsidies, price fixing
policies, and controls on new entrants.29 However, these benefits are lower than
the social costs imposed on the community. An informed democratic society
would reject industries’ demands for protection.30 However, requiring voters to
decide on every single issue is expensive, as “information must be sought on
many issues of little or no direct concern to the individual.”31 Instead, voters
rely on representatives, namely political parties and politicians, to act and de-
cide for them. Representatives who are able to act and decide in accordance
with the voters’ preferences are the ones who get elected.32
However, discernment of voter preferences is not an easy task. If a minority
group is injured by a certain policy by only a negligible amount, then this
group will have no interest in discovering this and opposing such policy. Only
“strongly felt preferences”33 are adhered to by representatives. Industries are
able to take advantage of this asymmetry. Acting as buyers of regulation, they
can o↵er representatives votes and resources that allow them to stay in power.34
Nevertheless, larger industries are at a disadvantage as benefits accruing to
larger industries impose higher social costs, inciting increased opposition from
voters.35
Some policies and regulations are issued not by elected representatives, but
by bureaucrats and regulators. In this case, it is useful to view capture in
the context of a principal-agent model involving a principal (the government),
the regulator, and the agent (industry).36 Let us assume that the government
aims to maximize social welfare. To incentivize industry to produce enough to
maximize net surplus, the government o↵ers to transfer remuneration to high
29. George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” The Bell Journal of Economics







36. Ernesto Dal Bó, “Regulatory Capture: A Review,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy
22, no. 2 (2006): 207.
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cost industries. This transfer is ultimately borne by consumers.37 Industry,
however, has private information regarding its costs.38 Low cost industries have
an incentive to misrepresent their costs in order to achieve higher profits. This
information asymmetry between the government and industry can be mitigated
by the appointment of a regulator tasked with monitoring industry’s production
costs.39 As truthful regulators who are informed of the true costs can dissipate
industry’s profits, the latter has an incentive to buy the former’s silence either
through positive or negative incentives.40 Regulatory capture “depends on the
amount of information that the regulator may obtain, and on how easy the
environment makes it to bribe regulators.”41
As with elected representatives, information and monitoring costs provide reg-
ulators with considerable discretion in enacting policies, thus shielding them
from public scrutiny.42 This shield ultimately allows regulators to pursue poli-
cies which benefit special interests at the expense of the majority. Regulators
may also cite public interest justifications for policies touching on complex sub-
ject matter, for which information and monitoring costs are particularly high.
This way, regulators can signal that their actions, which are di cult to mon-
itor, are in the general interest and need not be independently verified by the
public.43 Regulators can also take advantage of this information asymmetry by
deliberately choosing vague and complex instruments which mask the extent of
costs borne by the public.44 In addition to complex instruments, regulators can
also enact complex and burdensome administrative processes, which make the
granting of protection to certain industries less conspicuous.45
Olson’s (1964) seminal work on collective action predicts which interest groups
will succeed in influencing political outcomes. Groups aiming for the establish-
ment of a policy which is in the nature of a public good46 are necessarily plagued




40. Ibid., 209, 212-213.
41. Ibid., 210.
42. Levine and Forrence, “Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda:
Toward a Synthesis,” 185.
43. Ibid., 180.
44. Arye L. Hillman, The Political Economy of Protection (Harwood Academic Publishers,
1989), 73.
45. Ibid., 75.
46. Such as benefits or outcomes which are non-excludable and non-rivalrous.
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enjoying the public good even though they did not contribute to the group’s
lobbying e↵orts.47 The larger the group’s membership, the greater this free rider
problem will be, resulting in sub-optimal lobbying e↵orts and contributions from
members. This implies that smaller groups, which have fewer members who can
enjoy the benefits of the policy aimed for, are more successful in their lobbying
e↵orts.48 This is possible since “in some small groups each of the members, or
at least one of them, will find that his personal gain from having the collective
good exceeds the total cost of providing some amount of that collective good x
x x”.49 For example, producer groups can more e↵ectively lobby for, and re-
ceive, favorable policies than more disperse consumer groups.50 Groups which
provide “separate and ‘selective’ incentives”51 are likewise able to overcome the
free rider problem, by either punishing or rewarding members based on their
contributions to the group’s lobbying e↵orts.52
The prediction of the e↵ectiveness of small lobby groups is contradicted by the
ability of some sizable industries, namely agriculture, to successfully obtain fa-
vorable policies. Posner (1974) was among the first to o↵er an explanation for
this. He argued that lobby groups can be likened to cartels, as favorable poli-
cies can maintain group profits close to monopoly prices.53 Nevertheless, while a
large group size may be detrimental for cartels, this characteristic may actually
encourage lobbying e↵orts.54 Firstly, the fact that a sizable group is constrained
from pursuing other options, i.e., organizing a cartel, actually stimulates de-
mand for favorable regulations.55 Secondly, government intervention can take
many forms, ranging from clear-cut quotas and tari↵s to more subtle require-
ments and standards. A heterogenous group will necessarily be composed of
members with asymmetric political power and influence. More powerful and
influential members will have an interest in lobbying for the type of regula-
tion that will benefit them more than other members.56 Lastly, larger groups
47. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
(Harvard University Press, 2002), 11.
48. Ibid., 35-36.
49. Ibid., 33-34.
50. Ogus, Regulation, 71.
51. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, 51.
52. Ogus, Regulation, 51.
53. Richard A. Posner, “Theories of Economic Regulation,” The Bell Journal of Economics
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have voting power, which is an important determinant of political influence in
democratic systems.57
Declining industries have also been identified as a “natural candidate”58 for pro-
tection. Competitive industries which enjoy protection derive economic benefits
therefrom. However, these same benefits can stimulate entry into the industry.
New entrants can dissipate these profits, which will necessarily reduce the in-
dustry’s support for the protectionist government. On the other hand, new
entrants will not be attracted to protected declining industries. Thus, there is
only a given set of beneficiaries from protection, which will remain inclined to
support the government.59
The existing literature supports the idea that structural changes incentivize ad-
versely a↵ected industries and firms to lobby for beneficial regulation. In fact,
previous studies have shown that policies have shifted in favor of agriculture as a
response to certain structural changes that have a↵ected the political incentives
for, and costs and benefits of, protection.60 For one, consumption patterns in
growing economies shift from food to other commodities. This means that con-
sumers are less a↵ected by any price hikes caused by protectionist agricultural
policies, and will o↵er little to no opposition.61
Secondly, as agricultural incomes grow relatively slowly compared to other sec-
tors, farm workers and fishermen are pressured to look for other sources of
income and lobby for increased government support.62 Politicians can increase
support for the agricultural sector in light of this income gap, as this will have
less marginal welfare e↵ects on (higher) manufacturing wages.63
Lastly, the transition from an agricultural to a manufacturing economy is ac-
companied by a decrease in agriculture’s relative and absolute labor share. As
57. Ibid., 347.
58. Hillman, The Political Economy of Protection, 26.
59. Ibid.
60. Swinnen, “The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies,” 36; Swinnen,
Banerjee, and Gorter, “Economic Development, Institutional Change, and the Political Econ-
omy of Agricultural Protection,” 27.
61. Swinnen, “The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies,” 36; Anderson,
“Economic Growth, Comparative Advantage, and Agricultural Trade of Pacific Rim Coun-
tries,” 15.
62. Anderson, “Economic Growth, Comparative Advantage, and Agricultural Trade of Pa-
cific Rim Countries,” 15-16; Swinnen, “The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food
Policies,” 37.
63. Swinnen, “A Positive Theory of Agricultural Protection,” 4.
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there are fewer farmers and fishermen in relative terms, the per unit costs of
protection shouldered by taxpayers also decline.64 The lower labor share also
translates to lower political organization costs. Following Olson’s theory, this
reduced membership should make their lobbying e↵orts more e↵ective.65
The following section will look at the development of, and patterns characteriz-
ing, the Member States, in an attempt to determine how closely they conform
to the theory.
3.3 The ASEAN Experience: A Closer Look
The ASEAN experience began with tentative tari↵ liberalization e↵orts in the
1970s. The regionalization of trade and the growth of production networks
stimulated the creation of new rules and institutions designed to address the
needs of the changing economies. The increased importance of production net-
works and intra-industry trade led to structural changes in the economies of the
Member States, which transitioned from agriculture to industry, manufactures,
and even services.
This economic transformation created a demand for deeper integration in order
to maintain the region’s centrality in the global economy. The focus has now
shifted to measures, i.e., NTMs and NTBs, which a↵ect the free flow of goods
within the region. Paradoxically, however, it seems that the growth of produc-
tion networks itself stimulated the use of NTMs among the Member States.
This section begins with an overview of the growth of production networks in
the region. Section 3.3.2 examines the incidence of NTMs in the context of the
structural changes a↵ecting the Member States.
3.3.1 Changing Trade Patterns
ASEAN’s early regional economic projects were mainly unsuccessful.66 During
the 1960s, the Member States felt little need to pursue regional integration and
64. Swinnen, “A Positive Theory of Agricultural Protection,” 5; Swinnen, “The Political
Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies,” 36.
65. Swinnen, “The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies,” 37.
66. Bowles and MacLean, “Understanding Trade Bloc Formation,” 321-322.
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trade initiatives. Their individual trade policies were mainly protectionist, with
restrictions on the import of manufactures and a strong emphasis on import
substitution.67
A number of political and economic factors during the 1980s contributed to
the formation of AFTA. The changing global political economy, coupled with a
regional economic downturn, forced the largest Member States68 to move from
import-substitution to outward-oriented policies, i.e., the promotion of exports
and foreign direct investment (FDI).69 These policies served to attract, among
others, a significant portion of Japanese FDI.70 This period also saw the rise of
intra-industry, particularly intra-firm, trade in the region. From 1979 to 1988,
intra-industry trade rose by 91% in the Philippines, 90% in Indonesia, 85% in
Thailand, and 64% in Malaysia.71 Trade in parts and components rose from 2%
of intra-regional trade in 1967 to 18% in 1992.72 The growing political clout
of private business interests within ASEAN, which favored trade liberalization,
also played a role in the creation of AFTA.73 Since much of the intra-industry
trade stemmed from the intra-ASEAN activities of multinational corporations,
the idea of the creation of a regional trading area became more appealing.74
In 1992, the Member States75 embarked on the creation of the AFTA. The un-
derlying motivation was “to increase ASEAN’s competitive edge as a production
base geared for the world market.”76 The primary aim was to integrate77 the
region into the global economy by reducing trade costs and making the Member
67. Ian Coxhead, “Southeast Asia’s Long Transition,” in Routledge Handbook of Southeast
Asian Economics, ed. Ian Coxhead (New York: Routledge, 2015), 9.
68. Namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
69. Bowles and MacLean, “Understanding Trade Bloc Formation,” 332.
70. Bowles and MacLean, “Understanding Trade Bloc Formation,” 333; Walter Hatch, Jen-
nifer Bair, and Günter Heiduk, “Connected Channels: MNCs and production networks in
global trade,” chap. 13 in The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International
Trade, ed. Lisa L. Martin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 237; Masahiro Kawai
and Ganeshan Wignaraja, “Trade Policy and Growth in Asia” (Tokyo, 2014), 7, http://
www.adbi.org/working-%20paper/2014/08/15/6375.trade.policy.growth.asia/.
71. Bowles and MacLean, “Understanding Trade Bloc Formation,” 334.
72. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2011, 147.
73. Bowles and MacLean, “Understanding Trade Bloc Formation,” 337-339.
74. Ibid., 334.
75. During this time, ASEAN was composed of Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Vietnam joined in 1995, Lao People’s Democratic
Republic and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.
76. ASEAN Secretariat, “AFTA Reader,” accessed January 3, 2017, http://asean.org/
?static_post=afta-reader-volume-1-november-1993-table-of-contents.
77. Bowles and MacLean, “Understanding Trade Bloc Formation,” 333.
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States more appealing to foreign investors. AFTA implements a sectoral Com-
mon E↵ective Preferential Tari↵ (CEPT) Scheme which covers all manufactured
products, including capital goods, and agricultural products which originate78
from the Member States.79 Under the CEPT Scheme, tari↵s on covered goods
were scheduled to be reduced to a 0-5% range by January 2003.
The AFTA is supplemented by two initiatives, the ASEAN Investment Area
(AIA) and the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme (AICO). AIA aims to
give investors “a framework highly conducive to regional integrated production
activities, procurement, manufacturing and resources based investment activi-
ties.”80 AICO caters specifically to vertically integrated firms engaged in pro-
duction networks in the region, i.e., at least two companies operating in di↵erent
Member States. The output of these companies under AICO-approved projects
are entitled to preferential tari↵ rates of 0-5% and access to the markets of
participating Member States.81 As of 2007, 140 regional supply projects have
been approved under the AICO program.82
Outward-oriented trade policies such as these played a role in the structural
changes experienced by the Member States.83 As tari↵s and trade costs declined
during the 1990s, intra-regional trade and production network-related trade
were stimulated. For example, during the 1990s the composition of traded
goods in ASEAN shifted from primary and natural-resource intensive goods
to manufactures such as electronics, machineries, and transport equipment.84
From 1992/1993 to 2005/2006, AFTA’s exports of parts and components as a
78. A product is deemed to have originated from a Member State if at least 40% of its
contents originates from a Member State.
79. Agreement on the Common E↵ective Preferential Tari↵ (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA), 1992.
80. Tan, “Will ASEAN Economic Integration Progress Beyond a Free Trade Area?,” 942.
81. Ibid.
82. Asian Development Bank, Emerging Asian Regionalism: A Partnership for Shared Pros-
perity, technical report (Philippines, 2008), 62.
83. Yue and Plummer, “Introduction,” 2; Masahiro Kawai and Kanda Naknoi, “ASEAN
Economic Integration through Trade and Foreign Direct Investment: Long-Term Challenges”
(Tokyo, 2015), 3,10, http://www.adb.org/publications/asean-economic-%20integratio
n-through-trade-and-foreign-direct-investment-long-term/; Kawai and Wignaraja,
“Trade Policy and Growth in Asia,” 6.
84. Prema-chandra Athukorala, “Production Networks and Trade Patterns in East Asia:
Regionalization or Globalization? ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integra-
tion” (2010), 5, https://aric.adb.org/pdf/workingpaper/WP56%7B%5C_%7DTrade%7B%
5C_%7DPatterns%7B%5C_%7Din%7B%5C_%7DEast%7B%5C_%7DAsia.pdf; Yue and Plummer,
“Introduction,” 4.
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percentage of total manufactured goods exported increased from 29% to 44%.85
By 2005, “the concentration of component trade in electronics is much larger in
AFTA (over 60%) compared with the regional average.”86 Today, trade in parts
and components, as a share of GDP, “is among the highest in the world in the
ASEAN.”87
Elliott and Ikemoto (2004) used a gravity model to analyze intra- and extra-
regional trade flows in ASEAN to assess the e↵ects of AFTA on intra-regional
trade. Using data from 1982 to 1999, they found that while trade flows were not
significantly a↵ected immediately after the CEPT Scheme was launched, there
was evidence of a positive but gradual AFTA e↵ect.88 Intra-regional trade only
began to increase after the Asian financial crisis of 1997, suggesting that this
economic shock stimulated regional integration e↵orts.89 However, this study
did not distinguish trade in final goods from trade in intermediate goods.
Pomfret and Sourdin (2009) estimated trade cost functions in terms of exoge-
nous country characteristics to determine whether trade facilitation e↵orts in
the region worked to reduce trade costs.90 They used the data for Australian
imports from 1990-2007 at the 6-digit Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System (HS Code) level.91 Asian countries’ trade costs were examined
vis-a-vis the costs of other countries to discern any temporal trends.92
They found that ad valorem trade costs from the ASEAN Member States de-
creased from 10.3% in 1990 to 3.9% 93 in 2007.94 The average costs for Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand fell by more than 50% from
85. Athukorala and Menon, “Global Production Sharing, Trade Patterns, and Determinants
of Trade Flows in East Asia,” 9.
86. Athukorala and Menon, “Global Production Sharing, Trade Patterns, and Determinants
of Trade Flows in East Asia,” 10; Athukorala, “Production Networks and Trade Patterns in
East Asia,” 7.
87. Asian Development Bank, Emerging Asian Regionalism, 64.
88. Elliott and Ikemoto, “AFTA and the Asian Crisis,” 20-21.
89. Ibid., 17.
90. The term “trade costs” was defined as the gap between free-on-board (FOB) values
when a good reaches the port in the exporting country and import values that include cost,
insurance and freight (CIF).
91. The authors opined that Australia would be a good indicator of the trade costs of its
trading partners, as it is a large economy with little geographically discriminatory policies
and limited transport modes for imports.
92. Richard Pomfret and Patricia Sourdin, “Have Asian trade agreements reduced trade
costs?,” Journal of Asian Economics 20, no. 3 (May 2009): 256.
93. This is bigger than the drop from 8% to 5% in the ad valorem trade costs on all other
exports to Australia.
94. Pomfret and Sourdin, “Have Asian trade agreements reduced trade costs?,” 262.
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1990 to 2007.95 The significant decline occurred between 1994-2003, with aver-
age trade costs converging to 4-5.5% in 2007.96 For Indonesia, the Philippines,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, the decline occurred before 2002.97 The
trade costs for Myanmar and Vietnam fell after they joined ASEAN in the
late 1990s.98 The authors concluded that the period of the decrease in trade
costs “corresponds to the period during which AFTA was being established and
suggests that the importance of AFTA lies in the environment for trade facilita-
tion.”99 They also raised the possibility that both the rise in Asian preferential
trade agreements (PTAs) and the decline in trade costs may be linked to the
emergence of production networks, which created a demand for reduced trade
costs.100
Orefice and Rocha (2014) specifically focused on the role played by production
networks in trade. They found dual links between PTAs and production net-
works, i.e., that PTAs generated increases in production network trade, and
that countries involved in production networks were more likely to sign deeper
agreements. They also examined the impact of production network trade on the
probability of Asian countries to sign deeper agreements. For Asian countries,
production networks had a positive and significant e↵ect on the probability of
signing deeper PTAs. Production networks had an insignificant e↵ect on the
same probability for Europe, South and Central America, and Africa.101
Table 3.1 presents the main production network-related industries per Member
State.102 The wholesale and retail trade tops the list, followed by computers
and electronics. Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam are exporters of
agricultural inputs in production networks.






101. Orefice and Rocha, “Deep Integration and Production Networks,” 125-126.
102. As there was no available data for Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) and Myan-
mar, these countries were excluded.
103. “S” denotes that the Member State is a “seller” within the context of production net-
works, i.e., its domestic value added is exported as intermediates. “B” denotes that the
Member State is a “buyer”, i.e., an importer of foreign intermediates to produce exports of
both intermediate and final goods. Data from World Trade Organization, “Trade in Value-
Added and Global Value Chains: Statistical Profiles,” accessed January 3, 2017, https:
//www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/countryprofiles_e.htm.
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Table 3.1: Production Network Industries103.
BN KH ID MY PH SG TH VN
Mining S,B S,B S S
Transport, storage S,B S,B S,B S,B
Other business services S
Construction B
Agriculture S S S S
Textiles B B
Wholesale, retail S,B S S S S S S
Basic metals B B
Chemical products B B S
Computers, electronics S,B S,B S,B B B
Food, beverages B B
Petroleum products B
Motor vehicles B
Machinery and equipment B
3.3.2 Structural Change and Non-Tari↵ Measures
The evolving nature of ASEAN trade has stimulated and enhanced the struc-
tural changes that have been underway since the 1950s. These structural
changes are reflected in the indicators for output, employment and trade, among
others. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate the increased significance of industry and
services for the economies of the Member States, as measured by their contribu-
tion to gross domestic product (GDP). In the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Thailand, the shift from agriculture to industry which began
during the 1950s and 1960s continued during the 1980s and thereafter.104 While
agriculture made up around a quarter of those countries’ total output in 1980,
by 2015 it contributed between 8 to 14% of their total GDP.
The structural change is more dramatic in the newer Member States. Before
Vietnam joined ASEAN, agriculture comprised more than a third of its GDP.
By 2015, agriculture represented only 16% of its GDP. Agriculture’s share in the
GDPs of Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), and Myanmar
dropped from around 50 - 61% to just over 25%. Services currently constitute
the most important sector within the region.
104. Anne E. Booth, Colonial Legacies: Economic and Social Development in East and South-
east Asia (University of Hawai’i Press, 2007), 168-170.
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Table 3.2: Value Added as % of GDP105.
COUNTRY INDICATOR 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Brunei Agriculture 0.63 1.21 0.97 1.16 1.02 0.95 0.73 1.10
Darussalam Industry 84.82 71.81 61.56 54.27 63.67 71.56 68.66 61.36
Services 14.54 26.98 37.48 44.57 35.31 27.49 30.61 37.54
Indonesia Agriculture 25.80 23.76 20.93 17.14 15.60 13.13 13.93 13.52
Industry 44.90 36.71 42.17 41.80 45.93 46.54 42.78 40.01
Services 36.93 41.93 44.71 41.06 38.47 40.33 40.67 43.32
Malaysia Agriculture 23.03 20.28 15.22 12.95 8.60 8.26 10.09 8.45
Industry 41.79 39.23 42.20 41.40 48.32 45.93 37.80 36.43
Services 35.18 40.48 42.59 45.65 43.08 45.81 52.11 55.12
Philippines Agriculture 25.12 24.58 21.90 21.63 13.97 12.66 12.31 10.27
Industry 38.79 35.07 34.47 32.06 34.46 33.83 32.57 30.77
Services 36.10 40.35 43.62 46.31 51.58 53.50 55.12 58.96
Singapore Agriculture 1.57 0.96 0.34 0.16 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.04
Industry 36.23 33.44 32.34 33.75 34.83 32.36 27.63 26.40
Services 62.20 65.60 67.32 66.09 65.07 67.58 72.33 73.56
Thailand Agriculture 23.24 15.81 12.50 9.08 8.50 9.20 10.53 9.14
Industry 28.68 31.84 37.22 37.53 36.84 38.63 40.03 35.72
Services 48.08 52.35 50.28 53.39 54.66 52.17 49.44 55.14
Table 3.3: Value Added as % of GDP106.
COUNTRY INDICATOR 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Cambodia Agriculture 49.62 37.84 32.40 36.02 28.25
Industry 14.83 23.03 26.37 23.25 29.42
Services 35.55 39.13 41.23 40.73 42.33
Lao PDR Agriculture 61.23 55.68 45.17 36.18 31.45 27.38
Industry 14.51 19.24 16.61 24.61 32.29 30.95
Services 24.26 25.08 38.23 39.21 36.26 41.67
Myanmar Agriculture 57.24 46.69 36.85 26.75
Industry 9.69 17.51 26.47 34.54
Services 33.07 35.80 36.68 38.71
Vietnam Agriculture 38.74 27.18 22.73 19.30 18.38 16.99
Industry 22.67 28.76 34.20 38.13 32.13 33.25
Services 38.59 44.06 43.07 42.57 36.94 39.73
105. Data from World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” accessed January 14, 2017,
http://databank.worldbank.org/.
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The declining economic importance of agriculture is also seen in the decreas-
ing agricultural labor force. Table 3.4 shows the percent of the Member States’
population employed in agriculture, industry and services.107 Despite the struc-
tural changes in the Member States, and with the exception of Malaysia and
Cambodia, the agricultural sector still ranks second to services in terms of em-
ployment. In the case of Cambodia, most of its population is still engaged in
agricultural work. As of 2009, 67% and 64% of the economically active popu-
lations in Myanmar and Vietnam, respectively, were in agriculture.108
106. Data from ibid.
107. Brunei Darussalam is excluded due to lack of data.
108. Food and Agriculture Organization, “Food and Agriculture Country Profiles,” accessed
January 16, 2017, http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#home.
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Table 3.4: % of Total Employment109.
COUNTRY SECTOR 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Cambodia Agriculture 73.70 54.10
Industry 8.40 16.20
Services 17.9 29.60
Indonesia Agriculture 56.40 54.70 55.90 44 45.30 44 38.30
Industry 13.1 13.4 13.7 18.4 17.4 18.70 19.30
Services 30.4 31.80 30.20 37.60 37.30 37.20 42.30
Lao PDR Agriculture 85.4 71.30
Industry 3.5 8.30
Services 11.1 20.20
Malaysia Agriculture 37.2 30.4 26 20 18.4 14.6 13.30
Industry 24.1 23.8 27.5 32.3 32.2 29.7 27.60
Services 38.7 45.8 46.5 47.7 49.5 55.6 59.2
Myanmar Agriculture 67.1 66.1 69.7
Industry 9.8 10.6 9.2
Services 23.1 23.3 21
Philippines Agriculture 51.80 50 45.20 44.10 37.10 36 33.20
Industry 15.4 13.8 15 15.6 16.20 15.6 15.00
Services 32.80 36.5 39.70 40.30 46.70 48.5 51.80
Singapore Agriculture 1.3 0.7 0.4 0.2 1.1
Industry 35.7 35.2 37.9 31 21.7 30.40
Services 62.6 63.9 61.7 68.8 77.3 68.90
Thailand Agriculture 70.80 63.30 51.60 48.5 42.60 38.20
Industry 10.3 13.6 18.9 17.9 20.20 20.60




Except for Brunei Darussalam and Indonesia,110 the increased importance of
109. Data from World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”
110. Neither Brunei Darussalam nor Indonesia show any obvious shifts in the composition of
their traded goods. Brunei Darussalam is mainly an exporter of fuels and mineral products,
and an importer of manufactures. In general, Indonesia’s trade in agricultural items, fuels
and minerals, and manufactures have increased during the past decades. A majority of its
imports are manufactures. ibid.
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industry, specifically the manufacturing sector, is also reflected in the composi-
tion of the exports and imports of the Member States. Figures 3.1 to 3.6 depict
the trends in the exports and imports of the Member States by commodity.111
The trends for Cambodia and Vietnam are shown in Figures 3.1 (Cambodia)
and 3.2 (Vietnam). These newer Member States trade mainly in manufactures,
and this trade intensified shortly after their entry into ASEAN.112 Cambodia’s
leading traded products are textiles and clothing.113 The textile industry is also
the country’s leading importer of foreign inputs for items which are subsequently
exported as intermediate products, i.e., items which are meant for further pro-
cessing. It is reasonable to suppose that this sector’s involvement in production
networks is one reason for the increasing textile imports. Starting from the
early 2000s, Cambodia’s imports of machinery and transport equipment also
began to increase. One possible explanation for this is Cambodia’s increased
participation in transport industry production networks.114
Figure 3.1: Cambodia Exports and Imports115.
Vietnam’s exports and imports of manufactures steadily rose during the early
2000s, following its joining ASEAN in 1995. By 2015, trade in manufactures
greatly surpassed trade in agricultural, fuel and mining products. Vietnam’s
leading export industries are food and beverages, wholesale and retail trade, and
textiles. However, exports and imports of machineries and transport equipment,
including parts and components thereof, are considerably greater than its trade
111. Due to insu cient data, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar are excluded.
112. Cambodia and Vietnam joined ASEAN on 1999 and 1995, respectively.
113. World Trade Organization, “Time Series on International Trade,” accessed January 3,
2017, https://stat.wto.org.
114. World Trade Organization, “Trade in Value-Added and Global Value Chains: Statistical
Profiles.”
115. Data from World Trade Organization, “Time Series on International Trade.”
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in other products.116 This may be due to the country’s involvement in computers
and electronics production networks. In fact, this industry is the top importer
of foreign inputs for exported intermediate items.117
Figure 3.2: Vietnam Exports and Imports118.
Trends in exports and imports for the remaining Member States can be seen in
Figures 3.3 (Malaysia), 3.4 (the Philippines), 3.5 (Singapore) and 3.6 (Thai-
land). These Member States’ trade in manufactures noticeably increased during
the early 1990s. This coincided with the launch of the AFTA. While this is not
conclusive proof of causality, it is likely that the AFTA stimulated and con-
tributed to this trade growth. These Member States are also active participants
in production networks, most notably in the information and communication
technology sector.119 The active trade in machineries, particularly of electronics
parts and components,120 reflects the importance of this sector in these Member
States.
Figure 3.3: Malaysia Exports and Imports121.
116. World Trade Organization, “Time Series on International Trade.”
117. World Trade Organization, “Trade in Value-Added and Global Value Chains: Statistical
Profiles.”
118. Data from World Trade Organization, “Time Series on International Trade.”
119. Kawai and Naknoi, “ASEAN Economic Integration through Trade and FDI,” 3.
120. World Trade Organization, “Time Series on International Trade.”
121. Data from ibid.
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Figure 3.4: Philippines Exports and Imports122.
Figure 3.5: Singapore Exports and Imports123.
Figure 3.6: Thailand Exports and Imports124.
This increasing trade in manufactures coincided with an increased involvement
in production networks. These trends imply that the region’s trade policies
promoted increased participation in production networks. In particular, liber-
alized tari↵s within the context of the region’s trade agreements coincided with
increased trade in parts and components. The decision to pursue a deeper form
of integration in ASEAN was also reached in this context. With increased intra-
regional trade links, it is now in the Member States’ common interest to reduce
122. Data from ibid.
123. Data from ibid.
124. Data from ibid.
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trade costs between one another. In this way, they became more amenable to
trade liberalization.125
The lessened role of agriculture, however, also coincided with the rising incidence
of NTMs. Figure 3.7 illustrates the trends in both tari↵s and NTMs in the
region. The bars indicate the number of NTMs which are in force per year in
the region. The averages of both applied and most favored nation (MFN) tari↵
rates are indicated by the two lines. It is apparent that the decline in average
tari↵ rates coincided with the increasing incidence of NTMs. This begs the
question: are NTMs used as a substitute for tari↵s as a source of protection?
Figure 3.7: NTMs Initiated, 2001-2015126.
The idea that NTMs are used in lieu of tari↵s is not new.127 The theory is
“that treaties that remove or reduce one type of distortion may lead to the use
of other policies that are even worse”,128 such as NTBs. In the ASEAN case,
however, the analysis of this issue must be conducted bearing in mind that
tari↵ liberalization was pursued in order to foster regional production networks.
The question then becomes: are NTMs used to protect domestic industries that
although unconnected with production networks, were a↵ected by the structural
changes brought about by tari↵ liberalization?
125. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2011, 145; Orefice and Rocha, “Deep
Integration and Production Networks,” 107; Kim, “Deep Integration and Regional Trade
Agreements,” 367.
126. Adapted from Ing et al., “Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN: A Simple Proposal,” 22.
127. Ibid.
128. Simon P. Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt, “Nontari↵ Barriers and Trade Liberalization,”
Economic Inquiry 41, no. 1 (January 2003): 80.
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Alternatively, rising NTM incidence may be due to an increased demand for reg-
ulations in an increasingly modernized and globalized economy. Rising incomes
lead to increased demand for both product variety and quality. In other words,
“trade liberalization leads to import-quality heterogeneity which itself causes reg-
ulatory controls.”129 In the context of production networks, NTM use may be
the outcome of increased demand for both process and product quality. As
production processes become increasingly unbundled, countries involved in pro-
duction networks are driven to impose high quality standards. Quality measures
in particular may serve to address information asymmetries, by signaling that
products and processes comply with generally accepted international standards.
This serves the dual purpose of: (i) ensuring that intermediate and final goods
are compliant with the standards and regulations of the ultimate consumers,
i.e., developed countries; and (ii) enabling producers to signal the quality of
their production processes and products to their buyers. In this context, are
NTMs used to promote and enhance production networks?
If the use of NTMs was due to an increased regulatory demand, there would be
a greater incidence of measures dealing with the quality of products and pro-
cesses, i.e., SPS and TBTs.130 The regulatory demand hypothesis may also be
supported by the issuance of NTMs by governments’ health and environmen-
tal agencies, as there is a presumed public welfare motive for these measures.
Still, the possibility that these ministries are vulnerable to capture and lobby-
ing should not be discounted.131 The use of health, safety, and other welfare
justifications may merely be a ruse to “generate general support or tolerance
for actions or policies that cannot be fully monitored”.132 On the other hand,
NTMs which a↵ect “declining industries”133 and which were issued by trade
or industry agencies134 may evidence protectionism. Declining industries have
a greater incentive to lobby for protection from industry or trade agencies in
order to protect them against further losses. Additionally, since new entrants
129. Ing et al., “Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN: A Simple Proposal,” 23.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid., 28.
132. Levine and Forrence, “Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda:
Toward a Synthesis,” 180.
133. Richard E. Baldwin and Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, “Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying:




134. Ing et al., “Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN: A Simple Proposal,” 28.
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are unlikely in declining industries, incumbent industry players are the sole re-
cipients of the benefits of protection. Industry’s support for the government is
preserved.
The identity of the issuing authorities is thus enlightening. Table 3.5 shows a
breakdown of total ASEAN NTMs based on the issuing authorities. Regional
health ministries are the leading issuing authority, being responsible for 31.3%
of total NTMs. However, more than 60% of NTMs have been issued by bodies
which either cannot rely on a presumed public welfare motivation, or which
may be susceptible to capture by local interests. This warrants a closer look at
the trends in each of the Member States.
Table 3.5: ASEAN NTMs By Issuing Authority, as of 2015135.
Ministry/Agency Number of NTMs Percentage of NTMs
Ministry of Health 1868 31.3%
Ministry of Agriculture 1865 31.2%
(including forestry, plantation, fisheries)
Other institutions 759 12.7%
Ministry of Trade 468 7.8%
Ministry of Industry 425 7.1%
Ministry of Environment 178 3.0%
Cabinet O ce, State Secretary 175 2.9%
World Trade Organization 87 1.5%
Ministry of Finance 86 1.4%
Ministry of Energy 64 1.1%
A number of characteristics suggest that the use of NTMs in Brunei Darussalam,
Malaysia and Singapore can be supported by the regulatory demand hypothe-
sis.136 Firstly, the number of NTMs in Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia have
been relatively stable in recent years. It is true that the number of NTMs in
Brunei Darussalam increased noticeably from 2000 (74 NTMs) to 2001 (424).
However, by the end of 2013, Brunei Darussalam had 516 NTMs in force. In
the case of Malaysia, the number of NTMs rose from 579 in 2000 to 713 by
2014. These numbers show that increased participation in production networks
135. Adapted from Ing et al., “Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN: A Simple Proposal,” 29.
136. “Non-Tari↵Measures Based on O cial Regulations, ASEAN,” accessed January 3, 2017,
http://asean.i-tip.org/.
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did not coincide with the increased incidence of NTMs. Secondly, a majority
of the NTMs in Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia have been issued by health
ministries. 68.6%137 and 70.41%138 of the NTMs in Brunei Darussalam and
Malaysia, respectively, were issued by their Ministries of Health. It can be as-
sumed that these NTMs were issued by health ministries acting in accordance
with their mandate, i.e., to promote public health. Nevertheless, it is equally
possible that public health motivations were used merely as a ruse to justify
possibly protectionist policies.
Thirdly, the high incidence of TBTs and SPS measures in foodstu↵s and agri-
cultural products in Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and Singapore suggests that
the aim is to enhance the quality of these products, thus supporting the regu-
latory demand hypothesis. It is also worth noting that some of the mosthighly
regulated products139 are used in production network trade. Since production
network trade in these Member States does not appear to have been adversely
a↵ected, the NTMs could be functioning as a signal of product quality and
safety.
For the other Member States,140 however, a number of characteristics indicate
that there may be underlying political economy motives. These motives may
have resulted from their increased participation in production networks. Firstly,
the increasing trend in NTMs coincided with their enhanced participation in
production networks. Figures 3.8 to 3.11 show the time trends of NTMs in
Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. For these Member States, there
is a clear upward trend in the incidence of NTMs. This trend is more noticeable
in countries141 which, until recently, were not as involved in production networks
as the other Member States. This suggests that there is a link between increased
participation in production networks and the use of NTMs.
137. Christina Ruth Elisabeth, “Classification of Non-tari↵ Measures in Brunei Darussalam,”
in Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN, ed. Lili Yan Ing, Santiago Fernandez de Cordoba, and
Olivier Cadot (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN, 2016), 41, http : / / asean . i -
tip.org.
138. Evelyn S. Devadason, V.G.R. Chandran, and Tang Tuck Cheong, “Non-tari↵ Measures
in Malaysia,” in Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN, ed. Lili Yan Ing, Santiago Fernandez de
Cordoba, and Olivier Cadot (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN, 2016), 89, http:
//asean.i-tip.org.
139. These are machineries and electrical products, for Singapore, and foodstu↵s and chemical
products, for Malaysia.
140. Lao PDR and Myanmar were excluded from this analysis due to insu cient information
regarding their participation in production networks.
141. Namely Indonesia, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
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Figure 3.8: Cambodia NTMs, 2000-2015142.
Figure 3.9: Indonesia NTMs, 2000-2015143.
Figure 3.10: Thailand NTMs, 2000-2015144.
142. Adapted from Ing et al., “Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN: A Simple Proposal,” 25.
143. Adapted from ibid., 26.
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Figure 3.11: Vietnam NTMs, 2000-2015145.
Secondly, the NTMs in these Member States mainly a↵ect agricultural prod-
ucts and foodstu↵s. Table 3.6 shows the total NTMs a↵ecting di↵erent indus-
tries, expressed as a percentage of total NTMs, in Cambodia (KHM), Indonesia
(IDN), the Philippines (PHL), Thailand (THA), and Vietnam (VNM). 62% of
the NTMs in these Member States a↵ect agricultural and food products. Ma-
chineries are the second most regulated product category, with 12% of total
NTMs. Among these Member States, Indonesia’s NTMs are mainly focused on
agricultural and food products.
Table 3.6: NTMs per Industry, as a %146.
IDN KHM PHL THA VNM Overall
Agricultural, Food 95 32 28 9 47 62
Chemicals 3 19 16 30 12 11
Light manufactures 1 23 22 12 23 9
Metals 0 4 9 6 5 3
Machineries 0 18 21 36 10 12
Others 0 3 5 8 3 3
Agricultural and food products are also among the most intensely regulated
products in these countries. All the traded products in Cambodia, including
144. Adapted from ibid.
145. Adapted from ibid.
146. Data from “Non-Tari↵ Measures Based on O cial Regulations, ASEAN.”
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agricultural products, are subject to at least 3 NTMs.147 In Indonesia, 9% of
the tari↵ lines of animal and animal products are subject to 3 or more NTMs.148
Agricultural products and foodstu↵s are likewise subjected to at least 3 NTMs
in Thailand.149 The most regulated products in these Member States include a
number of their main crops, such as rice, sugar cane, vegetable varieties, co↵ee,
sweet potatoes and other tubers, and tobacco. Edible meats, fish and di↵erent
kinds of seafoods, along with preparations thereof, are also among the most
regulated animal products.150
While most of the measures aim to ensure the quality and safety of agricultural
products, others seem motivated by non-quality concerns. Table 3.7 shows the
breakdown of NTMs by type, expressed as a percentage of total NTMs, in these
Member States. A majority of NTMs are quality measures, i.e., SPS (43%) and
TBTs (31%). However, more than 25% of NTMs fall under other NTM types
such as pre-shipment inspections and other formalities (PSI), quantity mea-
sures (QTY), price control measures (PCE), finance measures (FIN), measures
a↵ecting competition (COMP), and export-related measures (EXP). Cambo-
dia, the Philippines, and Vietnam all impose export-related measures (EXP)
on a number of products.151
147. Sotharith, Ruth Elisabeth L. Tobing, and Widiana, “Classification of Non-tari↵ Mea-
sures in Cambodia,” 60-61.
148. Ernawati Munadi, “Indonesia’s Non-tari↵ Measures: An Overview,” in Non-Tari↵ Mea-
sures in ASEAN, ed. Lili Yan Ing, Santiago Fernandez de Cordoba, and Olivier Cadot (Eco-
nomic Research Institute for ASEAN, 2016), 71, http://asean.i-tip.org.
149. Chedtha Intaravitak, “Non-tari↵ Measures in Thailand,” in Non-Tari↵ Measures in
ASEAN, ed. Lili Yan Ing, Santiago Fernandez de Cordoba, and Olivier Cadot (Economic
Research Institute for ASEAN, 2016), 146-148, http://asean.i-tip.org.
150. “Non-Tari↵ Measures Based on O cial Regulations, ASEAN.”
151. Export-related measures include, but are not limited to, quotas, export prohibitions,
licensing requirements, and quantitative restrictions.
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Table 3.7: NTMs by Type, in %152.
IDN KHM PHL THA VNM Overall
SPS 70 14 12 6 31 43
TBT 19 29 8 89 29 31
PSI 10 0 3 0 0 6
QTY 0 9 1 1 0 1
PCE 0 5 10 1 13 3
FIN 0 0 3 0 0 1
COMP 0 0 24 0 12 5
EXP 1 43 37 3 14 11
A closer look at these NTMs shows that they do not primarily aim to promote
quality and safety. For example, a price control measure in Cambodia provides
that the value-added tax on the importation of certain agricultural items, such
as vegetables and cereal seeds, shall be borne by the State.153 Indonesia can
postpone the importation of meat products if the domestic price of beef is lower
than the reference price of the former.154 The import of fish and other kinds of
seafood is only allowed in the Philippines if needed for food security155 or, in
the case of institutional buyers, if these items are not endemic in the country156.
And a regulation in Vietnam discourages imports of items which can be sourced
domestically, such as sugar, fish and seafood.157
Given the high incidence of NTMs on agricultural goods, their corresponding
trade patterns also bears looking into. With the exception of the Philippines,
these Member States are exporters of agricultural inputs for production net-
works.158 However, agricultural exports are greatly outnumbered by manufac-
tures exports. On the other hand, for the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam,
152. Data from “Non-Tari↵ Measures Based on O cial Regulations, ASEAN.”
153. Prakas No. 303 on the Implementation of the Value Added Tax on the Importation and
the Supply on Certain Goods.
154. Ministry of Trade Regulation No. 46/M-DAG/PER/8/2013.
155. Fisheries Administrative Order No. 195, series of 1999, Rules and Regulations Governing
Importation of Fresh/Chilled/Frozen and Fishery Aquatic Products.
156. Fisheries Memorandum Order No. 001, series of 2000, Guidelines in the processing of
applications for importation for fresh/chilled/frozen fish and fishery/aquatic products.
157. “Non-Tari↵ Measures Based on O cial Regulations, ASEAN.”
158. See Table 3.1.
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trade in machineries159 and chemicals is seemingly una↵ected by the high num-
ber of NTMs a↵ecting these products. Cambodian and Vietnamese trade in
light manufactures160 are likewise una↵ected.161 As Table 3.1 shows, these Mem-
ber States are involved in production network trade in these industries. It can
be surmised from this that NTMs on machineries, manufactures, and chemicals
serve to promote production network trade, that is, as a signal of quality.
As NTMs fail to promote trade (including production network trade) in agricul-
ture, the possibility that these have underlying protectionist motivations cannot
be denied. The decrease in the number of people employed in agriculture may
have made lobbying by the agricultural sector easier and more e↵ective. That
there is still a sizable agricultural workforce despite this fall in numbers, implies
that this sector has much to gain by lobbying for, and gaining, protection. In
addition, the agricultural workforce can deliver much-needed votes at elections.
The demand for NTMs in favor of agriculture may also come from landowning
entities, such as corporations and cooperatives. A recent agricultural census in
Cambodia identified 101 agricultural holdings of legal entities operating over
806,628 hectares.162 Compared to the 2.13 million household agricultural hold-
ings, working 3.30 million hectares,163 the number of legal entity holdings is
small. However, while around 90% of agricultural households conducted their
activities on less than 4 hectares,164 legal entities operated on large plantation
areas of at least 1000 hectares, with 5 entities operating on 47% of those 806,628
hectares.165
Vietnam also has a pattern of legal entities operating larger agricultural hold-
ings. Table 3.8 shows the structure of agricultural units in Vietnam according
to land use. As with Cambodia, household units are mainly smallholders, with
84% of households operating only 2 hectares or less. Holdings of legal entities,
159. Including transport products, computers, and electronics.
160. Including clothing and textiles.
161. World Trade Organization, “Time Series on International Trade.”
162. National Institute of Statistics, Census of Agriculture in Cambodia 2013: National Report
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including both enterprises and cooperatives, operate the larger holdings.166
Table 3.8: Agricultural Units in Vietnam, 2011167.




Data from the Philippines provide information on the size, structure and legal
status of agricultural holdings. Table 3.9 shows the percentage of holdings and
agricultural area that operate small168 and large169 holdings. It is noteworthy
that while large holdings account for only 2% of total holdings, these operate
21% of total agricultural area in the Philippines.
Table 3.9: Structure of Land Holdings in the Philippines,
2002170.
0-2 hectares 10-50 hectares
Holdings 68% 2%
Agricultural Area 26% 21%
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 show the structure of agricultural units in the Philip-
pines based on the legal status of rights holders and the type of tenure. As
with Cambodia, the number of agricultural holdings of legal entities is small.
Moreover, less than half of the holdings are owned by the rights holders. A
majority of holdings are under other forms of tenure, such as rentals or ten-
ancy arrangements. This implies that while 99% of all holdings are operated by
civil persons, such as agricultural households, these holdings are not necessarily
owned by them.
166. General Statistics O ce, Results of the 2011 Rural, Agricultural and Fishery Census,
technical report (2012), 269, www.fao.org/world-census-agriculture/wca2020/wca2010/
countries2010/en/.
167. Data from ibid.
168. Measuring 2 hectares or less.
169. Measuring 10 to 50 hectares.
170. Data from Sarah K. Lowder, Jakob Skoet, and Terri Raney, “The Number, Size, and Dis-
tribution of Farms, Smallholder Farms, and Family Farms Worldwide,” World Development
87 (2016): Appendix Table 3.
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Table 3.10: Legal Status of Holdings in the Philippines,
2002171.
Number of Holdings Area(ha)






Table 3.11: Tenure of Holdings in the Philippines, 2002172.
Number of Holdings Area(ha)
Under 1 Form of Tenure 3,322,411 6,565,776
Owned 2,292,666 4,896,765
Rented 989,885 1,573,815
Under other single forms 27,267 72,650
Not reported 12,593 22,546
Under More Than 1 Form of Tenure 1,500,328 3,105,017
Total 4,822,739 9,670,793
The apparent trend is for agricultural households to operate small holdings,
while legal entities operate large holdings, i.e., plantations. It is reasonable to
suppose that, given their similar interests, this small group of legal entities can
organize and lobby for regulations in their benefit. As the agricultural sector
has been declining in recent decades, no beneficial policies and regulations in
favor of this sector will be su cient to entice new entrants. Possible variations
in the issued NTMs also make it possible to tailor regulations in order to limit
any benefits to certain beneficiaries only, i.e., large plantations and corporate
entities.
The identity of the issuing authorities in these countries is also telling. Table
3.12 below indicates the percent of total NTMs attributable to the main issuing
171. Data from Food and Agriculture Organization, “2000 World Census of Agriculture:
Main Results and Metadata by Country (1996-2005),” accessed January 16, 2017, http:
//www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1595e/i1595e.pdf.
172. Data from ibid.
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authorities in these Member States. Agriculture ministries are the most prolific,
issuing a majority of the NTMs. Thailand stands out for having the most active
health ministry in terms of NTM issuances. Industry ministries also figure
prominently in Indonesia, Thailand, and Cambodia.
Table 3.12: % of NTMs, by Issuing Authority173.
Agriculture Industry Health Trade
Cambodia 30 14 12
Indonesia 14.4 21.8 29.2
Philippines 36.8
Thailand 29.1 14.5 42.6
Vietnam 34.2 16.62
Unlike NTMs issued by health ministries, those issued by trade, industry, and
other government bodies do not have the underlying presumption of promoting
public health. NTMs issued by agriculture ministries could support either the
regulatory demand hypothesis174 or the political economy hypothesis. However,
bearing in mind that the agricultural sector has a lot to gain from lobbying
for protection, agriculture ministries might be captured by lobby and interest
groups. NTMs issued by trade and industry ministries are equally likely to have
a protectionist intent. Considering that Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam
are buyers of imported intermediate inputs which are subsequently exported
within the context of production networks,175 these ministries might be aiming
to protect domestic industries that feel threatened by the influx of imports.
Another factor to consider is that, unlike tari↵ legislation, measures issued by
these regulatory agencies are not subject to review and revision by newly elected
173. Sotharith, Ruth Elisabeth L. Tobing, and Widiana, “Classification of Non-tari↵ Mea-
sures in Cambodia,” 54-55; Munadi, “Indonesia’s Non-tari↵ Measures: An Overview,” 67-69;
Loreli C. de Dios, “An Inventory of Non-tari↵ Measures in the Philippines,” in Non-Tari↵
Measures in ASEAN, ed. Lili Yan Ing, Santiago Fernandez de Cordoba, and Olivier Cadot
(Economic Research Institute for ASEAN, 2016), 117, http://asean.i-tip.org; Intaravi-
tak, “Non-tari↵ Measures in Thailand,” 145; Vo Tri Thanh, Nguyen Anh Duong, and Tran
Binh Minh, “Non-tari↵ Measures in Viet Nam,” in Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN, ed. Lili
Yan Ing, Santiago Fernandez de Cordoba, and Olivier Cadot (Economic Research Institute
for ASEAN, 2016), 161, http://asean.i-tip.org.
174. In particular, that these NTMs aim to enhance product quality.
175. World Trade Organization, “Trade in Value-Added and Global Value Chains: Statistical
Profiles.”
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o cials.176 This imbues these NTMs with more permanence, making them more
attractive for lobbyists as it becomes cheaper to lobby for protection. More
importantly, much of the processes within these ministries are shielded from
public scrutiny. Society relies on the expertise of specialized bodies, such as
ministries for agriculture and trade, and the stated objectives of regulations,
for due assurance that such regulations are in the interests of public welfare. At
the same time, regulators can take advantage of their concurrent, overlapping
jurisdictions, and of complex bureaucratic processes, to obscure the special in-
terests underlying their actions. Given the nature of regulatory and political
institutions, the information and monitoring costs needed to identify those pro-
tectionist objectives underlying NTMs outweigh any possible gains from such a
process.
Specifically, the political institutions of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thai-
land are known for their endemic rent-seeking and corruption. This makes the
apparently legitimate justifications for the issuance of NTMs in these countries
questionable. The political institutions of these countries are notably suscep-
tible to pressures from economic forces to tilt policies and regulations in the
latter’s favor. Indonesia and Thailand are both characterized by some form of
state capitalism, where state power and machineries are employed to further
the interests of public and private elites.177 The Philippines, on the other hand,
is known for a form of booty or crony capitalism, which allows private elites to
influence the bureaucracy.178
From the 1950s to the 1980s, Indonesia evolved to become a centralized state
under an authoritarian government. Under the banner of economic national-
ism, the Soeharto regime had a heavy hand in the management of the economy.
A number of protectionist trade policies were enacted, such as the establish-
ment of an approved traders program, the creation of both private and public
176. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2012, 66.
177. Paul D. Hutchcroft, “Obstructive Corruption: The Politics of Privilege in the Philip-
pines,” in Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia,
ed. Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2000), 212; Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, “Indonesia: Crisis, Oligarchy, and Reform,”
in The Political Economy of South-east Asia: Markets, Power and Contestation, ed. Garry
Rodan, Kevin Hewison, and Richard Robison (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press,
2006), 111.
178. Hutchcroft, “Obstructive Corruption,” 212.
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import monopolies,179 and the selective granting of licenses and government con-
tracts.180 Badan Urusan Logistik (BULOG), Indonesia’s logistics agency, had
sole rights over the trade in primary commodities such as sugar and rice.181
This political climate created and nurtured “powerful corporate conglomerates
and politico-business families”182 which used state power to protect and develop
their empires.
Despite deregulation during the 1980s, politically-backed cartels still dominated
the economy. Some “public monopolies simply became private monopolies still
backed by the authority of an authoritarian state.”183 This period’s policy re-
forms were limited to export-competitive sectors, while the status quo of state
capitalism prevailed in the domestic markets. For example, Tommy Soeharto
was awarded a monopoly in the clove trade. Cloves being the vital, distinctive
ingredient in kretek, the local type of cigarettes, Soeharto thus had access to
the lucrative cigarette industry.184
After the 1997 financial crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) made
Indonesia dismantle the machineries of state protection, i.e., to abolish state
trading monopolies in sugar, soy beans, and other commodities.185 However,
the rent-seeking relations between public and private actors still dominated
the political scene. After the formal end of the Soeharto regime, the politico-
business oligarchies simply adapted to the new political environment. The void
left by the former centralized state machinery has since been filled by political
brokers and fixers who mediate between political and economic actors.186 Rent-
seeking now occurs within the context of money politics, between the well-
entrenched politico-business interests and politicians who need funding for their
electoral campaigns.187
As with Indonesia, Thai state capitalism is rooted in a centralized authority.
Modern Thailand emerged in 1855 after the signing of the Bowring Treaty.
179. Robison and Hadiz, “Indonesia: Crisis, Oligarchy, and Reform,” 118-119.
180. Michael T. Rock, Dictators, Democrats, and Development in Southeast Asia: Implica-
tions for the Rest (Oxford University Press, 2017), 54.
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Thereafter, the majority of the population was engaged in subsistence agricul-
ture. Royalty and the nobility derived power from their control of land, labor
and trade.188 By the 1920s, Thai society was composed of 3 main elements:
(i) a centralized bureaucracy; (ii) a peasantry which cultivated the land; and
(iii) Chinese and European traders who mainly dealt in rice.189 A bureaucratic
polity190 emerged when the military took control after World War II. Military
and state o cials began to use state enterprises and private capital for their own
interests.191 For example, bureaucrats required a share of the Chinese traders’
profits in exchange for licenses, government contracts, and other concessions.192
Factionalism, favoritism, and nepotism pervaded the bureaucracy. Bureaucrats
used opaque, complex processes in order to abuse their o ce and engage in
rent-seeking activities.193 Additionally, a number of agencies had overlapping
jurisdictions on economic matters.194 This fragmentation enabled powerful bu-
reaucrats to “use sectoral policies to satisfy the demands of their supporters”.195
Policies, such as tari↵ protection and subsidized credit, benefited only a select
group of large firms with ties to the right “big men” in the bureaucracy.196
By the 1980s, this bureaucratic polity had weakened and was replaced by “liberal
corporatism”.197 Business interests organized themselves into associations in
order to lobby, and cooperate with, the State. The business community gained
their own power and influence, separate from that of the bureaucracy. With
this newfound independence, business was able to direct and influence policies
in ways designed to protect its own interests.198 This system transformed the
bureaucratic polity into a “broker polity”, where the prime minister acted as a
188. Kevin Hewison, “Thailand: Boom, Bust, and Recovery,” in The Political Economy of
South-east Asia: Markets, Power and Contestation, ed. Garry Rodan, Kevin Hewison, and
Richard Robison (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006), 81-82.
189. Michael T. Rock, “Thailand’s Old Bureaucratic Polity and Its New Semi-democracy,” in
Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia, ed. Mushtaq
H. Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 183.
190. In this political system, power was located within the bureaucracy.
191. Hewison, “Thailand: Boom, Bust, and Recovery,” 84.
192. Harold Crouch, Economic Change, Social Structure and the Political System in South-
east Asia: Philippine Development Compared with the Other ASEAN Countries (Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), 20.
193. Rock, “Thailand’s Old Bureaucratic Polity and Its New Semi-democracy,” 184.
194. Ibid., 185.
195. Ibid., 186.
196. Rock, Dictators, Democrats, and Development in Southeast Asia, 56.
197. Rock, “Thailand’s Old Bureaucratic Polity and Its New Semi-democracy,” 191.
198. Rock, Dictators, Democrats, and Development in Southeast Asia, 152.
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broker for business interests.199
After the 1997 economic crisis, the IMF granted Thailand a support package
in exchange for wide-ranging reforms.200 As the recession worsened, public op-
position against the seemingly ine↵ective reforms grew.201 The common senti-
ment was that the reforms came at the expense of Thai sovereignty and public
welfare, for the benefit of foreign investors only. The threat against their es-
tablished dominance prompted domestic business interests, as represented by
Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT), to enter the political realm.
Campaigning on nationalist sentiments and making promises to the rural poor,
TRT won a decisive victory in 2001.202 Shinawatra’s administration did deliver
on their promises to the rural poor. Nevertheless, this administration was no-
tably composed of representatives from the most powerful business interests
and families. Not unexpectedly, the administration disregarded the country’s
commitments to the IMF and hindered liberalization and privatization e↵orts,
all under the guise of economic nationalism.203
Unlike Indonesia and Thailand, private vested interests have historically con-
trolled policy in their favor in the Philippines.204 The rise to power of a small,
land-owning elite began with the commercialization of, and trade in, agricul-
ture in the late 1800s.205 Unlike in Indonesia and Thailand, where the State
itself was the source of power for the elites, the landed Philippine elite derived
its economic power from outside the public machinery.206 The most influential
member of that elite were the sugar growers. They were able to exploit loop-
holes in the 1902 Public Land Act not only to amass large tracts of land, but
also to gain protection against the entry of foreign landowners.207 They also
benefited from the preferential access to the United States market during the
American colonial era. By the 1920s, due to their economic successes, these
199. Rock, “Thailand’s Old Bureaucratic Polity and Its New Semi-democracy,” 193.




204. Jane Hutchison, “Poverty of Politics in the Philippines,” in The Political Economy of
South-east Asia: Markets, Power and Contestation, ed. Garry Rodan, Kevin Hewison, and
Richard Robison (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006), 39.
205. Ibid., 42.
206. Hutchcroft, “Obstructive Corruption,” 218; Crouch, Economic Change, Social Structure
and the Political System in Southeast Asia, 10.
207. Crouch, Economic Change, Social Structure and the Political System in Southeast Asia,
13.
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sugar barons became a formidable and influential lobby group.208 Their wealth
allowed landowners to send their children to universities in Manila and Europe.
The major political players in the pre- and post-independence years emerged
from this educated generation.209
Subsequent industrialization merely reinforced the oligarchy, as industrialists
came from this land-owning class as well. In fact, these elites used their politi-
cal connections to invest in finance, real estate, and other sectors, thus creating
“diversified family conglomerates”.210 The agricultural sector also underwent
structural changes, and became characterized by “high levels of corporate in-
volvement and contract farming, often through vertically integrated, transna-
tional agribusinesses.”211
The Marcos regime, which lasted from 1965 to 1985, was known for its crony
capitalism. The cronies, who mostly came from outside the traditional land-
owning class, were adept at using their access to, and connections with, the
presidential family to amass their own fortunes and expand their businesses.212
The Marcos family financially benefited from its dealings with these cronies as
well. While this period saw the rise of new elites, the traditional oligarchy “had
already created a relatively strong economic base of its own and could not be
simply pushed aside by the government.”213 The traditional oligarchy returned
to power after the fall of the Marcos regime. The winners of the 1987 elections
mostly hailed from traditional political and land-owning families.214
The landowning elites, using their financial resources, have been able to domi-
nate the legislative and executive branches of the State in the Philippines since
the 1950s. It is this group, and not the bureaucracy, that controls legislative and
policy-making processes from outside the political system.215 The bureaucracy
itself is relatively weak. For example, Congress exercises significant influence on
208. Booth, Colonial Legacies, 55.
209. Crouch, Economic Change, Social Structure and the Political System in Southeast Asia,
14.
210. Hutchison, “Poverty of Politics in the Philippines,” 49.
211. Ibid., 51-52.
212. Ibid., 49-50.
213. Crouch, Economic Change, Social Structure and the Political System in Southeast Asia,
27.
214. Hutchison, “Poverty of Politics in the Philippines,” 57.
215. Ibid., 54-55.
3.3. The ASEAN Experience: A Closer Look 107
appointments and promotions within the bureaucracy.216 Regulatory agencies
also remain tied to departments and o ces under the O ce of the President.217
Rent-seeking is thus historically and socially entrenched in the political and
economic institutions of these Member States. This kind of environment makes
regulators easily susceptible to pressures from interest groups. This political
context, coupled with the opaque nature of NTMs and the complex regulatory
processes, makes NTMs the ideal instrument for protection. Industries which
have been adversely a↵ected by structural changes are the most likely beneficia-
ries: with rice, the region’s staple food, and other agricultural products being
the products most likely to benefit from the use of NTMs.
For example, a 2014 issuance218 by the Indonesian Ministry of Trade concerning
the rice trade has been flagged as a potentially discriminatory measure.219 This
regulation revoked the eligibility of private importers, who held a general import
license, to import rice. Such importers are only allowed to import rice subject
to the following conditions:220
1. as a Producer Importer of Rice, for rice which cannot be produced do-
mestically and which shall be used as raw material for industry; and
2. as a Registered Importer of Rice, for special rice varieties, i.e., glutinous
and japonica rice.
This regulation likewise granted BULOG the right to import medium quality
rice in order to stabilize rice prices, meet emergency demands, and maintain
food security. However, BULOG is prohibited from importing rice for a period
stretching from 1 month before to 2 months after the rice harvest period.221
216. Hutchcroft, “Obstructive Corruption,” 219.
217. Hutchison, “Poverty of Politics in the Philippines,” 62.
218. Ministry of Trade Regulation No. 19/M-DAG/PER/3/2014
219. Global Trade Alert, Indonesia: Import and Export Provisions for rice, March 2014,
http://www.globaltradealert.org/state-act/7556.
220. Public Relations Center, Ministry of Trade Issues Ministry of Trade Regulation Number
19/M-DAG/PER/3/2014 Concerning Provisions of Rice Export and Import, 2014, http://
www.kemendag.go.id/files/pdf/2014/04/30/kemendag-terbitkan-permendag-nomor-
19m-dagper32014-tentang-ketentuan-ekspor-dan-impor-beras-en0-1398846442.pdf.
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In the case of the Philippines, the imports of rice, maize, certain meats, and
cane or beet sugar are subject to its minimum access volume (MAV) rules.222
The MAV is essentially a tari↵-rate quota. Imports of goods within the MAV
enjoy lower in-quota tari↵ rates, while quantities over and above the MAV are
subject to higher out-quota rates. This system is jointly implemented by the
heads of the departments of agriculture, agrarian reform, finance, science and
technology, and trade and industry. Their duties include the issuance of import
licenses. As of 2017, the MFN in-quota and out-quota tari↵ rates for rice are
35% and 50%, respectively. For cane sugar, however, the rates are 50% and
65%.223
In 1998, Thailand’s Ministry of Commerce imposed a price control measure
on imports of maize, fish meal, and soybean meal.224 Imports of these items
were subject to a special fee, the amount of which depended on World Trade
Organization membership, for the stated purpose of protecting the domestic
industry.225 Maize imports from AFTA members can be through the Public
Warehouse Organization, a state-trading enterprise, or through private entities.
However, private entities can only import maize in the period from 1 February
to 31 August of each year. The Public Warehouse Organization is not subject
to any similar limitation.226
These regulations have the potential to limit the inflow of agricultural imports.
It is undeniable that these Member States have an interest in protecting their
domestic producers. The Thai regulations are ostensibly motivated by these
nationalistic preferences, perhaps as a way to mollify the hard-hit smallhold-
ers and rural poor in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Nevertheless, the
underlying intent is admittedly protectionist. In Indonesia’s case, BULOG’s
right to import rice is a potential source of rents. And considering how this
agency has been used by politically well-connected interests to capture rents in
the past, this scenario does not seem unlikely. For the Philippines, the in-quota
and out-quota tari↵ rates for cane sugar, which are higher than those for rice,
are also notable. Considering how well-connected the sugar industry is with the
222. Department of Agriculture Administrative Order No. 08, series of 1997, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 01, series of 1998.
223. Tari↵ Commission, Philippine Tari↵ Finder, July 2017, http://finder.tariffcommis
sion.gov.ph.
224. Issue 19, series of 1997.
225. “Non-Tari↵ Measures Based on O cial Regulations, ASEAN.”
226. Ibid.
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country’s political forces, it is not unlikely that these rates resulted from the
industry’s political machinations.
3.4 Summary
The increased participation of ASEAN Member States in production networks
coincided with the region’s e↵orts at trade liberalization, which began in the
1990s. This shift in trade is one of the main factors which drove the struc-
tural changes, specifically the shift from agriculture to manufacturing, in the
Member States. The current primacy of production network trade is one of the
motivations for deeper integration in the region. The premise is that deeper
integration, through the harmonization of regulations and the removal of trade
barriers, will promote and strengthen production network links in the region.
While this premise seems clear and irrefutable, the reality may be more com-
plex. For one, the structural changes in the Member States also coincided with
an increased incidence of NTMs. For some, these NTMs do not adversely a↵ect
production network trade. In fact, they may even stimulate it by serving as
signals of quality and safety. For others, NTM use seems to be driven by po-
litical economy considerations, such as support for certain declining industries.
However, a more focused analysis is needed in order to achieve a fuller analysis
of the incidence and persistence of NTMs in ASEAN.
Nevertheless, the idea that NTMs need to be harmonized, or even eliminated
in order to promote trade, needs to be reexamined. It is possible that these
instruments, which are nothing but governmental issuances, may be motivated
by private interests and considerations. However, it is also possible that they are
motivated by legitimate goals which actually promote the public interest. For
example, quality-promoting measures may increase demand and stimulate trade
in both intermediate and final goods. Thus, a broad and general rule, such as
a blanket prohibition of these measures, might be ine↵ective and unnecessary.
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4 Determinants of Non-Tari↵
Measures1
4.1 Introduction
As part of its regional integration e↵orts, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Members States committed to reduce, if not eliminate com-
pletely, both border2 and behind-the-border trade barriers such as non-tari↵
measures (NTMs) and non-tari↵ barriers (NTBs).3 This is undoubtedly a di -
cult task, given the complex nature of NTMs and NTBs.
NTMs are instruments, other than tari↵s, which can a↵ect the prices, quantities,
or both of traded goods.4 Any law or regulation can thus be classified as an
NTM as long as these e↵ects are produced, including instruments which are
not necessarily intended to a↵ect trade. This includes, but are not limited to,
sanitary and phytosanitary measures,5 technical barriers to trade,6 labelling and
specification requirements, and quantitative restrictions. For example, a health
standard imposing minimum quality requirements on food products, whether
produced domestically or abroad, can be considered an NTM if this can a↵ect
1. I would like to thank Emanuela Carbonara, Michael Faure, Bertrand Crettez, the par-
ticipants of the EDLE Third Year Seminar held at the University of Bologna, the participants
of the EMLE Midterm Meeting held at Erasmus University Rotterdam, and the participants
of “The Future of Law and Economics” Joint Seminar held at Université Paris II Panthéon
Assas for their valuable comments. I am likewise grateful for the assistance of Jason Alin-
sunurin in organizing and setting up the data on non-tari↵ measures, and in the computation
of the frequency ratios.
2. Such as tari↵s and quotas.
3. ASEAN Secretariat, AEC Blueprint 2025, 3.
4. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Non-Tari↵ Measures to Trade:
Economic and Policy Issues for Developing Countries, 2.
5. This refers to measures which aim to protect consumers by preventing the spread of
diseases, pests, or contaminants. ibid., 33.
6. This refers to measures which aim to protect the environment, ensure product safety
and quality, and promote other non-trade objectives. ibid.
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the price or quantity of imported items. NTMs become NTBs when (i) they are
applied in a discriminatory manner against foreign firms, (ii) are imposed with
a protectionist intent, or (iii) when they are unjustified or improperly applied.7
In other words, NTBs are NTMs that “are protectionist by either intent or
e↵ect.”8
This uncertainty and ambiguity regarding the nature of, and classification of
instruments as, NTMs and NTBs may explain the seeming inability of Member
States to comply with their NTM-related obligations. Alternatively, the persis-
tence of NTMs may be due to the Member States’ and ASEAN’s short-sighted
view of the underlying determinants of policy. The political economy of trade
protection literature posits that both economic and political factors are influ-
ential in the policy-making process. On the one hand, certain economic shocks
may lead to increased demand for protectionist policies. On the other hand, the
underlying political institutions may a↵ect how societal preferences for either
free trade or protection are translated into policy. In order to e↵ectively address
the problem of NTMs and NTBs, the Member States need to first identify and
understand these underlying determinants.
This chapter aims to identify the determinants of the incidence of NTMs in the
ASEAN region. In particular, it asks whether political and economic factors
can illuminate the rising incidence and persistence of NTMs. Firstly, is there
a relationship between certain economic trends, such as unemployment and
structural change, and the imposition of NTMs? Secondly, is there a significant
di↵erence in the incidence of NTMs among countries with di↵erent types of
political institutions? Relationships between NTM incidence, on the one hand,
and di↵erent political and economic characteristics, on the other, are duly ana-
lyzed to discover (i) any possible links between them, and (ii) the strength and
direction of this association.
Frequency ratios were generated to measure NTM incidence for each Member
State. This variable indicates the percentage of a country’s imported products
which are subjected to at least 1 NTM. Spearman’s correlation analyses were
used to determine the correlation between frequency ratios and economic indi-
cators. Independent samples t-tests were used to identify di↵erences in NTM
7. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Non-Tari↵ Measures to Trade:
Economic and Policy Issues for Developing Countries, 2.
8. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Trade and
Non-Tari↵ Measures: Impacts in the Asia-Pacific Region, 11.
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incidence based on the political characteristics of the Member States. The re-
sults indicate that sectoral trends do in fact matter. Additionally, the degree
of political insulation and accountability may a↵ect how governments react to
demands for increased protection.
Section 4.2 provides an overview of the current literature on the political econ-
omy of trade protection. This is followed by a description of the data and
methodology in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 discusses the results of the correlation
analyses and the independent t-tests. Section 4.5 summarizes the key results,
and discusses possible areas for future research.
4.2 The Political Economy of Trade Protection
It is useful to look at NTMs within the context of a market for trade policy.
In this market, trade policy is determined by (i) the goals and preferences of
policymakers (supply), (ii) the interests and e↵orts exerted by gainers and losers
from policies (demand), and (iii) the economic and political institutions where
these interactions occur.9 The theory of endogenous trade protection emphasizes
that industry’s demand for protection increases as a result of certain economic
shocks. The supply of protection depends on the interests and preferences of
policymakers, i.e., whether they value general welfare over self-interest. In
light of these, trade policy cannot be detached from its socio-economic and
political contexts, since they shed light on why certain industries and sectors
are protected. These underlying determinants of policy are among the main
focal points of the political economy of trade protection literature.
This section presents a brief overview of the current literature, both theoretical
and empirical, on the political economy of trade protection. This discussion is
not meant to provide an exhaustive inventory of the scholarship on this topic.
Rather, it merely serves as a guide for the analysis set out in Section 4.4.
This section ends with a discussion of this chapter’s analytical framework and
hypotheses.
9. Hillman, The Political Economy of Protection, 3.
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4.2.1 The Interest Group Approach
The interest group approach currently dominates the literature. Its main schools
of thought are the tari↵ formation function, the political support function, and
the political contributions model. While these models may di↵er in certain
aspects, common key determinants of protection have emerged such as lobby
group size, the ratio of outputs against imports, and import demand elasticity.
The tari↵ formation function is based on Findlay and Wellisz (1982). In a two-
sector specific factor economy, opposing groups will compete by lobbying the
government either for or against protection.10 Firms aim to raise the domestic
prices of the goods they produce and to lower the prices of the goods they
consume.11 The tari↵ either increases or decreases, based on the lobbying e↵orts
of the di↵erent firms.12 The government trades o↵ the lobbying contributions
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where ti represents the tari↵, ↵i is the proportion of the population that owns
sector-specific inputs in sector i, bi is the government’s marginal rate of substi-
tution between the level of lobbying spending for protection and for free trade.
z represents the inverse import penetration ratio14, and e denotes the absolute
import demand elasticity.15
A lobby group gains protection only if bi > 1, i.e., if its contributions are more
e↵ective than those of the other lobby group. If the marginal lobbying spending
of both groups is equally e↵ective (bi = 1), there is free trade.16 The tari↵ is
10. Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz, “Endogenous Tari↵s, the Political Economy of
Trade Restrictions, and Welfare,” chap. 8 in Import Competition and Response, ed. Jagdish
N. Bhagwati (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 224.
11. Ibid., 225.
12. Ibid., 226.
13. Kishore Gawande and Pravin Krishna, “The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empir-
ical Approaches,” chap. 8 in Handbook of International Trade, ed. E. Kwan Choi and James
Harrigan (MA, USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003), 224.
14. This refers to the ratio of domestic output to imports.
15. Elhanan Helpman, “Politics and Trade Policy” (1995), 12, http://www.nber.org/
papers/w5309; Gawande and Krishna, “The Political Economy of Trade Policy,” 224.
16. Helpman, “Politics and Trade Policy,” 12; Gawande and Krishna, “The Political Econ-
omy of Trade Policy,” 224.
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higher when the lobby group is small17, its output level is high, and the demand
elasticity for imports is low.18 High output levels mean that the stakes are higher
for this industry, making tari↵s more profitable. The excess burden of a tari↵
is lessened if import demand is inelastic.19
Hillman (1982) proposed a political support function. In choosing trade poli-
cies, the Government trades o↵ industry’s political support against consumer
welfare and satisfaction. On the one hand, protectionist policies increase do-
mestic prices, leading to increased industry support. On the other, free trade
policies lower domestic prices and increase consumer welfare and support.20 The
government settles for the policy that maximizes aggregate political support.21
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where ↵pi denotes the government’s marginal rate of substitution between ag-
gregate welfare and industry profits in sector i. Organized and politically active
sectors (i.e., ↵pi is finite) are protected. As with the tari↵ formation function,
the tari↵ is higher with greater output and inelastic import demand.22
The tari↵ formation and political support functions have been criticized for
being short-sighted. It has been argued that these two models can be seen as
mirror-images of one another,23 with each focusing on just one side of the pic-
ture. The tari↵ formation function focuses on the demand-side for protection,
without accounting for supply-side considerations such as the objective func-
tions and preferences of policymakers.24 The political support function, however,
17. The more concentrated the ownership of the sector-specific factor is.
18. Helpman, “Politics and Trade Policy,” 13.
19. Ibid., 6.
20. Arye L. Hillman, “Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives,”
The American Economic Review 72, no. 5 (1982): 1183.
21. Helpman, “Politics and Trade Policy,” 7; Gawande and Krishna, “The Political Economy
of Trade Policy,” 225; Hillman, “Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist
Motives,” 1184.
22. Helpman, “Politics and Trade Policy,” 8-9; Gawande and Krishna, “The Political Econ-
omy of Trade Policy,” 225.
23. Dani Rodrik, “Political Economy of Trade Policy,” chap. 28 in Handbook of International
Trade, ed. Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogo↵ (The Netherlands: Elsevier Science B.V.,
1995), 1465.
24. Ibid., 1464.
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only accounts for the objective function of policymakers.25 Another criticism is
that neither model is directly testable as they contain elements26 which are not
observable and measurable.27
Unlike the tari↵ formation and political support functions, the political contri-
butions approach considers the dynamics between the demand for and supply
of protection. The focus is on the role of political contributions of interest
groups which aim to influence either (i) the outcome of elections or (ii) the
policy choices of the incumbent government. These di↵erent perspectives are
embodied in Magee, Brock and Young (1989) and in Grossman and Helpman
(1994), respectively.
Magee, Brock and Young (1989) envisage an economy with two lobbies and
two political parties. The parties are either for or against trade. The lobbies
represent either capital or labor, and each contributes funds to a certain party.
A party’s probability of winning increases with the number of contributions
received, but decreases with the level of policy intervention it commits itself
to.28
The timing is as follows: during the first stage, the parties choose their respec-
tive trade policies; during the second stage, the lobbies make their campaign
contributions based on the declared party platforms. Thus, contributions are
intended solely to influence election outcomes, and not the policy choice of
o cials.29
While this model is useful, it has received its own share of criticism, particularly
from those who believe that it is more likely that contributions aim to influence
policy choice, rather than to impact the outcome of an election.30
Policy influence as the underlying motive for contributions is embodied in the
25. Rodrik, “Political Economy of Trade Policy,” 1465.
26. Notably the marginal rate of substitution of the government between di↵erent lobby
groups for the tari↵ formation function (bi), and between industry interests and consumer
welfare in the political support function (↵pi).
27. Gawande and Krishna, “The Political Economy of Trade Policy,” 225.
28. Helpman, “Politics and Trade Policy,” 14-15; Rodrik, “Political Economy of Trade Pol-
icy,” 1467.
29. Helpman, “Politics and Trade Policy,” 14-15; Rodrik, “Political Economy of Trade Pol-
icy,” 1467.
30. Helpman, “Politics and Trade Policy,” 16-17.
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Grossman and Helpman (1994) model.31 On the supply-side, this model as-
sumes the presence of an incumbent government. As the decision-maker, the
Government aims to maximize a weighted sum of total political contributions
and aggregate welfare.32
On the demand-side, the di↵erent economic sectors are represented by lobby
groups. These lobby groups present the Government with a contribution sched-
ule, where contribution levels correspond to, and depend on, the implemented
trade policy.33 In this case, the lobbies pledge contributions before policies have
been chosen by the Government. Thus, lobbying aims to directly influence the
policy choices of the Government. Each lobby aims to maximize the total utility
of its members, given other lobbies’ contributions, the anticipated policy choices
of the Government, and domestic prices.34 A sector gets more protection if (i) it
is organized into a lobby, (ii) its total output is greater than competing imports,
and (iii) the import elasticity of demand is low.35
The timing is as follows: during the first stage, the lobbies present their contri-
bution schedules; during the second stage, the Government determines its trade
policies in view of these contribution schedules.36 The cross-industry pattern of
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where Ii indicates whether the sector is organized into a lobby or not, ↵L is the
fraction of the population organized into lobbies, and ↵ is the constant weight
placed by the government on total welfare relative to total contributions.37
Organized import-competing and export-competing industries (Ii > 0) will be
able to obtain protection in the form of tari↵s and subsidies, respectively (ti >
0). Unorganized import-competing and export-competing industries, on the
other hand, will be subjected to an import subsidy and export tax, respectively
31. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, “Protection for Sale,” The American Eco-
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(ti < 0). Industries characterized by higher output (high zi) and lower import
elasticities of demand (ei) enjoy higher levels of protection. And if all industries
were organized (Ii = 1 and ↵L = 1), their lobbying activities would cancel one
another out, resulting in free trade (ti = 0).38
There are 2 reasons for the lower rates of protection in industries (i) with high
import demand (low zi). First, the deadweight loss from protection translates
to a political cost for the Government. Second, members of lobbies will also
have to bear the social cost of this deadweight loss. Thus, the lobby groups “in
industries other than i will bid more to avoid protection in sector i the greater
is the social cost of that protection.”39
Despite its current popularity, the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model is not
without its critics. The assumption that lobbyists only aim to buy protection
has been questioned. Lobby contributions may also buy other things, such as
access to policymakers. The model’s key prediction vis-à-vis import penetration
(1/zi) has also been called “unintuitive”.40 It is more logical for protection to
be positively related to a change in import penetration, as reported by Trefler
(1993). That is, “industries where import penetration used to be low and has
increased tend to be those where a comparative advantage existed but has been
eroded”.41
4.2.2 Political Institutions and Trade
Current scholarship also aims to illuminate the relationship between political
institutions, namely electoral rules and forms of government, and economic pol-
icy. The premise is that di↵erent kinds of political institutions may generate
di↵erent types of incentives for both governmental and non-governmental ac-
tors. This variety in incentives may help explain the resulting economic policy.
For example, electoral rules determine how voters are linked to their repre-
sentatives,42 and how voters’ preferences are aggregated within governmental
38. Grossman and Helpman, “Protection for Sale,” 842-843.
39. Ibid., 842.
40. Susumu Imai, Hajime Katayama, and Kala Krishna, “Is Protection Really For Sale? A
survey and directions for future research,” International Review of Economics and Finance
18 (2009): 181.
41. Ibid., 181-182.
42. Stephanie J. Rickard, “Electoral Systems and Trade,” in The Political Economy of In-
ternational Trade, ed. Lisa L. Martin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 280.
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systems.43 How a government functions, i.e., how policy-making powers are
acquired and exercised, depends on the form of government.44 Thus, political
institutions may determine how well a government can respond to demands for
a certain kind of policy.
The seminal work on the e↵ect of political institutions on economic policy is
Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004). According to Persson and Tabellini (2003),
the di↵erent dimensions of electoral rules matter. For example, district mag-
nitude45 a↵ects the nature of electoral competition. Larger districts, which
elect more representatives, cater to broader constituencies. Electoral success in
large districts depends on the candidates’ ability to capture votes from a wider
constituency. Party platforms in these systems tend to feature broad-based
projects and general public goods. Smaller districts, however, have narrower
constituencies. Thus, candidates tend to cater to voters by targeting district-
specific interests and preferences.46
The electoral formula47 is likewise potentially determinative of economic policy.
When voters elect individual candidates (as in plurality or majoritarian sys-
tems) rather than parties (as in proportional representation [PR] systems), the
politicians are held more accountable for their actions. In other words, “individ-
ual accountability under plurality rule strengthens the incentives of politicians
to please the voters and is conducive to good behavior.”48
The form of government also matters, as this a↵ects the allocation and exer-
cise of power within a government.49 Presidential systems are characterized by:
(i) the election of the President by the citizenry; (ii) the separation of powers
and a system of checks and balances between the branches of government; and
(iii) a term which does not depend on the continued support and confidence
of the legislative assembly. These characteristics incentivize good behavior as
the President is not only directly accountable to voters, but any inclinations
43. Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic E↵ects of Constitutions (MIT
Press, 2003), 11.
44. Ibid., 11-12.
45. District magnitude refers to the number of representatives per electoral district.
46. Persson and Tabellini, The Economic E↵ects of Constitutions, 17.
47. This refers to how the cast votes are translated into legislative seats.
48. Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, “Constitutions and Economic Policy,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004): 82; Persson and Tabellini, The Economic E↵ects of
Constitutions, 22.
49. Persson and Tabellini, “Constitutions and Economic Policy,” 79.
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to abuse power are also curbed by the other branches of government. In par-
liamentary systems, the legislative body appoints the executive, but executive
and agenda-setting powers are concentrated in the hands of Government.50 This
concentration of power may allow legislators to better “collude with each other
at the voters’ expense”.51
On the other hand, the confidence requirement in parliamentary systems stim-
ulates “legislative cohesion”52 in policy proposals and decisions. This stable
majority of legislators in parliamentary systems can better pursue broad-based
programs and provide public goods. Meanwhile, the lack of a confidence re-
quirement in presidential systems incentivizes di↵erent groups to lobby for leg-
islative influence, and legislators tend to favor targeted programs which only
benefit their own constituencies.53
Grossman and Helpman (2005) were the first to develop a model specifically
linking electoral rules to trade policy. Using a 3-stage model of political cam-
paigns, elections, and policy-making, they showed that a protectionist bias
emerges in majoritarian systems. They take the example of a small country
where 1/3 of the citizens live in 1 of 3 geographically distinct districts. The
districts have distinct and separate economic interests, i.e., in a specific indus-
try.54 Each district is represented by a single legislator, who may come from
either party A or party B.55
At the first stage, each party chooses a platform which will allow it to win a
majority of the legislative seats.56 Given the heterogenous economic interests
present in the 3 districts, the parties promise district-specific protection.57 At
the second stage, the citizens vote for a single representative. Each voter’s ob-
jective is to maximize his expected utility given the uncertainty of the outcomes
in the other districts.58 At the last stage, the majority party sets policy, with
50. Persson and Tabellini, “Constitutions and Economic Policy,” 79-80.
51. Persson and Tabellini, “Constitutions and Economic Policy,” 84; Persson and Tabellini,
The Economic E↵ects of Constitutions, 23-24.
52. Persson and Tabellini, The Economic E↵ects of Constitutions, 24.
53. Persson and Tabellini, “Constitutions and Economic Policy,” 92; Persson and Tabellini,
The Economic E↵ects of Constitutions, 24-25.
54. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, “A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Poli-
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legislators setting “trade policy to maximize aggregate welfare of residents of the
districts they represent net of any penalties they will su↵er by deviating from
their party’s platform.”59
If a party wins in all 3 districts, free trade will prevail as this maximizes aggre-
gate welfare. If the majority party only represents 2 districts, which is the more
probable outcome in majoritarian systems, a positive tari↵ will be enacted.
This policy benefits only those districts represented by legislators from the ma-
jority party.60 Unlike majoritarian systems, PR systems are more likely to have
a governing party which represents all electoral districts. Thus, a protectionist
bias is foreseen in majoritarian systems.
4.2.3 Empirical Evidence from Previous Studies
The empirical scholarship aims, among others things, to determine the link
between certain economic and political characteristics on the one hand, and
protection levels on the other. Early works o↵ered a range of hypotheses ex-
plaining the structure of protection, primarily tari↵ levels.61 The emergence of
formal theories, notably the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model, provided
later scholarship with testable hypotheses and solid micro-foundations.
Ray (1987) is among the notable early works. He analyzed the patterns of tari↵s
and NTBs in the United States vis-à-vis the interaction of industry’s lobbying
e↵orts and political (both domestic and foreign) objectives.62 It is generally
assumed that lobbying e↵orts influence policy. However, it is di cult to trace
the resulting trade policy back to individual industry interests.63 Moreover, na-
tional objectives may play a significant role in policy deliberations. Ray (1987)
argued that trade policy is determined by this “interaction of self-promoting
economic interest groups with national economic and political policies.”64 A free
trade policy emerges when both national interests and industry prefer free trade.
When national interests favor free trade but industry lobbies for protection, the
59. Ibid., 1249.
60. Ibid., 1259.
61. Gawande and Krishna, “The Political Economy of Trade Policy,” 214-216.
62. Edward John Ray, “Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Fall in Tari↵s and the
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resulting policy will be ambiguous. Governments therefore act in accordance
with national interests while being subject to industry pressure. This is borne
out in the historical trends of protection in the United States.65
Trefler (1993) estimated the impact of NTBs, as measured by coverage ratios66,
on American manufacturing imports in 1983. Accounting for the endogene-
ity of protection levels and trade flows, he simultaneously estimated the NTB
and import equations.67 Increased import penetration levels led to increased
protection levels.68 Furthermore, increased protection levels negatively a↵ected
import penetration.69 This simultaneous estimation also showed that NTBs
reduced imports by $49.5 billion, which is more than had been previously es-
timated.70 Regarding the determinants of protection, comparative advantage
variables (such as the increase in import penetration and number of exports)
were highly significant. These variables were at least 5 times as important as
business-related variables (such as the number of firms, firm concentration, scale
and capital stock).71
Following Trefler (1993), Lee and Swagel (1997) also simultaneously estimated
the determinants of NTBs, as measured by coverage ratios, and trade flows.
They used 1988 data on various political and economic determinants for a group
of both developed and developing countries.72 They found that sectoral factors
a↵ected the incidence of NTBs. NTBs tended to protect import competing73
and declining74 industries.75 On the other hand, exporting industries76 received
65. Ray, “Changing Patterns of Protectionism,” 292.
66. The coverage ratio measures the number of products or tari↵ lines that are subject to
any type of NTB.
67. Daniel Trefler, “Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An





71. Trefler, “Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection,” 146-147;
Gawande and Krishna, “The Political Economy of Trade Policy,” 217.
72. Jong-Wha Lee and Phillip Swagel, “Trade Barriers and Trade Flows Across Countries
and Industries,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 79, no. 3 (1997): 373.
73. As measured by the share of imports.
74. As measured by the change in wage per worker.
75. Lee and Swagel, “Trade Barriers and Trade Flows Across Countries and Industries,”
378.
76. As measured by the share of exported industry output.
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less protection.77 Large industries78, which may be politically important by
virtue of their size, also received protection.79 The observed trends suggest that
tari↵s and NTBs are used as complements,80 and that NTBs can negatively
a↵ect imports.81
Mansfield and Busch (1995) viewed protectionist policies as the result of the
interaction of 2 sets of factors: (i) those that give rise to industry demands
for protection, and (ii) those that regulate the supply of protection, i.e., polit-
ical and institutional factors.82 On the one hand, trade policy is influenced by
industry’s and other non-state actors’ lobbying activities.83 Certain macroeco-
nomic conditions, such as rising unemployment and currency appreciation, can
spur these groups to demand greater protection.84 On the other hand, national
interests and domestic institutions can regulate the provision of protection. In
particular, public o cials’ degree of autonomy and insulation from pressure
may a↵ect policymaking processes.85
Mansfield and Busch (1995) conducted a cross-country analysis using the fol-
lowing model:
NTBt+1 = A+B1SIZEt +B2(logCONST )t+
B3(SIZE ⇤ logCONST )t +B4UNEMt+
B5(UNEM ⇤ logCONST )t +B6(UNEM ⇤ SIZE ⇤ logCONST )t+
B7REERt +B8(REER ⇤ logCONST )t+
B9(REER ⇤ SIZE ⇤ logCONST )t +B10TARIFFt + et
(4.4)
where:
77. Lee and Swagel, “Trade Barriers and Trade Flows Across Countries and Industries,”
378.
78. As measured by the industry share of value added.




82. Edward D. Mansfield and Marc L. Busch, “The Political Economy of Nontari↵ Barriers:
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1. NTMt+1 denotes the number of imports subject to NTBs in year t+ 1;
2. SIZEt is the economic size of the State in year t;
3. CONST is the number of parliamentary constituencies, which proxies86
for state insulation and autonomy;87
4. UNEMt is the unemployment rate;
5. REERt is the index of the real exchange rate;
6. TARIFFt is the average national post-Tokyo Round tari↵ rate; and
7. et is the error term.88
High unemployment rates and appreciated currencies were strongly linked with
pronounced pressures for protection and high NTB incidence. The highest val-
ues of NTBs89 occurred in larger States where policymakers were autonomous
and well-insulated from societal pressures, as in PR systems.90 NTBs are thus
likelier “when deteriorating macroeconomic conditions generate widespread de-
mands for protection, a state is su ciently large to give policymakers incentives
to impose protection, and public o cials are vested with the institutional capac-
ity necessary to act on these preferences and resist pressures exerted by groups
with an interest in lower trade barriers”.91
Saksena and Anderson (2008) reevaluated Mansfield and Busch’s (1995) conclu-
sion on the relationship between political insulation and the incidence of NTBs.
They argued that the finding that political insulation from social pressures, as
in PR systems, leads to higher protection is debatable. The implication is “that
a state’s national interest is for protectionism [. . .] and that insulated politi-
cians are able to pursue this because they are protected from societal pressures
for free trade.”92 If this is true, then the national preference is for protection-
ist policies, while interest groups prefer free trade. However, this position is
86. A high number of constituencies leads to a smaller average constituency size. A small
constituency would enable interest groups to gain more power in that district.
87. Mansfield and Busch, “The Political Economy of Nontari↵ Barriers,” 730.
88. Ibid., 735-736.
89. As measured by trade coverage ratios.
90. Mansfield and Busch, “The Political Economy of Nontari↵ Barriers,” 739.
91. Ibid., 747.
92. Jyotika Saksena and Liam Anderson, “Explaining Variation in the Use of NTBs in
Developed Countries: The Role of Political Institutions,” International Politics 45 (2008):
483.
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counter-intuitive and improbable, as shown by the need for treaties safeguard-
ing free trade.93 Using a pooled time series94 and a cross-sectional analysis95,
Saksena and Anderson (2008) found that:
1. NTBs are higher in larger states which are more dependent on trade;
2. NTBs are higher in countries where interest groups are institutionalized
within the policy-making process; and
3. NTBs are higher in majoritarian systems than in PR systems.96
Evans (2009) considered the impact of a country’s electoral system, i.e., majori-
tarian/plurality or proportional,97 on its trade policies. The hypothesis is that
legislators in majoritarian countries had a greater incentive to enact policies
which favoring their own districts, including protectionist tari↵s. On the other
hand, legislators with a wide electoral base pursued more egalitarian policies,
i.e., they were in favor of free trade. Using data from 147 countries from 1981
to 2004,98 she found that majoritarian countries had higher average tari↵s than
those seen in proportional system countries.99 This supported the hypothesis
that majoritarian countries were biased in favor of protection.
A subsequent study by Rickard (2012), which focused on subsidies, found that
this majoritarian bias is also present for NTMs. Looking at a sample of 68
countries from 1990 to 2006, budgets for subsidies were higher in majoritarian
countries than in PR countries.100
93. Ibid.
94. For the years 1988, 1993, and 1996.
95. The authors used data from Austria, Australia, Canada, Finland, Iceland, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and USA.
96. Saksena and Anderson, “Explaining Variation in the Use of NTBs in Developed Coun-
tries,” 491.
97. Evans (2009) classified countries into these 2 main groups. A majoritarian/pluralitarian
country is one characterized by a winner-take-all system. The country is usually divided
into districts, each of which elects only 1 representative to the legislature. The winner is the
one who receives the most votes. A country following the proportional system has multiseat
constituencies, and the allocation of seats depends on the votes received by the parties.
Carolyn L. Evans, “A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: An Empirical Investigation,”
Economics & Politics 21, no. 2 (2009): 280
98. Ibid., 285.
99. Ibid., 293.
100. Stephanie J. Rickard, “A Non-Tari↵ Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: Gov-
ernment Subsidies and Electoral Institutions,” International Studies Quarterly 56 (2012):
782.
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Kono (2009) examined the e↵ects of intra-industry trade101 and electoral rules
on trade protection102. Kono argued that intra-industry trade may generate
stronger protectionist policies.103 With new varieties (entrants) in the market,
economies of scale lead to a smaller number of specialized domestic producers
(and varieties).104 Any protectionist measure regarding a specific variety would
then benefit a smaller group. Thus, intra-industry trade lessens the collective
action problem, which can incentivize producers to lobby for protection.105
Market structure and electoral rules must be examined together, and con-
stituency size is an important factor. In particularist systems, electoral rules
are more personality-based and candidates appeal to a narrow constituency in
order to be elected. Success then hinges on candidates’ ability to appeal to
their constituencies’ preferences. Protection is expected to be higher. On the
other hand, party-oriented systems are characterized by larger constituencies.
A candidate’s success is linked to his party’s. As a party needs to appeal to a
broader constituency, the interests of narrow groups are not decisive, and thus
there is a lower level of protection.106
Using data from approximately 4,400 sectors in non-European Union countries,
Kono found that intra-industry trade indeed led to increased protection. This
e↵ect was insignificant in systems characterized by low and moderate levels of
particularism. However, it became larger and significant in highly particularist
electoral systems.107 This supports the hypothesis that increased intra-industry
trade allows firms to overcome collective action problems in lobbying for pro-
tection.
4.2.4 Analytical Framework
Guided by the aforesaid literature, the present study proceeds to examine the
relationship between economic and political factors, on the one hand, and the
101. Intra-industry trade is characterized by an exchange of di↵erent varieties of the same
product.
102. As measured by tari↵s, NTBs, and subsidies.
103. Daniel Yuichi Kono, “Market Structure, Electoral Institutions, and Trade Policy,” In-
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incidence of NTMs in ASEAN Member States, on the other. This analysis is
mainly guided by Grossman and Helpman (1994), Persson and Tabellini (2003,
2004), and Grossman and Helpman (2005).
Grossman and Helpman (1994) posit that the relationship between trade flows
and NTM incidence depends on whether the a↵ected industry is organized or
not. In organized industries, (i) high demand for imports, that is, a high im-
port penetration ratio, is expected to be associated with a lower NTM incidence;
and (ii) a larger domestic output vis-á-vis import demand, i.e., lower import
penetration ratio, is associated with a higher NTM incidence.108 Therefore, in
ASEAN Member States’ larger sectors, in terms of output and political influ-
ence, are expected to be associated with high levels of NTM incidence. Sectors
characterized by high demand for imports, on the other hand, are expected to
be associated with low levels of NTM incidence.
Empirical studies also suggest that economic size and unemployment are both
positively related to NTM incidence. Larger economies wield greater market
power, are more able to tailor trade policy to reap gains at the expense of smaller
economies, and are less vulnerable to retaliation.109 Increased imports would
make it harder for displaced workers to secure employment, creating a demand
for protection.110 Thus, there is an expected positive relationship between the
Member States’ economic size and NTM incidence. Rising unemployment rates
in the Member States are also expected to coincide with greater NTM incidence.
There are opposing views on the relationship between NTM incidence and po-
litical institutions. Grossman and Helpman (2005) argue that plurality and
majoritarian States are going to have a higher incidence of NTMs than PR
States.111 Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004), however, emphasize the fact that
the degree of political representation and accountability matters. Given such
contradictory views, the present chapter is non-committal in regard to the link
between political institutions and NTM incidence.
108. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi, “Protection for Sale: An Empirical
Investigation,” The American Economic Review 89, no. 5 (1999): 1146.
109. Mansfield and Busch, “The Political Economy of Nontari↵ Barriers,” 728; Saksena and
Anderson, “Explaining Variation in the Use of NTBs in Developed Countries,” 489.
110. Mansfield and Busch, “The Political Economy of Nontari↵ Barriers,” 727.
111. As confirmed by the empirical results of Saksena and Anderson (2008), Evans (2009),
and Rickard (2012).
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The following section describes in detail the variables used to analyze the rela-
tionship between NTM incidence and economic and political factors.
4.3 Data and Methodology
The political economy of trade protection suggests that economic and political
factors influence trade policy. Any examination of NTM incidence needs to
account for both, without giving too much importance to either type. This
study therefore uses a variety of economic and political variables to ascertain
the determinants of NTM incidence in the ASEAN region.
Analyses of NTMs are, however, complicated by the inherent endogeneity of
these measures. For example, a change in import penetration can generate
increased demands for NTMs. A higher incidence of NTMs, in turn, may lead
to fewer imports.112 Due to this endogeneity and to insu cient data, this chapter
focuses on determining possible correlations between NTM incidence and the
explanatory variables, rather than on trying to establish any causal links.
4.3.1 Data and Sources
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the variables of interest in this chapter, along with
the predicted relationships between NTM incidence and the various indicators.
The variables can be subdivided into 3 groups, based on their subject matter:
(i) NTM Incidence, (ii) Economic Indicators, and (iii) Political Indicators.
Table 4.2 provides the summary statistics. For the Member States, the mean
frequency ratio is 0.676. On average, 67% (s = 34%) of the region’s imported
products are regulated by NTMs. The mean values for the economic indicators,
and the frequencies of the political indicators, are also presented.
NTM Incidence
The focus of this analysis is on the incidence, or prevalence, of NTMs among
the Member States as measured by frequency ratios. The frequency ratio is an
112. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Non-Tari↵ Measures to Trade:
Economic and Policy Issues for Developing Countries, 22.
113. Based on the author’s estimations.
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Table 4.1: Variables of Interest
Variable Description Prediction
Frequency Ratio Percent of imported products that are regulated by NTMs
Import Penetration Ratio Ratio of imports over total domestic demand (-) organized
(+) unorganized
Imports Imports of goods and services, at constant 2010 US$ (+)
Exports Exports of goods and services, at constant 2010 US$ (-)
Gross Domestic Product At constant 2010 US$ (+)
Unemployment Rate Total, % of total labor force (national estimate) (+)
Agriculture, Value Added Sectoral net output, as % of GDP (+)
Industry, Value Added Sectoral net output, as % of GDP (+)
Services, Value Added Sectoral net output, ass % of GDP (+)
Plurality Where the winner-take-all/first past the post (+) or (-)
Proportional Representation Based on the proportion of votes received by a party (+) or (-)
Presidential The President’s tenure is independent of legislative confidence (+) or (-)
Parliamentary Governments require sustained legislative confidence (+) or (-)
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics, Country-Level113.
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min. Max. Percent
Frequency Ratio 112 0.676 0.344 0 0.999
Import Penetration Ratio 112 61.404 39.446 14.946 183.236
Imports 112 1.05e+10 8.76e+09 1.34e+08 3.58e+10
Exports 112 1.11e+10 9.31e+09 1.30e+08 3.62e+10
Gross Domestic Product 112 2.47e+11 2.13e+11 5.21e+09 9.88e+11
Unemployment Rate 106 4.296 3.098 .16 11.85
Agriculture, value added 102 13.716 10.263 .035 38.284
Industry, value added 102 35.549 7.097 23.296 48.530
Services, value added 102 50.589 10.515 37.058 75.160
Plurality 80 71.429
Proportional Representation 32 28.571
Presidential 48 42.857
Parliamentary 64 57.143
inventory measure which shows the percentage of imported products that are







where D and M are dummy variables indicating the presence of NTMs and
imports, respectively, in regard to goods i in country j.115 As a simple inventory
measure, this ratio does not reflect the relative value of the a↵ected imports nor
the e↵ects of NTMs on trade flows and prices.116 However, it shows both the
114. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Non-Tari↵ Measures to Trade:
Economic and Policy Issues for Developing Countries, 22-23.
115. D and M are coded 1 if there are NTMs or imports, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
116. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Non-Tari↵ Measures to Trade:
Economic and Policy Issues for Developing Countries, 23.
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incidence of NTMs on di↵erent product groups, and how these trends change
from one period to the next,117 which su ce for purposes of this analysis.
Frequency ratios were generated for 7 Member States118 from 2000 to 2015.
NTM data were sourced from the Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS)
Global Database on NTMs. This database is notable for containing updated,
comprehensive information on ASEAN NTMs.119 NTM information was dis-
aggregated according to the 6-digit Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System (HS Codes). HS Codes can classify items according to highly
specific product groupings. The first 2 digits (HS 2) refer to the products’ chap-
ter classification, i.e., 07 = Vegetables and Certain Roots and Tubers; Edible.
The next 2 digits (HS 4) refer to categories within that chapter, i.e., 07.01 =
Potatoes; fresh or chilled. And the last 2 digits (HS 6) refer to a more disaggre-
gated category, i.e., 07.01.10 = Vegetables; seed potatoes, fresh or chilled.120
As this system is internationally standardized, the product classifications are
uniform for all Member States, provided the same HS Codes version is used.
Imports data from 2000 to 2015 were sourced from the United Nations Com-
modity Trade (UN COMTRADE) database, which likewise disaggregated trade
flows according to the 6-digit HS Codes. However, imports were coded accord-
ing to an earlier HS Codes version (i.e., H0) while the TRAINS NTM database
used more recent versions (i.e., H3 and H4). In order to ensure consistency and
comparability among the data, the TRAINS NTM HS Codes were converted
from either H4 or H3 to H0.121
The 6-digit HS Codes identify more than 5000 product groups. To make this
analysis more tractable, these product codes were aggregated into 6 industry
and 21 product group classifications. These classifications were adapted, with
117. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Non-Tari↵ Measures to Trade:
Economic and Policy Issues for Developing Countries, 23.
118. Due to data constraints, we excluded Brunei Darussalam, the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic and Myanmar.
119. Santiago Fernandez de Cordoba et al., “Collecting and Classifying Non-Tari↵ Measures
in ASEAN,” in Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN, ed. Lili Yan Ing, Santiago Fernandez de
Cordoba, and Olivier Cadot (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN, 2016), 7-10, http:
//asean.i-tip.org.
120. “Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems (HS),” accessed May 10,
2017, https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledgebase/50018/Harmonized-
Commodity-Description-and-Coding-Systems-HS.
121. We used the conversion tables provided by the United Nations Statistics Division.
4.3. Data and Methodology 131
some modifications, from Ando and Obashi (2010).122 Products were sorted
into their respective categories based on their chapter codes, i.e., the first 2
digits of their 6-digit HS Codes. Frequency ratios were then estimated for each
Member State on 3 levels: (i) an overall (country) level; (ii) on the 6-level
industry classification; and (iii) on the more disaggregated 21-product group
classification.
Table 4.3 below details the industry and product group classifications, and their
corresponding HS chapter codes:
122. Mitsuyo Ando and Ayako Obashi, “The pervasiveness of non-tari↵ measures in ASEAN:
evidences from the inventory approach,” chap. 2 in Rising Non-Tari↵ Protectionism and Crisis
Recovery, ed. Mia Mikic (Thailand: United Nations, 2010), 55.
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Table 4.3: Industry Classifications123.
Classification: Industries Classification: Product Groups HS Code (Chapter)
I. Animals, plants, food
1. Live animals; edible animal products HS01-05
2. Live plants; edible vegetables and fruits; HS06-14
vegetable products
3. Animal or vegetable fats and oils HS15
4. Edible preparations; beverages; tobacco HS16-24
II. Chemicals, chemical products
5. Chemicals and chemical products HS28-38
6. Plastics and articles thereof; rubber HS39-40
and articles thereof
III. Light manufactured goods
7. Raw hides and skins; leather and articles HS41-43
thereof; fur skins and products
8. Wood and articles thereof; wood charcoal; HS44-46
cork and articles thereof; straw and esparto products
9. Pulp, paper, paperboard, and articles thereof; HS47-49
printing industry products
10. Textile fibers; yarn; textile and woven fabrics; HS50-63
articles of apparel and clothing accessories
11. Footwear; headgear; umbrellas and sticks HS64-67
12. Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos HS68-70
and mica; ceramic products; glass and glassware
13. Natural or cultured pearls, precious HS71
or semi-precious stones
IV. Metals, metal products 14. Base metals and articles thereof HS72-83
V. Machineries
15. Machinery, mechanical appliances, and HS84-85
parts thereof; electrical machinery and equipment
and parts thereof
16. Vehicles and parts thereof; aircraft, spacecraft, HS86-89
and parts thereof; ships, boats, floating structures
17. Optical, photographic, cinematographic, HS90-92
measuring, checking, precision, medical instruments;
clocks, watches, parts thereof; musical
instruments, parts and accessories thereof
VI. Other products
18. Minerals and mineral products HS25-27
19. Arms, ammunition, parts and HS93
accessories thereof
20. Miscellaneous items HS94-96
21. Art works, collectors’ pieces, antiques HS97
Economic Indicators
The political economy of protection literature suggests that trade flows can
a↵ect the demand for protection from domestic producers.124 To account for
123. Adapted from Ando and Obashi, “The pervasiveness of non-tari↵ measures in ASEAN.”
124. Trefler, “Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection,” 138-139.
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this, import penetration ratios (IPRs) were generated for the Member States
from 2000 to 2015, following the formula provided by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development:125
IPR =
Imports
GDP   Exports+ Imports (4.6)
Figures for imports and exports were sourced from the UN COMTRADE database,
while gross domestic product (GDP) data was taken from the World Devel-
opment Indicators. In addition to the IPR, the relationships of imports and
exports with NTM incidence were also examined. As with the frequency ratios,
the trade indicators (IPRs, imports, and exports) were aggregated at the (i)
country, (ii) industry, and (iii) product group levels. This permits frequency
ratios to be examined vis-á-vis trade indicators at more disaggregated levels.
Following Mansfield and Busch (1995) and Saksena and Anderson (2008), the
relation between a country’s relative size and NTM incidence was also consid-
ered. GDP levels from 2000 to 2015 were used as indicators of economic size.
Trefler (1993) and Mansfield and Busch (1995) also suggest that unemployment
levels are linked to protectionist policies.The influx of cheaper imports lead
to a reduced demand for domestic products, which ultimately lead to higher
unemployment rates. Thus, the link between unemployment rates, measured
as a percentage of the total labor force, and NTM incidence was included in
this analysis. Unemployment rates were sourced from the World Development
Indicators.
Unlike the United States,there is no detailed information on interest groups in
the Member States and their lobbying contributions. Following Lee and Swagel
(1997), data on sectoral value added126, measured as a percentage of GDP, were
used instead as proxies for each sector’s level of political influence. This assumes
that larger sectors have more political influence.127 These indicators were also
sourced from the World Development Indicators.128
125. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, STAN Indicators: Collection
of Calculation Formula, 2011, https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/47447210.pdf.
126. This refers to (i) agricultural value added, (ii) industry value added, (iii) services value
added, and (iv) manufacturing value added.
127. Lee and Swagel, “Trade Barriers and Trade Flows Across Countries and Industries,”
378.
128. Lee and Swagel(1997) used industry employment as another proxy for political influence.
Due to data constraints, we excluded this variable from the present study.
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Political Indicators
Based on the existing literature, political institutions such as electoral rules
are considered determinants of trade policy. One debate centers on whether
PR systems are more conducive to free trade. As with Mansfield and Busch
(1995), Evans (2009), and Rickard (2012), this study includes electoral indica-
tors. Using data from the Database of Political Institutions 2015 (DPI 2015),
Member States were classified as adopting either the plurality system129 or the
PR system130 in their legislative elections. As Table 4.4 shows, most of the
Member States adopt a plurality system. Only Indonesia and Cambodia have
legislatures elected by means of a PR system.
Table 4.4: Electoral Rule, 2015131.
IDN KHM MYS PHL SGP THA VNM TOTAL
PR 2
Plurality 5
The form of government, particularly the structure and division of power, a↵ects
how societal preferences are reflected in policies. A parliamentary government
might find it easier to initiate or amend trade policies. A presidential system,
where power is divided between the executive and legislative branches, might
be more constrained.132 Thus, this study also examines the link between form
of government and NTM incidence. Based on information from the DPI 2015,
Member States are identified as either parliamentary or presidential.
In constructing the DPI 2015, Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini (2016) classified
those governments where the legislature designated the president as being par-
liamentary, except when said legislature lacked the power to recall the president.
Where the legislature lacked this power, the government was classified as hav-
ing an assembly-elected president.133 Thus, assembly-elected presidents could
129. This refers to winner-take-all/first past the post rules.
130. In this case, a candidate’s success hinges on the number of votes received by his party.
131. Data from Cesi Cruz, Philip Keefer, and Carlos Scartascini, Database of Political In-
stitutions Codebook, 2015 Update (DPI 2015), Inter-American Development Bank, https:
//publications.iadb.org/document.cfm?id=40094628.
132. Peter F. Cowhey, “Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commit-
ments: Japan and the United States,” International Organization 47, no. 2 (1993): 302.
133. Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini, Database of Political Institutions Codebook, 2015 Update
(DPI 2015).
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remain in o ce even in the absence of legislative confidence. Of the Member
States, Vietnam has an assembly-elected president. Considering that a term of
o ce independent of legislative will and confidence is a characteristic of presi-
dential systems,134 Vietnam is classified for the purposes of the present study
as a presidential system, along with Indonesia and the Philippines. Cambodia,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have parliamentary governments.
Table 4.5: Form of Government, 2015135.
IDN KHM MYS PHL SGP THA VNM TOTAL
Presidential 3
Parliamentary 4
The variables for electoral rules and form of government were coded as cate-
gorical variables. In the case of electoral rules, plurality and PR systems were
coded as 1 and 0, respectively. In the case of form of government, presidential
and parliamentary governments were coded as 1 and 0, respectively.
4.3.2 Tests of Association
This study aims to determine whether there is a relationship between NTM
incidence, as measured by frequency ratios, and a number of economic and
political factors characterizing the Member States. First of all, Spearman’s
correlation analyses were used to determine the association, if any, between
NTM incidence and the economic indicators. Secondly, independent samples
t-tests were used to analyze whether there were significant di↵erences between
the Member States, based on their political characteristics.
Based on scatterplot analyses, the economic indicators exhibited monotonic,
but non-linear, trends characterized by outliers vis-á-vis the frequency ratios.
Given these data features, Spearman’s rho (⇢) correlation coe cients were esti-
mated between the economic indicators and frequency ratios. Spearman’s rho
(⇢) indicates both the strength and direction of the relationship between the
134. John M. Carey, “Presidential versus Parliamentary Government,” chap. 5 in Handbook
of New Institutional Economics, ed. Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley (The Netherlands:
Springer, 2005), 92.
135. Data from Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini, Database of Political Institutions Codebook,
2015 Update (DPI 2015).
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variables. As a nonparametric measure of rank correlation, it is less sensitive
to outliers and works well with non-linear data. In cases where multiple corre-
lations were estimated, i.e., between frequency ratios and trade indicators, the
coe cients were tested using the Bonferroni adjusted significance levels.
However, Spearman’s correlation requires variables that are measured on either
the ordinal or continuous scale. Thus, this method is inappropriate for polit-
ical variables. Point-biserial correlation is also inappropriate for a number of
reasons. Firstly, an analysis of box plots indicated that there were outliers in
the groups of political categories for the disaggregated levels136 of frequency
ratios. Secondly, Levene’s test of equality of variances showed that there was
no homogeneity of variances in any of the groups of political categories. At
the country-level, there was homogeneity of variances only among the category
of electoral rules, (p = 0.076). Finally, Shapiro-Wilk’s test assessed that all 3
levels of frequency ratios were not normally distributed for either set of political
indicators (p<0.05).
Instead of a direct test of association, independent samples t-tests were used for
the political variables. The aim was to determine whether the mean frequency
ratios between the di↵erent political categories, such as between parliamentary
and presidential governments, were significantly di↵erent. Given the lack of
homogeneity in variances, the unequal variance or Welch t-test was adapted.
4.4 Determinants of ASEAN Protection
In recent years, NTMs have become prevalent in the ASEAN region. Certain
trends suggest a link between selected economic and political factors on the one
hand, and NTM incidence on the other.
This section begins with a general overview of NTM incidence in the region.
Section 4.4.2 describes the results of the correlation analyses and independent
samples t-tests. Section 4.4.3 analyzes and discusses these results within the
context of the existing literature’s theories and predictions.
136. Country-level frequency ratios had no significant outliers.
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4.4.1 Overview of NTM Incidence
NTM incidence can be considered by looking at both the intensity of regulation
and the character of regulated goods. By identifying the highly regulated goods,
heavily regulated industries are identified. This identification is the necessary
first step to take in an analysis of NTM determinants.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the trends in the mean values of the region’s
frequency ratios from 2000 to 2015. Figure 4.1 shows the mean values of the
country-level frequency ratios. The region’s frequency ratios have been steadily
rising, up from 0.51 in 2000 to 0.87 in 2015. On average, a little over half of
the region’s imports were a↵ected by NTMs in 2000. By 2015, however, almost
90% of the region’s imports were regulated by at least 1 NTM.
Figure 4.1: Mean Frequency Ratios, 2000-2015
Figure 4.2 shows that animals, plants, and food products have the highest mean
frequency ratios among the 6 industry categories. It rose from 0.72 in 2000 to
0.98 in 2015. Metals and metal products have the lowest mean frequency ratios,
at 0.79 in 2015.137
137. In 2000, the industry with the lowest mean frequency ratios was metals, followed by
others, chemicals, light manufactured goods, machineries, and animals, plants, and food.
In 2015, metals still had the lowest mean frequency ratios, followed by others, machineries,
chemicals, light manufactured goods, and animals, plants, and food.
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Figure 4.2: Mean Frequency Ratios, 6-Industry Level
4.4.2 Results
Spearman’s rank correlation analyses were ran to assess the relationship between
frequency ratios and the following:138
1. Imports, exports, and IPRs;
2. Agricultural value added, industry value added, and services value added,
all expressed as a percentage of total GDP;
3. GDP; and
4. Unemployment rate, expressed as a percentage of total employment.
Independent samples t-tests (Welch test) were used to assess the di↵erences in
the frequency ratios among Member States under di↵erent:139
1. Electoral rules, i.e., either plurality or PR; and
2. Forms of government, i.e., either presidential or parliamentary.
138. For brevity, only notable results are presented in the main discussion. See Appendix A
for the complete correlation matrices.
139. For brevity, only notable results are presented in the main discussion. See Appendix B
for the complete results.
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Economic Variables
Except for GDP, there were statistically significant findings for the relationship
between the economic indicators and frequency ratios.
Trade indicators were generally positively correlated with frequency ratios. This
correlation was weak at the country-level, as shown in Table 4.6 :
Table 4.6: Trade Indicators, Country-Level




Exports 0.292* 0.981* 1
(0.011) (0.000)
IPR 0.243 0.555* 0.531* 1
(0.060) (0.000) (0.000)
1 Coe cients were tested against the Bonferroni adjusted signif-
icance level. Asterisked coe cients are significant.
2 Observations = 112
Among the 6 industries, the strongest positive correlations between trade indi-
cators and frequency ratios were found in (i) animals, plants, and food, and (ii)
other products. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 present the correlation coe cients between
trade indicators and frequency ratios within those industries.
Tables 4.9 to 4.12 present the correlation coe cients for the product groups
with the strongest correlation coe cients. Among such product groups, animals
and edible animal products display the strongest degrees of association between
frequency ratios and both imports and import penetration. None of the trade
indicators registered a statistically significant relationship with frequency ratios
for pearls, precious or semi-precious stones.141
140. Coe cients were tested against the Bonferroni adjusted significance level. Asterisked
coe cients are significant. Observations = 108
141. The correlation coe cients are: imports with ⇢ = 0.101, p = 1; exports with ⇢ = 0.049,
p = 1.000; and import penetration with ⇢ = 0.089, p = 1.000.
142. Coe cients were tested against the Bonferroni adjusted significance level. Asterisked
coe cients are significant. Observations = 112
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Table 4.7: Animals,
plants, food140.




Ex 0.110 0.834* 1
(1.000) (0.000)



















Ex 0.094 0.516* 1
(1.000) (0.000)



















Ex 0.179 0.748* 1
(0.350) (0.000)










0.237 0.275* 0.138 1
(0.072) (0.020) (0.887)
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Frequency ratios were generally negatively associated with agricultural and in-
dustrial value added. Services value added, on the other hand, were positively
associated with frequency ratios. At both country-level and industry-level, the
weakest, and the only insignificant, correlations were for agriculture, while the
strongest were for industry. Table 4.13 presents the country-level correlation
coe cients between frequency ratios and sectoral value added.
Table 4.13: Sectoral Value Added, Country-Level




Industry -0.524* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
Services 0.400* -0.813* -0.299* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)
1 Coe cients were tested against the Bonferroni adjusted signifi-
cance level. Asterisked coe cients are significant.
2 Observations = 102
In general, the correlation coe cients between frequency ratios on the one hand,
and industry and services value added, on the other, were statistically significant
at product-group level. The following were exceptions:
1. Animals and edible animal products, where there was a moderate negative
correlation between agricultural value added and frequency ratios (Table
4.14 );
2. Plants, vegetables, and fruits, where the correlation between services value
added and frequency ratios was statistically insignificant (Table 4.15 );
3. Textiles, apparel, and clothing accessories, where the relationship between
the di↵erent sectoral value added and frequency ratios were statistically
not significant (Table 4.16 ); and
4. Arms and ammunition, where agricultural value added and frequency ra-
tios were negatively, albeit weakly, correlated (Table 4.17 ).
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Table 4.14: Ani-
mals products143.




I -0.306* -0.113 1
(0.011) (1.000)


















I -0.215 -0.113 1
(0.183) (1.000)










0.396* -0.806* -0.308* 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)
As previously mentioned, the relationship between frequency ratios and GDP
was not statistically significant. This indicates that the hypothesis of lack of
association between these variables cannot be rejected. At the country-level,
there was a weak positive correlation between NTM incidence and GDP, ⇢ =
0.033, p = 0.733. At the product group level, there were statistically significant
results in only 3 instances:
143. Coe cients were tested against the Bonferroni adjusted significance level. Asterisked
coe cients are significant. Observations = 102.
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1. A weak positive correlation for animals and edible animal products, ⇢ =
0.192, p = 0.042;
2. A weak positive correlation for textiles, apparel and clothing accessories,
⇢ = 0.309, p = 0.001; and
3. A negative correlation for art works, ⇢ = -0.420, p < 0.005.
The results for unemployment were statistically significant, yet contrary to the
predicted outcome. Unemployment was negatively correlated with frequency
ratios. This correlation was moderately strong at the country-level, ⇢ = -0.430,
p < 0.005. This negative relation became stronger at industry level, notably
for (i) animals, plants, and food (⇢ = -0.587, p < 0.005), and (ii) chemicals
and chemical products (⇢ = -0.525, p < 0.005). 3 out of the 4 product groups
under animals, plants, and food displayed strong negative correlations as well,
namely:
1. Plants, vegetables and fruits, ⇢ = -0.528, p < 0.005;
2. Animal or vegetable fats and oils, ⇢ = -0.552, p < 0.005; and
3. Edible preparations, beverages and tobacco, ⇢ = -0.512, p < 0.005.
There were also notable negative degrees of correlation for wood and wood prod-
ucts (⇢ = -0.548, p < 0.005) and arms and ammunition (⇢ = -0.543, p<0.005).
Pearls, precious or semi-precious stones was the sole product group for which
there was no statistically significant relation between unemployment and fre-
quency ratios, ⇢ = -0.157, p = 0.108.
Independent Samples t-test
Figure 4.3 illustrates the distribution of frequency ratios within the di↵erent
categories of electoral rules, while Table 4.18 provides the relevant descriptive
statistics. Member States under the plurality system appear to have higher fre-
quency ratios than those under PR. The median is noticeably higher in plurality
Member States (0.94 vs 0.41). However, frequency ratios in PR systems display
less variability.
The results of the independent samples t-test for electoral rules at country-level
are presented in Table 4.19. The mean frequency ratios in PR countries were
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Figure 4.3: Frequency Ratios and Electoral Rules








lower (0.529 ± 0.297) than they were in plurality countries (0.735 ± 0.346).
This was a statistically significant di↵erence of -0.206 (95% confidence interval
of -0.336 to -0.076), t(66.155) = -3.155, p = 0.0002.
Likewise, frequency ratios were statistically significantly higher in plurality sys-
tems at both the industry and product group levels, except where this di↵erence
was not significant:
1. At industry level, for light manufactured goods; and
2. At product group level, for (i) natural or cultured pearls, precious or
semi-precious stones, and (ii) minerals and mineral products.
The textiles, apparel, and clothing accessories product group is another no-
table exception. In this group’s case, frequency ratios in PR countries were
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higher (0.761 ± 0.385) than in plurality countries (0.689 ± 0.411), a statisti-
cally not significant di↵erence of 0.071 (95% confidence interval of -0.093 to
0.236), t(60.827) = 0.871, p = 0.39.
Table 4.19: Two-sample t-test with unequal variances:
Electoral Rules
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
PR 32 .529 .052 .297 .422 .636
Plurality 80 .735 .039 .346 .658 .812
combined 112 .676 .033 .344 .612 .741
di↵ -.206 .065 -.336 -.076
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -3.155
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.002 Satterthwaite’s deg. of freedom = 66.155
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of frequency ratios within Member States in
the cases of presidential and parliamentary forms of government. Table 4.20
provides the descriptive statistics. While parliamentary governments have a
higher median frequency ratio (0.94 vs 0.62), frequency ratios in presidential
governments display greater variability.
Figure 4.4: Frequency Ratios and Form of Government
The results of the independent samples t-test for forms of government, at the
country-level, are presented in Table 4.21. The mean frequency ratios for par-
liamentary states were higher (0.747 ± 0.298) than those in presidential states
(0.582± 0.381). This represents a significant di↵erence of 0.165 (95% confidence
interval of 0.033 to 0.297), t(86.525) = 2.490, p = 0.015.
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The statistically significant result that frequency ratios in parliamentary states
were higher than in presidential states was also obtained at the industry and
product group levels, except in the case of the following categories, which pro-
duced statistically not significant outcomes:
1. At the industry level for (i) metals and metal products, and (ii) other
products; and
2. At the product group level for (i) plastics and rubber; (ii) pulp, paper
products, and printing industry products; (iii) footwear, headgear, um-
brellas, and sticks; (iv) stone, plaster, cement, ceramics, and glassware;
(v) pearls, precious or semi-precious stones; (vi) base metals; and (vii)
mineral products.
The opposite result, namely that frequency ratios were higher in presidential
systems than in parliamentary ones, was obtained in 2 cases:
1. For the light manufactured goods industry, frequency ratios were higher in
presidential states (0.752 ± 0.276) than in parliamentary states (0.665 ±
0.402), a non-statistically significant di↵erence of -0.087 (95% confidence
interval of -0.217 to 0.042), t(105.999) = -1.340, p = 0.183.
2. For the textiles, apparel, and clothing accessories product group, fre-
quency ratios in presidential states were higher (0.783 ± 0.369) than in
parliamentary states (0.654 ± 0.422), a non-statistically significant di↵er-
ence of -0.129 (95% confidence interval of -0.277 to 0.020), t(107.363) =
-1.720, p = 0.088.
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Table 4.21: Two-sample t-test with unequal variances:
Form of Government
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .747 .037 .298 .673 .821
Presidential 48 .582 .055 .381 .471 .692
combined 112 .676 .033 .344 .612 .741
di↵ .165 .066 .033 .297
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 2.490
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.015 Satterthwaite’s deg. of freedom = 86.525
Summary of Results
For the Spearman’s correlation analyses, only GDP registered results that were
not statistically significant for all the frequency ratio levels. In general, there
was a weak positive correlation between GDP and frequency ratios.
The general trends between frequency ratios and other economic indicators are:
1. A positive relation with trade flows, as measured by imports, exports, and
the import penetration ratio;
2. A negative relation with the agricultural and industrial sectors;
3. A positive relation with the services sector; and
4. A negative relation with unemployment.
Based on independent samples t-tests, frequency ratios are higher in Member
States under (i) plurality electoral rules, and (ii) parliamentary systems.
4.4.3 Discussion
An examination of the correlation results for trade indicators and sectoral value
added can generate a number of insights. At this point, the endogeneity of
protection should be emphasized. While rising imports can lead to demand
for protection, likewise protectionism can result in reduced imports.144 This
feedback mechanism may explain the weak positive correlation between imports
and import penetration on the one hand, and frequency ratios on the other.
While correlation does not establish causality, the moderately strong correlation
144. Trefler, “Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection,” 143.
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in the case of animals and edible animal products, which is one of the most
regulated product groups, hints at a strong positive link between imports and
NTM incidence.
The political economy literature predicts that protection will be higher for those
industries with low or inelastic import demand, where deadweight costs are
minimized.145 Additionally, larger sectors, i.e., those whose domestic output is
greater than import demand, have more to gain from protection. With protec-
tionist policies, large sectors can increase their profit from the domestic mar-
ket.146 Larger industries also tend to have more political power.147 In theory,
governments would prefer to deviate from the free trade norm to favor large
industries with low import demand elasticity. As such, there is an expected
positive correlation between sectoral value added, which is also used as a proxy
for political influence, and frequency ratios.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the value added of each sector for each Member State for
2015. The services sector is the largest in the region, followed by industry.148
Figure 4.5: Sectoral Value Added, 2015149.
145. See Findlay and Wellisz, “Endogenous Tari↵s, the Political Economy of Trade Restric-
tions, and Welfare”; Hillman, “Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Mo-
tives”; Grossman and Helpman, “Protection for Sale.”
146. Grossman and Helpman, “Protection for Sale,” 842.
147. Lee and Swagel, “Trade Barriers and Trade Flows Across Countries and Industries,”
378.
148. The services sector has grown during the recent decades. For more details, kindly refer
to Tables 3.2 and 3.3 in Chapter 3.
149. Data from World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”
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As noted in Table 4.13, services value added is indeed positively associated with
NTM incidence. However, the expected positive correlation did not materialize
in the case of industry. Nevertheless, it can be argued that this result was to be
expected given the significance of trans-boundary production network trade.
Since the 1990s, the composition of traded goods in ASEAN has shifted from
primary and natural-resource intensive goods to manufactures such as electron-
ics, machineries, and transport equipment.150 From 1992/1993 to 2005/2006,
the region’s exports of parts and components increased from 29% to 44% of to-
tal manufacturing exports.151 Today, trade in parts and component, as a share
of GDP, “is among the highest in the world in the ASEAN.”152 Cambodia,
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam are all mainly importers of inter-
mediate goods which are subsequently used for exports of both intermediate and
final goods. Indonesia and the Philippines, on the other hand, are exporters of
domestic goods as inputs for transnational production networks.153 Table 4.22
presents the extent of trade in intermediate goods,154 expressed as a percentage
of total merchandise trade, among the Member States.
Table 4.22: Trade in Intermediates, 2014 (% Share, Total Mer-
chandise Trade)155.
Exports Imports







150. Athukorala, “Production Networks and Trade Patterns in East Asia,” 5; Yue and Plum-
mer, “Introduction,” 4.
151. Athukorala and Menon, “Global Production Sharing, Trade Patterns, and Determinants
of Trade Flows in East Asia,” 9.
152. Asian Development Bank, Emerging Asian Regionalism, 64.
153. World Trade Organization, “Trade in Value-Added and Global Value Chains: Statistical
Profiles.”
154. Intermediate goods refer to products which are used as inputs in production.
155. Data from World Trade Organization, “Trade in Value-Added and Global Value Chains:
Statistical Profiles.”
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Industrial sectors, such as mining and manufacturing, are among the top im-
porters of intermediate goods.156 These intermediate goods make up the bulk
of merchandise trade.157 In this context, the assumption that profit-maximizing
large sectors use their political power to secure protection is inapplicable. In-
stead, it is more rational for the industrial sector to lobby for lower prices of
their imported inputs. Additionally, the growth of this sector depends on the
free flow of goods. Policies which hinder and distort trade have the potential to
raise production costs. Thus, the negative correlation between industrial value
added and frequency ratios can reflect either one or both of the following:
1. As trans-boundary production network trade gains in prominence, indus-
trial firms demand lower barriers to trade, which translates to a lower
NTM incidence.
2. Rising NTM incidence can increase the costs of trade, and ultimately the
industrial sector’s production costs.
Services is the region’s largest sector in terms of both value added and employ-
ment.158 Services are generally produced and consumed domestically, and the
imports of such represent just a fraction of merchandise imports, as shown in
Table 4.23. This suggests that the services sector is politically important159 and
well-placed to secure protection.
Table 4.23: Merchandise and Commercial Services Imports,









156. World Trade Organization, “Trade in Value-Added and Global Value Chains: Statistical
Profiles.”
157. See Table 4.23.
158. See Table 3.4 in Chapter 3 for sectoral employment data.
159. Lee and Swagel, “Trade Barriers and Trade Flows Across Countries and Industries,”
378.
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It is interesting that the strongest association between services value added and
NTM incidence was in the animals, plants, and food industry, specifically for
the animals and edible animals product group. This suggests that the growth
of the services sector is associated with an increase in NTM incidence in the
case of agricultural products. As noted in Figure 4.2, the animals, plants and
food industry has the highest mean frequency ratios in the region. However, the
agricultural sector’s economic importance has diminished compared to services
in terms of both value added161 and employment162. Between these 2 sectors,
one would then expect services-related imports to have a higher incidence of
NTMs. However, the decline in agricultural value added has been accompanied
by a rise in NTM incidence in agricultural products, notably in the animals and
edible animals product group. An examination of agricultural import trends
may be enlightening here.
While regional trends suggest the diminished economic and political importance
of the agricultural sector, agricultural imports make up only a small fraction
of Member States’ total imports. Table 4.24 shows agricultural imports as a
percentage share of Member States’ total merchandise imports in recent years.
The low demand for agricultural imports translates into lower deadweight losses
and social costs arising from distortionary trade policies. The link between low
import demand and NTM incidence is supported by the positive correlation be-
tween frequency ratios and imports for animals, plants and food. As a declining
industry, agriculture is a “natural candidate”163 for protection. Increasing im-
ports may create a demand for protection, which is not politically costly for
politicians to grant.
In other words, the shift of import demand from primary agricultural to other
commodities makes any potential costs of protectionist policies less burden-
some to both the politically influential industrial producers and the general
160. Data from World Trade Organization, Trade Profiles 2015, 2015, https://www.wto.
org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_profiles15_e.pdf.
161. See Table 4.22.
162. See Table 3.4 in Chapter 3.
163. Hillman, The Political Economy of Protection, 26.
164. Data from World Trade Organization, Trade Profiles 2006, 2006, https://www.wt
o.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/trade_profiles06_e.pdf; World Trade
Organization, Trade Profiles 2010, 2010, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_
e/anrep_e/trade_profiles10_e.pdf; World Trade Organization, Trade Profiles 2015.
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Table 4.24: Agricultural Imports (as a % of Total Imports)164.
2006 2010 2015
Cambodia 6.8 6.6 5
Indonesia 11.5 12.4 12.5
Malaysia 6.3 9.9 9.7
Philippines 8.1 12.1 12.8
Singapore 3.2 3.6 4
Thailand 6 7 7.1
Vietnam 7.8 13.2 11.5
consumers.165 The services sector, which employs a greater portion of the pop-
ulation whose incomes are no longer dependent on agricultural prices, is less
likely to o↵er any e↵ective opposition.166 Thus, NTM incidence is highest in
agriculture, the seemingly least influential sector.
These structural changes may also shed light on the correlation between fre-
quency ratios and unemployment rate, which is contrary to expectations. The
predicted positive relation between protection and unemployment is based on
the assumed negative impact of trade on the domestic labor market. Specif-
ically, imports and domestic products are presumed to be direct competitors.
As a result, “workers who are displaced by imports will find it progressively
more di cult to obtain alternative employment, and when they do, downward
pressure will be placed on their wages.”167
The wholesale applicability of this assumption to ASEAN is questionable, given
the prominence of trans-boundary production network trade in the region.
Trade in intermediate products is not damaging to domestic production. On
the contrary, it is a vital part of the domestic production process. As such,
there is less danger of the displacement of domestic labor as a result of rising
trade flows. Consequently, there is less demand for protection as a result of
unemployment.
165. Swinnen, “The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies,” 60; Anderson,
“Economic Growth, Comparative Advantage, and Agricultural Trade of Pacific Rim Coun-
tries,” 15.
166. Anderson, “Economic Growth, Comparative Advantage, and Agricultural Trade of Pa-
cific Rim Countries,” 14.
167. Mansfield and Busch, “The Political Economy of Nontari↵ Barriers,” 725-726.
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The negative correlation between unemployment and NTM incidence is there-
fore not surprising within this context. Given transboundary production net-
work trade, the labor force is more interested in trade liberalization, than in
protection. Trade barriers, which include NTMs, have the potential of to raise
trade costs. Displaced workers have an interest in stimulating domestic produc-
tion, notably in labor-intensive sectors involved in transboundary networks, by
lobbying for lower trade costs.
The region’s labor market trends support this interpretation. Regional un-
employment rates have declined in recent years, from 4.7% in 2010 to 4.2% in
2013.168 While it is still among the main sectors, agriculture’s employment share
has fallen. The decline in agriculture’s importance in terms of labor has been
accompanied by rising employment in manufacturing and in both market169
and non-market170 services.171 Figure 4.6 illustrates the changing structure of
regional employment in the di↵erent sectors.
The fall in unemployment together with increased employment in the services
and manufacturing sectors coincided with increased NTMs on agricultural prod-
ucts. The decline in agricultural employment makes NTMs on agricultural prod-
ucts less costly. As real incomes are less a↵ected by food prices, there is less
opposition to potentially protectionist agricultural policies and regulations. The
declining absolute labor share of agriculture also means that the per unit cost
of protection is also declining. There might even be public support for policies
which benefit farmers and fishermen.173 Thus, the aforesaid employment trends
may facilitate the imposition of NTMs on agricultural products.
Taken together, these labor sector trends show that within the context of a
globally integrated economy, the negative correlation between unemployment
rates and NTM incidence is logical and unsurprising.
168. Asian Development Bank and International Labour Organization, ASEAN Community
2015: Managing integration for better jobs and shared prosperity (ILO / ADB, 2014), 9.
169. This include trade, transportation, accommodation and food, and business and admin-
istrative services.
170. This includes public administration, community, social, and other services.
171. International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT, http://www.ilo.org/ilostat.
172. Data from International Labour Organization, “ILOSTAT: Employment by sex and
economic activity,” http://www.ilo.org/ilostat.
173. Anderson, “Economic Growth, Structural Change and the Political Economy of Protec-
tion,” 15-16.
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Figure 4.6: Employment by Economic Activity (In thou-
sands)172.
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The correlation results for GDP and frequency ratios were consistent with theo-
retical predictions. As developing economies, the Member States have relatively
little market power compared with their main trading partners, i.e., the United
States, China, Japan, and the European Union.174 This makes Member States
vulnerable to retaliatory acts from their larger trading partners. As such, the
use of trade policy as an instrument of terms-of-trade manipulation is not a vi-
able strategy. Thus, NTM incidence in the region has no statistically significant
relationship with the economic size of the Member States.
The results from the independent samples t-test on electoral rules are consis-
tent with Saksena and Anderson (2008).175 Plurality Member States have higher
frequency ratios than proportional representation Member States. As plural-
ity States are also characterized by smaller electoral districts, electoral success
hinges on developments at district, rather than national, level. This suggests
that plurality Member States are less insulated from, and more responsive to,
their constituencies’ demands for protection. Thus, politicians have an incen-
tive to cater to specific voters, i.e., industries, within their constituencies, by
promising and enacting protectionist policies for example, such as those in favor
of the agricultural sector.
The nature of NTMs may also explain why plurality systems are associated
with higher frequency ratios. Plurality systems are expected to incentivize good
behavior on the part of politicians. Thus, plurality systems should coincide with
lower frequency ratios. However, NTMs are inherently opaque and complex. It
is di cult to identify and examine the e↵ects of all the current NTMs within a
given country. The information costs which voters would need to bear, in order
to become fully informed on this issue, are too burdensome.176 As such, NTMs
would ordinarily not be salient to the ordinary voter. As a result, elections do
not provide su cient or e↵ective incentives for good behavior among politicians.
As predicted by the separation of powers argument, parliamentary Member
States have higher frequency ratios than presidential States. Unlike presiden-
tial systems, parliamentary governments are less accountable to the electorate.
174. ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Yearbook on International Merchandise Trade in Goods
2015, 2016, 23-24, http://www.aseanstats.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ASEAN-
IMTS-2015_hires-1.pdf.
175. Saksena and Anderson, “Explaining Variation in the Use of NTBs in Developed Coun-
tries”; Rickard, “A Non-Tari↵ Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics”; Evans, “A Pro-
tectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics.”
176. See Olson, The Logic of Collective Action.
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Legislators, by virtue of the greater concentration of power in the parliament,
are also more capable of entering into collusive agreements. Notably, 3 out of
the 4 parliamentary Member States (Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) elect
members of their lower houses on the basis of plurality rules.177 The lower elec-
toral accountability of parliamentary systems is coupled with an incentive for
politicians to cater to narrow economic interests. The parliamentary system
enables these legislators to pursue policies and programs which benefit such
economic interests. Thus, these political institutions potentially make the gov-
ernments more responsive to, and capable of meeting, industries’ demands for
protection.
Several insights can be gleaned from these results. Contrary to the predicted
outcome, a sector’s economic and political importance is not always positively
linked with NTM incidence. This is reflected in the negative correlation between
industrial value added and frequency ratios. Industrial sectors, given their in-
volvement in transboundary production network trade, are more interested in
lower trade costs. Consequently, labor is also more interested in lowering trade
costs, as this stimulates the growth of labor-intensive industries which are part
of production networks. Thus, industry’s growth is linked with falling, rather
than rising, frequency ratios.
The correlation results also support the notion that declining sectors do tend
to receive greater protection. The rising incidence of NTMs on agricultural
products noticeably coincided with the decline of the agricultural sector in terms
of both value added and employment. As a declining industry, agriculture is
a “natural candidate for protection”.178 Thus, the underlying socioeconomic
context does matter, as this shapes preferences either for, or against, free trade.
In this specific case, the agricultural sector retains a preference for protection.
The structural changes seen in recent decades, namely the growth of the services
sector and the transformation of the labor markets, has e↵ectively reduced the
social and political costs of protection for agriculture.
The region’s political institutions incentivize politicians to respond and cater
to these preferences. The results are in line with the theories that plurality
177. Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini, Database of Political Institutions Codebook, 2015 Update
(DPI 2015).
178. Hillman, The Political Economy of Protection, 26.
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electoral rules and parliamentary governments lead to higher levels of NTM in-
cidence. In ASEAN Member States, electoral success is based on the legislators’
ability to cater to narrow, district-specific interests. Parliaments, which enjoy
a large amount of power and discretion, are likewise better able to collude with
each other to enact their preferred policies and legislation. In other words, (i)
the socioeconomic context results in preferences for certain types of policy, and
(ii) political institutions determine how well these preferences are reflected in
laws and policies.
4.5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This chapter aimed to determine whether there is a link between political and
economic factors on the one hand, and NTM incidence in ASEAN Member
States on the other. In general, frequency ratios have been positively related
to trade flows and the growth of the services sector. It has also been nega-
tively related to unemployment and the value added of the agricultural and
industrial sectors. Member States with plurality electoral systems and par-
liamentary governments have also displayed higher frequency ratios than PR
systems and presidential governments have.
These results suggest that economic and political factors do impact Member
States’ trade policy. This implies that regional-level commitments designed to
address NTMs might be insu cient and ine↵ective, if these underlying domestic
factors remain unaddressed. Thus, a re-examination of the form and content of
the region’s NTM-related commitments could be in order.
Due to limited data, this study was restricted to an analysis of correlations
between NTM incidence on the one hand, and economic and political variables
on the other. An investigation of the causal links between these variables,
including an examination of the direction of causality, would shed even more
light on the policy-making process. This study was further limited by its use
of data on sectoral value added as proxies for political influence. An in-depth
examination of sectoral characteristics (such as market concentration, number of
firms per industry, and geographic distribution of firms) and lobbying activities
vis-á-vis NTM incidence may provide greater insights into the link between
a sector’s political power andthe question of protection. A more fine-toothed
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classification of Member States, made on the basis of political characteristics
(such as constituency, district sizes, and types of presidential and parliamentary
systems) may likewise yield additional beneficial insights. Unfortunately, these
economic and political data from the ASEAN region are still lacking.
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5 Conclusion
This thesis has focused on the incidence of non-tari↵ measures (NTMs) in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The persistence of NTMs
in the Member States, despite their legal1 commitments to reduce NTMs and
eliminate non-tari↵ barriers (NTBs), has been analyzed within a law and eco-
nomics framework. The aim of the thesis is to contribute to the literature on
both NTMs and ASEAN policy making.
This concluding chapter summarizes the findings and insights of this thesis
(Section 5.1), and discusses the possible implications for ASEAN policy making
(Section 5.2). As this research has merely scratched the surface of this complex
issue, possible directions for future research are also discussed (Section 5.3).
5.1 Observations and Findings
This thesis mainly focuses on the persistence and rising incidence of NTMs
in ASEAN in spite of the presence of various international law instruments
mandating their reduction. As such, Chapter 2 begins with an analysis of the
issues on compliance with, and e↵ectiveness of, these legal instruments.
International trading systems can be seen as multilateral prisoners’ dilemmas.
While the highest payo↵s can be achieved through free trade, States retain an
incentive to defect. Defection, which may come in the form of tari↵s and protec-
tionist measures, allows States to gain at the expense of their trading partners.
This dilemma is further complicated by the nature of NTMs. The broad scope
of NTMs makes it di cult to identify and classify these instruments. The fact
that NTMs may have legitimate underlying purposes2 may also obscure their
1. Both treaty and soft law.
2. For example, NTMs may come in the form of health and environmental regulations.
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adverse trade e↵ects. These qualities may facilitate both willful and inadvertent
acts of defection.
The compliance literature suggests that international law can alleviate this
dilemma by encouraging cooperation. Instruments such as treaties and soft
law commitments can clarify any ambiguities by clearly distinguishing acts of
cooperation from acts of defection. Enforcement regimes can also render contin-
ued cooperation more profitable than defection, thus o↵ering States an incentive
to comply. For example, costly sanctions and penalties may dissipate any short
term gains from defection.
However, the data suggests that ASEAN’s trade-related soft law and treaty
commitments are largely ine↵ective at reducing the number of NTMs. In fact,
the number of NTMs has steadily increased during recent years, as shown in
Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: NTMs in Force in ASEAN, 2000-20153.
Chapter 2 shows that the ASEAN trade regime has provided insu cient in-
centives for compliance. Firstly, the instruments in question have failed to
distinguish acts of cooperation from acts of defection. The ASEAN Trade in
Goods Agreement (ATIGA), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint,
and AEC Blueprint 2025 were written in general and vague language, leaving
the exact nature and details of the Member States’ obligations unclear. For
example, NTMs are permitted only insofar as these do not create “unnecessary
obstacles in trade”4. The specific measures needed to identify and address these
3. Adapted from Ing et al., “Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN: A Simple Proposal,” 22.
4. Article 40(2), ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement.
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unnecessary obstacles have been left undefined. Secondly, the Member States
have been granted a wide scope of discretion on how and when they are to
comply with these obligations. In both ATIGA and the AEC Blueprint 2025,
ASEAN merely recognizes the di↵erent approaches that can be used to address
NTMs, such as standards harmonization and mutual recognition agreements.
There are, however, no guidelines or schedules for the enforcement of these
approaches.
These weaknesses of the ASEAN trade regime has further undermined the ef-
fectiveness of other compliance mechanisms, namely reputation, retaliation and
reciprocity. While the breach of clearly defined obligations can result in repu-
tational costs,5 these costs are lessened when there is doubt as to what States
are bound to do. In the ASEAN context, the ambiguous, vague language of
said trade instruments has created uncertainty over the nature and content of
the Member States’ obligations. It is inherently di cult to pinpoint clear and
intentional instances of breach. As a result, the e↵ectiveness of reputation as
an incentive for compliance is impaired.
Retaliation is also ine↵ective due to the region’s weak enforcement systems.
They do not even provide for penalties or sanctions in the event of Member
States’ noncompliance with their obligations. The region’s preference for diplo-
matic, rather than rules-based, processes also casts doubt over the persuasive-
ness of enforcement and settlement systems. Thus, these systems lack su cient
coercive power.
The threat of reciprocal defections is likewise not credible. This undermines
the region’s economic integration agenda. The “ASEAN Way” of resolution
through flexibility and consensus further allows dissenting Member States to
dilute the obligatory pull of commitments. This renders any basis for reciprocal
defections futile. It is also doubtful whether reciprocity is a viable option for
the Member States. Due to the primacy of sovereignty in ASEAN, Member
States take great pains not to interfere in each others’ domestic a↵airs. Any
threat of reciprocal action may be construed as an infringement of sovereignty.
As such, any resort to reciprocity becomes unlikely.
5. For instance, a defecting State becoming less credible in the eyes of other States. Thus,
the latter are less inclined to enter into future agreements with the former.
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In light of these considerations, Chapter 2 concludes that the language used in
drafting the legal instruments has not only created considerable uncertainty and
ambiguity, which has facilitated noncompliance with the NTM-related obliga-
tions, but it has also impaired the e↵ectiveness of other compliance mechanisms.
Notably, the persistence of NTMs has coincided with the rise of industry, partic-
ularly production networks, together with e↵orts at deeper integration. While
the region’s economic transformation has created a demand for more liberal
trade policies, such as the endeavor to establish the AEC, it has also been ac-
companied by a rise in NTMs among Member States. Based on this observation,
Chapter 3 examines the persistence of NTMs within the context of the region’s
structural changes.
Since the 1980s, the emergence of production networks and the growth of intra-
regional trade in manufactures and intermediate goods has been facilitated by
the Member States’ and ASEAN’s outward-oriented policies. For example, the
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and its related initiatives has provided for
preferential tari↵s in favor of ASEAN goods, and encouraged the establish-
ment of regionally integrated production networks. Currently, ASEAN’s share
of trade in parts and components is among the highest in the world.6 The
Member States’ trade in manufactures has also intensified together with their
increased participation in production networks. However, as industry’s eco-
nomic importance in the region has grown, that of agriculture has declined in
terms of both value added and employment. These structural changes have also
coincided with the rising incidence of NTMs.
The increased adoption of NTMs may be due to an increased regulatory de-
mand, as “trade liberalization leads to import-quality heterogeneity which itself
causes regulatory controls.”7 For example, quality measures8 may address infor-
mation asymmetries by ensuring that imports comply with generally accepted
international standards. Otherwise, these products would not have been allowed
to enter the importing State’s domestic market. Consequently, quality measures
potentially (i) ensure that intermediate and final goods meet the preferences of
the ultimate consumers, and (ii) enable producers to signal the quality of their
products to their buyers.
6. Asian Development Bank, Emerging Asian Regionalism, 64.
7. Ing et al., “Non-Tari↵ Measures in ASEAN: A Simple Proposal,” 23.
8. These are NTMs which impose standards and requirements on either the production
process or product features.
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This seems to be the case of Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and Singapore. There
is a high incidence of quality measures9 regarding agricultural and food prod-
ucts. A majority of the NTMs in Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia have also
been issued by health ministries. It can be assumed that health ministries is-
sued these NTMs in accordance with their mandate, i.e., to promote the public
health. As such, it is not unlikely that these NTMs ensure that imports meet
certain minimum quality standards. Furthermore, some of the most regulated
goods in Singapore10 and Malaysia11 are used in production network trade.
NTMs in this case could be operating as a signal of product quality. Produc-
tion network-related trade in these goods in these Member States has remained
strong, despite the high incidence of NTMs.
Alternatively, rising NTM incidence may also be accounted for on protectionist
grounds. On the one hand, structural changes may have created a preference for
trade liberalization in certain sectors, such as those involved in intra-regional
production networks. On the other hand, structural changes may have in-
centivized the declining agricultural sector to lobby for beneficial regulation.
Indeed, as a result of the region’s structural changes, agriculture became a
declining industry and thus a “natural candidate”12 for protection.
A number of factors indicate that political economy motives may be at play
in the cases of Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Agricultural products, including these Member States’ main crops, are among
the most highly-regulated goods. In addition to quality measures, these goods
are also subject to export-related,13 price control and quantity measures. There
are also a great number of NTMs a↵ecting goods involved in production net-
works, such as machineries14, chemicals, and light manufactures15. As in the
cases of Singapore and Malaysia, production network-related trade in these
goods has remained strong despite the considerable number of NTMs.
9. Specifically, technical barriers to trade (TBTs) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
measures. SPS measures aim to protect against the spread of harmful contaminants and
diseases. TBTs refer to any measure which imposes technical and quality requirements.
10. Machineries and electrical products.
11. Foodstu↵s and chemical products.
12. Hillman, The Political Economy of Protection, 26.
13. This includes, but is not limited to, measures such as quotas, export prohibitions, li-
censing requirements, and quantitative restrictions.
14. This includes transport products, computers, and electronics.
15. Such as clothing and textiles.
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Unlike in the case of production network-related goods, NTMs do not appear
to promote trade in regulated agricultural goods. Agricultural imports consti-
tute but a small fraction of these Member States’ total imports. Additionally,
most of the NTMs in these Member States were issued by agriculture, indus-
try, and trade ministries. Unlike health ministry NTMs, these issuances do
not have the underlying presumption of promoting public health. Studies have
also noted the presence of endemic rent-seeking and corruption in Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Thailand. This political context, which makes regulators
susceptible to pressures from interest groups, casts doubt on the supposedly
legitimate justifications for these NTMs on agricultural goods.
The demand for NTMs may have originated from the small group of landowning
entities that operate large tracts of land. Given their similar interests, this group
can easily overcome their collective action problems and lobby for beneficial
regulations. The wide range of NTMs also allows regulators to tailor NTMs
in order to favor only a limited selection of beneficiaries. And as agriculture’s
share of the labor force has declined, real incomes are now less dependent on food
prices. Correspondingly, consumers will o↵er less opposition to the imposition
of NTMs on agricultural goods.
In sum, Chapter 3 shows how structural changes may have influenced the inter-
ests of political and economic actors in each of the Member States. Ultimately,
these interests are now reflected in the trade policies of these Member States.
Building upon these insights, Chapter 4 extends the analysis to an examina-
tion of the underlying determinants of trade policy in ASEAN. In particular,
it asks whether there is a link between economic trends and political factors
on the one hand, and NTM incidence on the other. According to the politi-
cal economy of trade protection literature, both economic and political factors
matter in the policy-making process. Economic trends may generate demands
for certain types of policy, while political institutions a↵ect how these demands
are translated into such policy. Relationships between NTM incidence on the
one hand, and economic and political factors on the other, have been analyzed
in order to ascertain (i) the existence of possible links between them, and (ii)
the strength and direction of any such association.
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The results indicate that sectoral trends do matter. There was a positive corre-
lation between NTM incidence and the services sector16. Indeed, the growth of
the services sector has coincided with the rise in NTM incidence, specifically in
food and agricultural products. Both the agricultural and industrial sectors17,
however, are negatively correlated with NTM incidence. The unemployment
rate is also negatively correlated with NTM incidence. Chapter 4 discusses how
these results are not unexpected, given the importance of production network
trade in ASEAN.
Industrial sectors, such as mining and manufacturing, are highly involved in
production networks. These sectors are among the top importers of intermediate
goods. In this context, the assumption that large sectors use their political
power to secure protectionist policies is inapplicable. Policies which may hinder
the flow of goods, such as NTMs, can increase the costs of trade and, ultimately,
this sector’s production costs. It is more rational for industrial sectors to use
their influence in order to lobby for free trade, as this results in lower prices of
imported inputs. Hence, the importance of trans-boundary production network
trade explains the negative correlation between industry value added and NTM
incidence.
Regarding the agricultural sector, its decline has been accompanied by a rise
in the incidence of NTMs on agricultural goods. As a declining industry, agri-
culture retains a preference for protection. The low demand for agricultural
imports means that there are fewer social and deadweight costs arising from
potentially distortionary policies. As a majority of the population are now em-
ployed in the services sector, their incomes are no longer a↵ected by agricultural
prices. Consequently, they are less likely to oppose any NTMs on agricultural
products. In this way, the structural changes in the region may have facilitated
the issuance of NTMs in favor of agriculture.
The negative correlation between NTM incidence and unemployment seems
counter-intuitive. However, the predicted positive correlation is based on the
assumed negative impact of imports on the domestic market, i.e., on the as-
sumption that imports and domestic products are direct competitors. This as-
sumption no longer holds given the role of transboundary production networks.
16. As measured by services value added.
17. Measured as agricultural value added and industrial value added.
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In this context, imports are now a vital part of production processes. As such,
there is less danger of displacement of domestic labor because of imports.
Chapter 4 also notes that the degree of political insulation and accountability
may a↵ect how governments react to preferences for certain types of policies.
Plurality States have smaller electoral districts, and electoral success depends
on district, rather than national, level. Consequently, politicians are less insu-
lated from their constituencies’ demands and preferences, making them more
susceptible to demands for protection. Indeed, Member States under plural-
ity electoral rules have a higher NTM incidence than Member States under
proportional representation.
Parliamentary governments are subject to less electoral accountability than
presidential governments. Furthermore, parliamentary legislatures are char-
acterized by a greater concentration of power, and are more capable of entering
into collusive agreements. These features enable parliamentary legislatures to
pursue policies which benefit specific interests only. Moreover, as expected, par-
liamentary Member States do have a higher incidence of NTM than presidential
States.
In other words, Chapter 4 shows that (i) the socio-economic context of the
Member States has created preferences and demands for certain policies, and
(ii) their political institutions has determined how these preferences are reflected
in laws, policies, and regulations.
In light of these insights, the following questions raised in Chapter 1 can be
answered thus:
1. Does the ASEAN trade regime provide su cient incentives for compliance
with the commitments pertaining to NTMs? The ASEAN trade regime
has not only failed to su ciently incentivize the Member States to comply
with their commitments pertaining to NTMs, but it has also impaired the
e↵ectiveness of other compliance mechanisms.
2. Can the region’s structural changes, such as the increased prominence of
industry and production networks, explain the demand for NTMs? The
region’s structural changes may explain the demand for NTMs. Specifi-
cally, sectoral and structural changes may stimulate and create preferences
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for di↵erent kinds of NTMs. While not all of these preferences are pro-
tectionist in nature, declining sectors not unexpectedly retain an interest
for protectionist policies.
3. Are political and economic factors linked with NTM incidence? Can the
former explain the rising incidence of NTMs in ASEAN? The Member
States’ economic and political contexts are linked with NTM incidence.
While economic factors may explain why societies prefer certain types
of policies, political institutions determine how well these preferences are
catered to by the policymakers.
Taken together, the aforesaid may shed light on the incidence of NTMs in
ASEAN. That is, NTMs persist because the region’s trade regime has failed to
overcome policymakers’ interests in catering to the societal preferences for dif-
ferent kinds of NTMs resulting from the structural changes witnessed in recent
decades.
5.2 Policy Implications
Using a law and economics framework, Chapters 2 to 4 each delved into di↵erent
aspects of the persistence of NTMs in ASEAN. However, the aim was not to
definitively provide the reasons for this persistence, but to o↵er insights which
may aid ASEAN policymaking.
Chapters 3 and 4 illustrated the value of analyzing NTMs vis-à-vis the socio-
economic and political contexts of the Member States. The general implication
is that e↵orts aimed at addressing NTMs should, first and foremost, be executed
on a national level. NTMs are essentially domestic issuances, and can best be
addressed by the relevant issuing authorities. While current ASEAN e↵orts are
indeed implemented at the Member State level, the general and broad delegation
of authority is insu cient. The possibility of regulatory capture cannot be
discounted. Ideally, e↵orts to harmonize NTMs and eliminate NTBs should be
conducted under the supervision of an independent review body. At the very
least, “independence” means that such a body has to be su ciently insulated
from both economic and political interests. This way, the danger of e↵orts to
review NTMs being influenced by vested interests would be minimized.
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In this vein, the underlying rationale and justifications of the existing NTMs
also need to be examined. While some NTMs may be motivated by protectionist
interests, others may be prompted by legitimate concerns, such as the protec-
tion of public health or the addressing of market failures. A narrow focus on
NTM incidence disregards the possible role played by these instruments in the
promotion of trade, i.e., in addressing information asymmetries by acting as a
signal of product and process quality. While there is no doubt that protectionist
NTBs needs to be eliminated, legitimate NTMs are a di↵erent matter.
E↵orts to address NTMs thus need to be more nuanced than mere simple com-
mitments to harmonize and improve the transparency of these measures, and to
reduce their number. For example, where NTMs which a↵ect the same product
groups have been issued by di↵erent government bodies, the review needs to go
beyond a determination that the NTMs were warranted. There is also a need
to check for obsolete, redundant, inconsistent, and overlapping NTMs. Where
NTMs have legitimate rationales, whether these measures are the most e↵ec-
tive, i.e., whether they do not entail unnecessary costs and burdens in order
to achieve their aims, should also be verified. The e↵ects of NTMs need to
be examined as even legitimate NTMs can become NTBs when they are ap-
plied in a discriminatory or improper manner. As such, the participation of
the private sector in the Member States’ e↵orts becomes indispensable. Cit-
izens, businesses and other non-governmental actors require more knowledge
and experience about the manner of application and e↵ects of NTMs. This
information would prove invaluable to Governments’ e↵orts to identify NTBs.
Consequently, the Member States need to work more closely with the private
sector in the review of NTMs and identification of NTBs.
While much work needs to be done at the national level, ASEAN itself still
has a significant role to play in this matter. As discussed in Chapter 2, the
region’s current legal framework has failed to provide the necessary focal points
for cooperation. ASEAN can remedy this by providing (i) specific guidelines
for the review of both existing and proposed NTMs, together with (ii) concrete
definitions of, and methods of identify NTBs. ASEAN can also take advantage
of its regional centrality by aiding in the flow of information. It is well-placed
to secure data, not only regarding Member States’ trade regimes, but also re-
garding their experiences in dealing with NTMs and NTBs. This information
could supplement the NTM database in the ASEAN Trade Repository, for the
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benefit of both the public and private sectors.
Chapter 2 ’s insights into the ASEAN enforcement systems also need to be ad-
dressed. These insights point to a need to strengthen the enforcement and dis-
pute settlement mechanisms in the region. One way of doing this is by shifting
away from the “ASEAN Way” of diplomatic and voluntary processes, towards
legally binding rules and enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, the region needs
a clearly defined and mandatory enforcement system which provides for bind-
ing sanctions and penalties in case of non-compliance or insu cient compliance.
This way, the Member States would have a forum where they could discuss both
existing and proposed NTMs, and identify any problematic measures. A legally
binding enforcement system would also ensures that, after due process, Member
States remove or modify problematic NTMs. ASEAN should also consider al-
lowing private individuals and entities to initiate enforcement proceedings. As
previously mentioned, the private sector has first-hand knowledge of the e↵ects
of NTMs, and can thus facilitate the identification of problematic NTMs.
Ultimately, given the nature of NTMs and the region’s goal to establish a unified
market, policy changes at both regional and national levels are needed.
5.3 Final Words
It is hoped that the insights offered by this thesis are enlightening and useful.
Nevertheless, in view of the broad and complex nature of NTMs, this thesis
can only really be considered to have scratched the surface of such a research
agenda.
This thesis has employed insights from compliance theories and the political
economy of protection, as well as correlation analyses, in order to address the
research questions. In order to gain a better understanding of the NTM in-
cidence in ASEAN, however, more empirical analyses would be required. In
particular, causation analysis would provide additional insights into the rela-
tionship between economic trends and political institutions on the one hand,
and NTM incidence on the other. Ideally, future empirical research would use
more finely-tuned political data, i.e., on electoral district sizes and lobbying ac-
tivities within the Member States, to glean a more thorough understanding of
the underlying mechanisms of trade policy. A deeper look into industry-specific
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trends, such as market shares and geographic concentration of firms, may also
generate nuanced insights into the link between structural changes and NTM
incidence. Future research could thus not only broaden the understanding of
NTMs and NTBs, but also provide policymakers with the information they need
to deal e↵ectively with these measures.
Another issue that requires further study is whether the Member States’ regu-
latory regimes are indeed significantly di↵erent. A high incidence of NTMs may
not adversely a↵ect intra-regional trade if the Member States are imposing the
same kinds of NTM on the same goods. This inquiry would entail a thorough
examination of the NTM regimes of the Member States. This, in turn, would
call for an analysis not only of the specific types of NTMs imposed on di↵erent
kinds of goods, but also of their substantive contents and requirements. If the
Member States’ NTM regimes are su ciently similar, then the region’s focus
on reducing NTMs might need to be reexamined. A clear picture of the cur-
rent state of the ASEAN NTM regime would also be needed in deliberations on
appropriate approaches to NTMs. For example, harmonization e↵orts may be
appropriate if the Member States’ regulatory regimes are dissimilar; otherwise,
mutual recognition agreements may su ce to achieve the region’s goals.
Due to this thesis’ limited scope, the region’s integration endeavours were taken
at face value. For example, the delegation of trade-related responsibilities, such
as the identification and removal of NTBs, from ASEAN to its Member States
was not examined. The e ciency of the region’s adapted methods, i.e., stan-
dards harmonization and the use of mutual recognition agreements, was also
beyond the scope of this research. The wisdom of including the region’s less de-
veloped Member States in the integration e↵orts, albeit at staggered schedules,
was also not examined. Issues such as these can be addressed within the frame-
work of the economics of federalism. This research agenda has the potential
to shed light on the e↵ectiveness of the region’s current institutional structure,
as well as to yield useful insights into both the design and implementation of
integration measures.
On a related note, future research could involve an in-depth look at how various
regional integration initiatives have tackled the issue of NTMs. The problem of
how to e↵ectively address NTMs is not an experience that is unique to ASEAN.
A comparative analysis of the e ciency of various regional attempts to deal with
NTMs, including those made by the European Union (EU) and the Southern
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Common Market (MERCOSUR), could yield some useful insights for the pur-
poses of future policy-making.
Finally, this thesis only considers the incidence of NTMs in ASEAN. Both the
stringency and the actual e↵ects of such NTMs are beyond the scope of this
study. Nevertheless, these are important issues. Future research could examine
how stringent and restrictive the Member States’ NTM regimes actually are,
by examining the substantive provisions vis-à-vis their underlying goals and
objectives. For example, quality measures would need to be compared against
a benchmark18 to determine whether the measures in place are unduly harsh.
A study of trade e↵ects requires the use of quantitative analyses such as price
comparisons, quantity impact assessments, gravity models, and general equilib-
rium models. The results of such analyses would illustrate the e↵ectiveness of
NTMs, either in addressing market failures or providing protection to certain
industries. These results may also shed light on whether the rising NTM inci-
dence is a↵ected by, or a response to, intra- or extra-ASEAN trade flows. These
insights can likewise supplement analyses of the political economy of trade pro-
tection, i.e., of policymakers’ use of NTMs as a source of rents. Lastly, this type
of data would provide guidance on whether the harmonization of NTMs would
indeed be beneficial for ASEAN, or whether it could prove costly for ASEAN’s
Member States.
This research agenda is timely and relevant, not just for ASEAN but for any
economy aiming at integration and the liberation of trade. As trade continues
to be a politically contentious topic, studies on the underlying mechanisms
of trade policy are undeniably valuable. This thesis aims to show whether
policy-making processes, at both regional and national levels, can benefit from
an interdisciplinary analysis of issues, such as that provided by the law and
economics framework. It is hoped that this thesis o↵ers useful insights into
both ASEAN’s integration e↵orts and the research agenda concerning NTMs.























































Industry-Level Frequency Ratios and Trade Indicators
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EX 0.110 0.834* 1.000
(1.000) (0.000)
IPR 0.396* 0.220 0.007 1.000
(0.000) (0.134) (1.000)




EX 0.256* 0.928* 1.000
(0.044) (0.000)
IPR 0.285* 0.437* 0.423* 1.000
(0.017) (0.000) (0.000)




EX 0.226 0.834* 1.000
(0.114) (0.000)
IPR 0.195 0.051 -0.196 1.000
(0.260) (1.000) (0.250)




EX 0.205 0.910* 1.000
(0.199) (0.000)
IPR 0.209 0.660* 0.456* 1.000
(0.181) (0.000) (0.000)




EX 0.314* 0.954* 1.000
(0.006) (0.000)
IPR 0.250 0.732* 0.785* 1.000
(0.055) (0.000) (0.000)




EX -0.008 0.818* 1.000
(1.000) (0.000)
IPR 0.332* 0.567* 0.310* 1.000
(0.003) (0.000) (0.007)
Industry-Level Frequency Ratios and Sectoral Value Added
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I -0.481* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.447* -0.813* -0.229* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.471* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.425* -0.813* -0.299* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.432* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.319* -0.813* -0.299* 1.000
(0.007) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.477* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.410* -0.813* -0.299* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.623* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.386* -0.813* -0.299* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.466* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.398* -0.813* -0.299* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)






















































































Product Group-Level Frequency Ratios and Unemployment Rates
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Product Group-Level Frequency Ratios and Trade Indicators




EX 0.094 0.516* 1.000
(1.000) (0.000)
IPR 0.420* 0.571* 0.328* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003)




EX 0.017 0.538* 1.000
(1.000) (0.000)
IPR 0.004 0.492* 0.223 1.000
(1.000) (0.000) (0.108)




EX -0.132 0.495* 1.000
(0.994) (0.000)
IPR 0.255* 0.731* -0.019 1.000
(0.040) (0.000) (1.000)




EX 0.406* 0.833* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
IPR 0.390* -0.116 -0.331* 1.000
(0.000) (1.000) (0.002)




EX 0.264* 0.917* 1.000
(0.030) (0.000)
IPR 0.222 0.371* 0.419* 1.000
(0.111) (0.000) (0.000)




EX 0.255* 0.912* 1.000
(0.040) (0.000)
IPR 0.258* 0.010 -0.091 1.000
(0.036) (1.000) (1.000)
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EX 0.340* 0.840* 1.000
(0.001) (0.000)
IPR 0.276* 0.423* 0.240 1.000
(0.019) (0.000) (0.064)




EX -0.324* 0.377* 1.000
(0.003) (0.000)
IPR -0.065 0.605* 0.053 1.000
(1.000) (0.000) (1.000)




EX 0.190 0.698* 1.000
(0.273) (0.000)
IPR -0.025 -0.284* -0.373* 1.000
(1.000) (0.015) (0.000)




EX 0.334* 0.729* 1.000
(0.002) (0.000)
IPR -0.102 0.133 0.019 1.000
(1.000) (0.970) (1.000)




EX 0.064 0.511* 1.000
(1.000) (0.000)
IPR 0.128 0.350* 0.062 1.000
(1.000) (0.001) (1.000)




EX 0.179 0.748* 1.000
(0.350) (0.000)
IPR 0.375* 0.273* -0.078 1.000
(0.000) (0.022) (1.000)
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EX 0.144 0.818* 1.000
(0.776) (0.000)
IPR 0.264* 0.878* 0.554* 1.000
(0.030) (0.000) (0.000)




EX 0.257* 0.918* 1.000
(0.038) (0.000)
IPR 0.183 0.642* 0.442* 1.000
(0.323) (0.000) (0.000)




EX 0.343* 0.962* 1.000
(0.001) (0.000)
IPR 0.282* 0.779* 0.824* 1.000
(0.016) (0.000) (0.000)




EX 0.434* 0.906* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
IPR 0.237 0.275* 0.138 1.000
(0.072) (0.020) (0.887)




EX 0.368* 0.963* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
IPR 0.265* 0.794* 0.750* 1.000
(0.029) (0.000) (0.000)




EX -0.032 0.821* 1.000
(1.000) (0.000)
IPR 0.370* 0.618* 0.397* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Appendix A. Spearman’s Correlation Analyses 181




EX 0.331* 0.504* 1.000
(0.004) (0.000)
IPR 0.169 0.823* 0.278* 1.000
(0.531) (0.000) (0.027)




EX -0.047 0.614* 1.000
(1.000) (0.000)
IPR 0.222 0.147 -0.265* 1.000
(0.113) (0.727) (0.028)




EX 0.080 0.661* 1.000
(1.000) (0.000)
IPR 0.195 0.813* 0.445* 1.000
(0.249) (0.000) (0.000)
Product Group-Level Frequency Ratios and Sectoral Value Added




I -0.306* -0.113 1.000
(0.011) (1.000)
S 0.612* -0.813* -0.229* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.467* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.276 -0.813* -0.299* 1.000
(0.030) (0.000) (0.014)
182 Appendix A. Spearman’s Correlation Analyses




I -0.475* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.442* -0.813* -0.229* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.509* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.431* -0.813* -0.299* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.486* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.425* -0.813* -0.229* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.486* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.411* -0.813* -0.299* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.514* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.401* -0.813* -0.229* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.538* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.308* -0.813* -0.299* 1.000
(0.010) (0.000) (0.014)
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I -0.450* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.359* -0.813* -0.229* 1.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.215 -0.113 1.000
(0.183) (1.000)
S 0.096 -0.813* -0.299* 1.000
(1.000) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.453* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.381* -0.813* -0.229* 1.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.370* -0.113 1.000
(0.001) (1.000)
S 0.369* -0.813* -0.299* 1.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.623* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.435* -0.813* -0.229* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.477* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.410* -0.813* -0.299* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)
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I -0.587* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.412* -0.813* -0.229* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.574* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.357* -0.813* -0.299* 1.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.541* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.415* -0.813* -0.229* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.465* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.440* -0.813* -0.299* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.379* -0.093 1.000
(0.001) (1.000)
S 0.396* -0.806* -0.308* 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)




I -0.479* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)
S 0.367* -0.813* -0.299* 1.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.014)
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I -0.757* -0.113 1.000
(0.000) (1.000)




B Independent Samples t-tests
Industry-Level Frequency Ratios and Electoral Rules
Table B.1: Animals, Plants, Food
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .648 .062 .352 .521 .775
Plurality 76 .919 .021 .184 .877 .961
combined 108 .839 .026 .274 .786 .891
di↵ -.271 .066 -.404 -.138
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -4.116
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 38.355
Table B.2: Chemicals, Chemical Products
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .414 .065 .368 .281 .547
Plurality 76 .786 .034 .295 .718 .853
combined 108 .675 .035 .360 .607 .744
di↵ -.372 .073 -.519 -.224
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -5.070
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 48.635
Table B.3: Light Manufactured Goods
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .632 .056 .320 .517 .748
Plurality 76 .729 .042 .370 .645 .814
combined 108 .701 .034 .357 .632 .769
di↵ -.097 .071 -.238 .044
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -1.373
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.174 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 67.120
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Table B.4: Metals, Metal Products
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .331 .071 .402 .187 .476
Plurality 76 .718 .047 .407 .625 .811
combined 108 .604 .042 .441 .520 .688
di↵ -.387 .085 -.557 -.217
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -4.552
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 58.993
Table B.5: Machineries
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .525 .061 .346 .400 .650
Plurality 76 .767 .038 .327 .692 .842
combined 108 .695 .034 .349 .629 .762
di↵ -.242 .072 -.386 -.098
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -3.374
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.001 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 55.506
Table B.6: Other Products
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .505 .059 .334 .384 .625
Plurality 76 .736 .039 .344 .657 .814
combined 108 .667 .034 .356 .599 .735
di↵ -.231 .071 -.373 -.089
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -3.251
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.002 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 59.909
Industry-Level Frequency Ratios and Forms of Government
Table B.7: Animals, Plants, Food
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .945 .011 .086 .923 .966
Presidential 44 .684 .055 .368 .572 .796
combined 108 .839 .026 .274 .786 .891
di↵ .261 .056 .147 .374
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 4.617
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 46.232
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Table B.8: Chemicals, Chemical Products
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .736 .040 .324 .655 .817
Presidential 44 .587 .059 .394 .468 .707
combined 108 .675 .035 .360 .607 .744
di↵ .149 .072 .006 .292
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 2.072
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.041 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 80.462
Table B.9: Light Manufactured Goods
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .665 .050 .402 .565 .765
Presidential 44 .752 .042 .276 .668 .836
combined 108 .701 .034 .357 .632 .769
di↵ -.087 .065 -.217 .042
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -1.340
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.183 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 105.999
Table B.10: Metals, Metal Products
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .642 .055 .442 .532 .753
Presidential 44 .548 .066 .439 .414 .681
combined 108 .604 .042 .441 .520 .688
di↵ .094 .086 -.077 .265
Ha : di↵ != 0 t =1.096
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.276 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 92.979
Table B.11: Machineries
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .787 .033 .260 .722 .852
Presidential 44 .562 .063 .416 .435 .688
combined 108 .695 .034 .349 .629 .762
di↵ .225 .071 .084 .366
Ha : di↵ != 0 t =3.189
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.002 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 65.979
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Table B.12: Other Products
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .698 .044 .353 .610 .786
Presidential 44 .623 .054 .359 .514 .732
combined 108 .667 .034 .356 .599 .735
di↵ .075 .070 -.064 .214
Ha : di↵ != 0 t =1.076
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.285 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 91.635
Product Group-Level Frequency Ratios and Electoral Rules
Table B.13: Live animals, edible animal products
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .745 .058 .326 .628 .863
Plurality 80 .886 .029 .257 .829 .944
combined 112 .846 .027 .284 .793 .899
di↵ -.141 .064 -.271 -.012
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -2.192
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.033 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 47.233
Table B.14: Live plants, edible plant products
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .644 .069 .391 .503 .785
Plurality 80 .866 .029 .263 .807 .924
combined 112 .802 .030 .319 .742 .862
di↵ -.221 .075 -.373 -.070
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -2.945
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.005 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 42.698
Table B.15: Animal or vegetable fats and oils
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .448 .072 .408 .301 .595
Plurality 80 .850 .032 .287 .786 .914
combined 112 .735 .035 .372 .665 .805
di↵ -.402 .079 -.561 -.242
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -5.085
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 43.763
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Table B.16: Edible preparations; beverages; tobacco
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .626 .069 .390 .486 .767
Plurality 80 .877 .033 .293 .811 .942
combined 112 .805 .032 .341 .741 .869
di↵ -.250 .076 -.404 -.097
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -3.281
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.002 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 45.714
Table B.17: Chemicals and Chemical Products
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .443 .063 .358 .314 .572
Plurality 80 .761 .035 .313 .692 .831
combined 112 .671 .034 .355 .604 .737
di↵ -.318 .072 -.463 -.173
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -4.398
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 50.920
Table B.18: Plastics and Rubber
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .316 .072 .407 .170 .463
Plurality 80 .689 .050 .447 .590 .789
combined 112 .583 .044 .466 .496 .670
di↵ -.373 .088 -.548 -.198
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -4.260
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 62.385
Table B.19: Skins and Leather
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .539 .060 .338 .417 .661
Plurality 80 .774 .030 .264 .715 .833
combined 112 .707 .029 .305 .650 .764
di↵ -.235 .067 -.369 -.101
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -3.525
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.001 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 46.924
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Table B.20: Wood Articles
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .582 .070 .395 .439 .724
Plurality 80 .747 .038 .343 .670 .823
combined 112 .699 .034 .365 .631 .768
di↵ -.165 .080 -.325 -.005
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -2.067
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.044 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 50.743
Table B.21: Pulp and Paper Articles
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .326 .075 .425 .173 .479
Plurality 80 .654 .047 .424 .560 .748
combined 112 .560 .042 .448 .476 .644
di↵ -.328 .089 -.506 -.151
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -3.699
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.001 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 57.108
Table B.22: Textiles
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .761 .068 .385 .622 .899
Plurality 80 .689 .046 .411 .598 .781
combined 112 .710 .038 .403 .634 .785
di↵ .071 .082 -.093 .236
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 0.871
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.388 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 60.827
Table B.23: Footwear, headgear, umbrellas
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .542 .052 .297 .435 .649
Plurality 80 .699 .037 .329 .626 .773
combined 112 .654 .031 .327 .593 .716
di↵ -.157 .064 -.285 -.029
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -2.457
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.017 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 63.016
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Table B.24: Stones, ceramics, glass
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .384 .071 .403 .239 .529
Plurality 80 .699 .047 .419 .606 .792
combined 112 .609 .041 .436 .527 .691
di↵ -.314 .085 -.485 -.144
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -3.693
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.001 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 59.250
Table B.25: Pearls and precious stones
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .660 .052 .296 .553 .767
Plurality 80 .682 .052 .461 .580 .785
combined 112 .676 .040 .419 .597 .754
di↵ -.023 .073 -.169 .124
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -0.307
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.760 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 87.782
Table B.26: Base metals
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .331 .071 .402 .187 .476
Plurality 80 .682 .048 .427 .588 .777
combined 112 .582 .042 .447 .498 .666
di↵ -.351 .086 -.522 -.180
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -4.102
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 60.429
Table B.27: Machinery
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .560 .065 .366 .428 .692
Plurality 80 .744 .039 .352 .665 .822
combined 112 .691 .034 .364 .623 .759
di↵ -.184 .076 -.335 -.032
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -2.428
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.019 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 55.304
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Table B.28: Vehicles
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .501 .056 .316 .387 .615
Plurality 80 .701 .046 .410 .610 .793
combined 112 .644 .037 .395 .570 .718
di↵ -.200 .072 -.344 -.056
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -2.770
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.007 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 73.735
Table B.29: Photographic instruments; medical instruments;
clocks, etc.; musical instruments
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .392 .066 .371 .258 .526
Plurality 80 .693 .041 .369 .611 .776
combined 112 .607 .037 .392 .534 .681
di↵ -.301 .077 -.456 -.146
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -3.892
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 56.884
Table B.30: Minerals, mineral products
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .612 .060 .339 .489 .734
Plurality 80 .716 .042 .379 .632 .801
combined 112 .686 .035 .370 .617 .756
di↵ -.105 .073 -.251 .042
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -1.423
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.160 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 63.476
Table B.31: Arms and ammunition
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .580 .073 .413 .431 .729
Plurality 71 .839 .031 .260 .777 .900
combined 103 .758 .033 .336 .693 .824
di↵ -.259 .079 -.419 -.099
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -3.268
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.002 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 42.488
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Table B.32: Miscellaneous items
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .408 .063 .359 .278 .537
Plurality 80 .662 .044 .395 .574 .750
combined 112 .590 .038 .401 .515 .665
di↵ -.255 .077 -.409 -.100
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -3.291
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.002 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 62.539
Table B.33: Art works and antiques
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Proportional 32 .551 .084 .474 .380 .721
Plurality 78 .824 .034 .300 .756 .891
combined 110 .744 .036 .378 .673 .816
di↵ -.273 .090 -.456 -.091
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -3.023
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.004 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 41.569
Product Group-Level Frequency Ratios and Forms of Government
Table B.34: Live animals, edible animal products
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .962 .004 .028 .955 .969
Presidential 48 .691 .055 .384 .580 .803
combined 112 .846 .027 .284 .793 .899
di↵ .271 .055 .159 .382
Ha : di↵ != 0 t =4.884
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 47.381
Table B.35: Live plants, edible plant products
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .932 .018 .147 .895 .969
Presidential 48 .629 .057 .398 .514 .745
combined 112 .802 .030 .319 .742 .862
di↵ .303 .060 .182 .424
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 5.020
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 56.653
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Table B.36: Animal or vegetable fats and oils
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .899 .021 .171 .856 .942
Presidential 48 .516 .065 .449 .386 .647
combined 112 .735 .035 .372 .665 .805
di↵ .383 .068 .246 .519
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 5.601
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 57.300
Table B.37: Edible preparations; beverages; tobacco
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .960 .007 .054 .946 .973
Presidential 48 .599 .064 .442 .471 .727
combined 112 .805 .032 .341 .741 .869
di↵ .361 .064 .232 .490
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 5.630
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 48.056
Table B.38: Chemicals and chemical products
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .762 .036 .290 .689 .834
Presidential 48 .549 .058 .399 .433 .665
combined 112 .671 .034 .355 .604 .737
di↵ .212 .068 .077 .348
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 3.122
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.003 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 82.040
Table B.39: Plastics and Rubber
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .646 .057 .459 .532 .761
Presidential 48 .498 .067 .466 .363 .634
combined 112 .583 .044 .466 .496 .670
di↵ .148 .088 -.028 .323
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 1.672
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.098 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 100.585
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Table B.40: Skins and leather
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .807 .027 .218 .752 .861
Presidential 48 .573 .051 .352 .471 .676
combined 112 .707 .029 .305 .650 .764
di↵ .233 .058 .118 .348
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 4.042
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 73.443
Table B.41: Wood articles
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .807 .039 .314 .728 .885
Presidential 48 .557 .055 .382 .446 .668
combined 112 .699 .034 .365 .631 .768
di↵ .250 .068 .115 .384
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 3.692
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 89.662
Table B.42: Pulp and paper articles
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .614 .057 .453 .501 .727
Presidential 48 .488 .063 .435 .362 .614
combined 112 .560 .042 .448 .476 .644
di↵ .126 .085 -.042 .293
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 1.488
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.140 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 103.566
Table B.43: Textiles
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .654 .053 .422 .549 .760
Presidential 48 .783 .053 .369 .676 .890
combined 112 .710 .038 .403 .634 .785
di↵ -.129 .075 -.277 .020
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = -1.720
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.088 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 107.363
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Table B.44: Footwear, headgear, umbrellas
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .694 .040 .323 .613 .774
Presidential 48 .602 .047 .328 .507 .697
combined 112 .654 .031 .327 .593 .716
di↵ .092 .062 -.032 .215
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 1.475
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.143 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 100.418
Table B.45: Stones, ceramics, glass
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .640 .057 .454 .526 .753
Presidential 48 .567 .059 .412 .448 .687
combined 112 .609 .041 .436 .527 .691
di↵ .072 .082 -.091 .235
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 0.882
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.380 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 106.034
Table B.46: Pearls and precious stones
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .735 .052 .418 .630 .839
Presidential 48 .597 .059 .412 .478 .717
combined 112 .676 .040 .419 .597 .754
di↵ .137 .079 -.020 .294
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 1.734
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.086 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 102.208
Table B.47: Base metals
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .642 .055 .442 .532 .753
Presidential 48 .502 .064 .447 .372 .632
combined 112 .582 .042 .447 .498 .666
di↵ .140 .085 -.028 .308
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 1.650
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.102 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 100.77
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Table B.48: Machinery
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .823 .029 .230 .766 .881
Presidential 48 .515 .062 .432 .389 .640
combined 112 .691 .034 .364 .623 .759
di↵ .309 .069 .172 .446
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 4.496
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 66.948
Table B.49: Vehicles
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .721 .044 .355 .632 .810
Presidential 48 .541 .061 .425 .418 .665
combined 112 .644 .037 .395 .570 .718
di↵ .180 .076 .029 .330
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 2.373
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.020 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 90.586
Table B.50: Photographic instruments; medical instruments;
clocks, etc.; musical instruments
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .688 .044 .352 .600 .776
Presidential 48 .500 .061 .421 .378 .622
combined 112 .607 .037 .392 .534 .681
di↵ .188 .075 .039 .337
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 2.504
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.014 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 90.565
Table B.51: Minerals, mineral products
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .725 .043 .345 .639 .811
Presidential 48 .635 .057 .398 .520 .751
combined 112 .686 .035 .370 .617 .756
di↵ .090 .072 -.053 .232
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 1.248
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.215 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 92.935
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Table B.52: Arms and ammunition
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .872 .030 .237 .813 .932
Presidential 39 .571 .062 .390 .444 .697
combined 103 .758 .033 .336 .693 .824
di↵ .302 .069 .163 .440
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 4.361
Pr(|T | > |t|)=0.000 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 55.292
Table B.53: Miscellaneous items
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .655 .049 .395 .556 .754
Presidential 48 .503 .057 .395 .388 .618
combined 112 .590 .038 .401 .515 .665
di↵ .152 .075 .002 .302
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 2.013
Pr(|T | > |t|)= 0.047 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 101.43
Table B.54: Art works and antiques
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Parliamentary 64 .857 .031 .249 .795 .919
Presidential 46 .587 .068 .465 .449 .725
combined 110 .744 .036 .378 .673 .816
di↵ .270 .075 .119 .420
Ha : di↵ != 0 t = 3.585
Pr(|T | > |t|)= 0.001 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 63.623
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Summary 
While various treaties and agreements have substantially reduced tariff rates on 
most traded goods, international trade is still burdened by restrictive laws and 
regulations. As a result, policymakers have shifted their focus to these non-tariff 
measures which have the potential to adversely affect trade flows. One such 
example   is   the  Association   of  Southeast  Asian  Nations’ (ASEAN) efforts to 
harmonize and reduce non-tariff measures, as well as eliminate non-tariff 
barriers, all of which are embodied in both treaty and soft law commitments. 
Nevertheless, these measures have persisted, and even increased, in ASEAN 
during the past decades.  
This thesis aims to shed light on the persistence of non-tariff measures in 
ASEAN. It begins with an analysis of the issues on compliance with, and 
effectiveness  of,  the  region’s  international  law  instruments  relating  to  non-tariff 
measures. The persistence of non-tariff measures may be due to the trade 
regime’s   inability to provide the Member States with sufficient incentives to 
comply with their obligations. Not only did the vaguely worded instruments fail 
to identify the focal points for cooperative behavior, but they also granted the 
Member States a wide scope of discretion with respect to the fulfillment of their 
commitments. In addition, the weaknesses in   the   region’s   trade   regime   and  
enforcement mechanisms undermined the effectiveness of other compliance 
mechanisms.  
As this persistence issue concerns the actions of States, it is also necessary to 
consider their underlying motivations. It is noteworthy that the persistence of 
non-tariff measures  coincided  with  significant  structural  changes  in  the  region’s  
economies. This begs the question of whether structural changes may explain 
the  Member  States’  demand  and  preferences  for  non-tariff measures. This thesis 
shows how these structural changes may have influenced the preferences of 
different actors in the Member States for non-tariff measures. For some Member 
States, their rising use of non-tariff measures may be due to an increased 
regulatory demand. As trade liberalization and globalization permitted the 
influx of imports, the resulting product heterogeneity created a demand for 
increased regulatory controls. In this context, non-tariff measures address 
market failures and externalities, such as by signaling and ensuring product 
quality. For others, however, the structural changes may have prompted 
declining sectors, particularly agriculture, to lobby for protection which came 
in the form of non-tariff measures.  
The last part of this thesis builds upon these insights and extends the analysis to 
an examination of the underlying determinants of trade policy in the region. 
Relationships between non-tariff measure incidence and various political and 
economic factors were examined to determine possible links between them, and 
the strength and direction of association, if any. The results indicate that 
economic factors, particularly sectoral trends, do matter. Sectoral economic 
trends influence societal preferences for trade policies. Additionally, the degree 
of political insulation and accountability may affect how governments respond 
to these societal preferences, as reflected in laws, policies, and regulations. 
In other words, non-tariff measures persist in ASEAN because its trade regime 
failed   to   overcome   the   policymakers’   interests   in   catering   to   the   societal  
preferences for different kinds of trade measures, which preferences resulted 





Hoewel tarieven over de meeste verhandelde goederen dankzij diverse 
verdragen en overeenkomsten aanzienlijk zijn verlaagd, wordt de internationale 
handel nog altijd geplaagd door beperkende wet- en regelgeving. Als gevolg 
daarvan zijn beleidsmakers zich gaan richten op deze non-tarifaire maatregelen, 
die een negatief effect kunnen hebben op handelsstromen. Een voorbeeld 
daarvan zijn de pogingen van de Associatie van Zuidoost-Aziatische Naties 
(ASEAN) om non-tarifaire maatregelen te harmoniseren en te verminderen en 
non-tarifaire belemmeringen te elimineren, die alle zijn vervat in zowel 
verdrags- als soft law-verplichtingen. Ondanks die pogingen zijn die non-
tarifaire maatregelen in ASEAN in de afgelopen decennia blijven bestaan. Ze 
zijn zelfs toegenomen.  
Het doel van dit proefschrift is het belichten van de aanhoudende non-tarifaire 
maatregelen in ASEAN. Het begint met een analyse van de problemen inzake 
conformiteit met, en effectiviteit van, de internationale instrumenten op het 
gebied van non-tarifaire maatregelen. Het voortduren van non-tarifaire 
maatregelen zou het gevolg kunnen zijn van het onvermogen van het 
handelsregime om de lidstaten voldoende prikkels te bieden om te voldoen aan 
hun verplichtingen. Niet alleen lieten de vaag verwoorde instrumenten na de 
focuspunten voor coöperatief gedrag te benoemen, ze boden de lidstaten ook 
een ruime beoordelingsvrijheid betreffende het nakomen van hun 
verplichtingen. Daarnaast ondermijnden de tekortkomingen van het 
handelsregime en de handhavingsmechanismen in het gebied de 
doeltreffendheid van andere nalevingsmechanismen.  
Aangezien dit aanhoudende probleem van invloed is op het gedrag van staten, 
moeten ook hun onderliggende beweegredenen worden bekeken. Het is 
opmerkelijk dat het aanhouden van non-tarifaire maatregelen samenliep met 
significante structurele veranderingen aangaande de economie in het gebied. 
Dat roept de vraag op of de lidstaten vanwege die structurele veranderingen 
behoefte aan en voorkeur voor non-tarifaire maatregelen hebben. Dit 
proefschrift toont hoe die structurele veranderingen er wellicht voor hebben 
gezorgd dat verschillende betrokkenen in de lidstaten de voorkeur geven aan 
non-tarifaire maatregelen. In sommige lidstaten is het toenemend gebruik van 
non-tarifaire maatregelen mogelijk toe te schrijven aan een grotere vraag naar 
regelgeving. Terwijl handelsliberalisatie en globalisering de instroom van 
import mogelijk maakte, creëerde de daaruit voortvloeiende 
productheterogeniteit de behoefte aan meer wettelijke controle. In dit opzicht 
pakken non-tarifaire maatregelen marktfalen en externaliteiten aan, 
bijvoorbeeld door productkwaliteit te signaleren en waarborgen. Aan de andere 
kant echter hebben de structurele veranderingen afnemende sectoren, met name 
de landbouw, er mogelijk toe aangezet te pleiten voor bescherming, wat leidde 
tot de non-tarifaire maatregelen.  
In het laatste deel van dit proefschrift wordt voortgebouwd op deze inzichten en 
wordt de analyse doorgetrokken naar een onderzoek van de onderliggende 
factoren van het handelsbeleid in het gebied. De verhouding tussen de incidentie 
van non-tarifaire maatregelen en diverse politieke en economische factoren is 
onderzocht om vast te stellen of er een verband tussen bestaat; en zo ja, wat de 
kracht en richting van dat verband is. Het resultaat duidt erop dat economische 
factoren, met name sectorale trends, zeker van belang zijn. Sectorale 
economische trends zijn van invloed op de maatschappelijke voorkeur voor een 
specifiek handelsbeleid. Daarnaast kan de mate van politieke isolatie en 
verantwoordelijkheid bepalen hoe overheden reageren op deze 
maatschappelijke voorkeur, zoals wordt weerspiegeld in wetten, beleid en 
regelgeving. 
Met andere woorden: non-tarifaire maatregelen blijven voortduren in ASEAN, 
omdat het handelsregime aldaar niet in staat is geweest het belang van de 
beleidsmakers om tegemoet te komen aan de maatschappelijke voorkeur (het 
resultaat van de structurele veranderingen in de afgelopen decennia) voor 
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